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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF COMMUNICATING A LOW PROBABILITY AND HIGH 
CONSEQUENCE RISK: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EARTHQUAKE PRE-CRISIS 
AND EMERGENCY-RISK COMMUNICATION  
 
The Crisis and Emergency-Risk Communication (CERC) model is effective in providing 
communication recommendations for public health agencies and shows potential for use 
by other agencies with similar crises characterizations. The current study explores the 
challenges of earthquake scientists in communicating earthquake risk during the pre-crisis 
stage in order to grasp experts’ experience and gain insight into the complexity of 
communicating earthquake risk. The researcher integrates the in-depth knowledge with the 
recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. This study employs 
qualitative interviewing with earthquake scientists (N = 21) from the Southern California 
Earthquake Center (SCEC). Categorized under general challenges, communication 
challenges, and communicating probability challenges, findings from this study indicate 
that earthquake scientists face eight unique challenges, such as communicating uncertainty, 
emphasizing their responsibility as solely hazard communicators, and keeping public 
attention during earthquake quiet periods. Implications for earthquake scientists during the 
pre-crisis stage of CERC are discussed and recommendations are provided. 
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earthquake forecasting, communicating uncertainty, hazard communication. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Earthquakes are complex crises that pose distinct communicatory challenges for 
scientists. An earthquake occurs when parts of the earth slip past one another (Wald, 2014). 
Earthquakes are unique from other natural disasters as they are unpredictable, usually occur 
in sequence, and are temporally and spatially variable (Mulargia & Geller, 2003). Given 
the nature of earthquakes, the communication environment is characterized by complexity, 
uncertainty, and time sensitivity. Such a phenomenon poses exceptional communication 
challenges for scientists tasked with communicating the probability of the event to occur 
to parties that lack such advanced and technical understanding of earthquakes.  
A similar communication environment has been illustrated by the Crisis and 
Emergency-Risk Communication (CERC) framework that essentially captures the essence 
of such crisis-events. CERC merges the areas of risk communication and crisis 
communication and is founded on the basis of temporal sensitivity. The researcher sees the 
potential of the recommendations provided by the framework in the context of earthquake 
communication. This study explores in-depth the communication challenges to be expected 
with earthquakes to aid earthquake scientists in crisis and emergency-risk communication 
during the pre-crisis stage where scientists play the largest role.  
Effective communication during the pre-crisis stage of crisis development is pivotal 
to preventing harm, yet there are immense barriers in this endeavor. While experts may be 
communicating probabilistic statements to stakeholders and the public, interpretation of 
those probability statements varies greatly as non-experts may have difficulty 
understanding risk in the formats provided by scientists, such as numbers (Slovic, 2010). 
Further, experts may prefer to receive their risk information in the form of a probabilistic 
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statement to increase their accurate interpretation of the risk, while non-experts would 
prefer their messages of risk in a more simplified and relevant form (Slovic, 2010; 
Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014).  
Imperative to effective risk communication during the earliest stages of crisis 
development is the realization that risk messages are being disseminated to various non-
technical audiences who will respond to the messages in variable ways based on their 
interpretation (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, & Littlefield, 2009). The issue is further 
problematized considering that less credible sources of information have been known to 
sway the public’s perception of the risk and increase public outrage (Sandman, 2012). Such 
was the case when Iben Browning made erroneous and unscientific predictions that a large 
magnitude earthquake would occur on the New Madrid Fault (Spence, Herrmann, 
Johnston, & Reagor, 1993). While researchers have come a long way in developing suitable 
and helpful crisis developmental stages, there is still a great deal of research that needs to 
be done in the initial stages of crisis development where risk is housed. The researcher 
seeks to better understand the experience of earthquake scientists, who provide expert 
opinion and technical information to non-expert audiences.  
Earthquake scientists were faced with the grave importance of pre-crisis 
communication following a devastating earthquake that struck L’Aquila, Italy in 2009. As 
a result of the earthquake disaster, six scientists and one public official were charged with 
multiple manslaughter. The scientists and public official were not blamed for inaccurate 
prediction of the earthquake, rather the Italian court found the scientists guilty on failing to 
appropriately communicate the risk information to the public. Although the scientists have 
since been acquitted of their charges, the event caused scientists world-wide to pay 
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attention. Dr. Thomas Jordan, lead seismological author of the comprehensive report 
written directly following the event, entitled Operational earthquake forecasting: State of 
knowledge and guidelines for utilization (from hereafter referred to as the ICEF final 
report), says the event was a failure “not of omission but of commission” (T. Jordan, 
speech, 2013). The scientists were charged with “providing civil authorities and the public 
with information that was ‘incomplete, imprecise, and contradictory’ about the nature, 
causes, and future developments of seismic hazards” (T. Jordan, speech, 2013).  
Following the eye-opening aftermath of the failed communication of the L’Aquila 
case, earthquake scientists proclaimed “the principles of effective public communication 
have been established by social science research and should be applied in communicating 
seismic hazard information” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 363). Earthquakes communication has 
largely been understudied by social scientists. Thus, reliable recommendations for 
communicating about earthquakes are sparse. Recommendations founded in 
Communication literature would enable earthquake scientists to follow the standards put 
in place by Communication scholars and aide them in their understanding and integration 
of effective communication in earthquake forecasting. The subsequent section further 
outline the rationale for this study. 
Rationale 
Of all human experiences, risk is one of the most complex and varied between 
individuals and across groups. Although risk is well-known to the human nature, part of 
the human existence, and fundamental to survival, individuals do not perceive risks the 
same (Slovic, 1987). For instance, while scientists have a more specialized understanding 
of a risk, allowing numbers and evidence to guide decision making, the lay public also 
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makes considerable contributions with their understanding of risk as they incorporate a 
richer and more contextually-based approach to the risk at-hand (Slovic, 2000). Human 
decision-making and risk perception differs based on various factors including previous 
experience with the risk, numeracy comprehension, comfortability with uncertainty, and 
feelings towards the risk. A commonly used definition of risk perception as “people’s 
beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social and cultural values 
and dispositions that people adopt, towards hazards and their benefits” (Lee & Jones, 2004, 
p. 25) alludes to the variability in humans’ interpretations and experiences with risk. Risk 
communication, thus, plays an imperative role in risk perception and subsequent action. 
The means by which risk is communicated – that is, the manner in which risk is discussed 
and presented - is the foci of risk management because risk perception is apt to change 
based on risk communication.  
A stark difference in risk perception particularly exists between experts and non-
experts (Sandman, 2012; Slovic, 2010). Experts are a person(s) perceived as attaining 
specialized understanding for the topic at-hand and who usually hold high social 
credibility. Experts are often asked to provide their judgements regarding a risk to non-
experts. Non-experts are a person(s) not perceived as attaining specialized understanding 
of the topic at hand and who do not hold high social credibility on the topic. Non-experts 
include the lay public, organizational stakeholders, and any interested parties. Researchers 
seek to understand how communication can improve between these two groups given the 
differences in their risk judgment experiences.  
Of all experts, earthquake scientists arguably face the most difficult risk 
assessment, judgement, and subsequent communication. Earthquake scientists are experts 
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on earthquakes and earthquake related topics and are inclusive of seismologists, geologists, 
earth scientists, and any other expert having knowledge and taking part in earthquake 
science, technology, and decision-making. The role of an earthquake scientist is to provide 
factually-based statements regarding the risk of an earthquake when providing predictions 
and issuing warnings; however, their role is proving to be increasingly more complex due 
to how non-experts may interpret earthquake scientists’ risk messages. Often the intended 
message is ‘lost in translation’ as non-experts may have difficulty interpreting earthquake 
scientists’ numerical representations of the earthquake risk. 
Communicating earthquake risk is a complex endeavor for experts because non-
experts may not have experience with earthquakes like they would with other natural 
disasters. Members of the lay public may compare earthquakes to other natural disasters 
with which they are more familiar such as tornadoes or snow storms (Nigg, 1982). Unlike 
other types of natural disaster forecasts, short-term earthquake forecasting yields extremely 
low probabilities, and higher probability forecasts are often delivered in a 30-year 
timeframe. Nigg (1982) asserts, “While it may be possible for individuals to take greater 
precaution during this lengthy period, it may also be more difficult to keep people’s 
attention aroused for any extended period of time” (p. 28). Thus, earthquake scientists face 
exceptional difficulty in conveying accurate and appropriate messages to non-experts 
surrounding earthquake risk.  
  Earthquakes are increasing in frequency due in part to man-made practices, such as 
the injection of wastewater in hydraulic fracturing, also known as “fracking,” and deep 
mining (Petersen et al., 2016). There is an increased need for better understanding how to 
communicate about these large-scale events with potentially fatal outcomes for the 
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communities affected. Specifically, better understanding of the complexity of earthquake 
forecasting and the experiences of scientists and other technical experts who are providing 
risk communication surrounding these events is imperative and timely.  
The CERC model (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012) is a widely used and reputable model 
that emerged as a means by which to understand and guide communicatory response during 
the crisis life cycle. The model has been used extensively by both scholars and practitioners 
to illustrate communication expectations throughout the lifecycle of a crisis. Veil, 
Reynolds, Sellnow, and Seeger (2008) assert that CERC is not a theory per se, but a 
beneficial framework of risk and crisis communication perspectives. As the framework has 
been mostly used in the context of public health, the model would benefit from application 
in other contexts and further development. 
CERC originally emerged in the public health context as a call from the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) for better management during public health emergencies. “CERC 
was developed as a tool to educate and equip public health professional for the expanding 
communication responsibilities of public health in emergency situations” (Veil et al., 2008, 
p. 27s). Reynolds (2002) asserts that risk communication and crisis communication should 
be integrated in response to the CDC’s call that health communication must be tactical, 
broad-based, receptive, and conditional on crisis type. Since its inception, CERC has been 
used in a variety of public health contexts including the water contamination crisis in West 
Virginia (Manuel, 2014); the influenza pandemic (Reynolds & Quinn, 2008); and building 
capacity and resiliency for minority populations (Quinn, 2008). The manner in which 
CERC has thus far been utilized is largely within the context of public health. Thus, 
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conceptualizing CERC within the earthquake risk context will be appropriate and necessary 
to understanding CERC’s wingspan and utility. 
Experts play an important role throughout the lifecycle of a crisis, however their 
expertise is most vital during the pre-crisis stage. During the pre-crisis stage is when 
experts are discussing the earthquake risk with one another and choosing how and what to 
say to stakeholders and the public. Experts can act as communication leaders helping to 
facilitate the communication needs of CERC. Reynolds and Seeger (2005) highlight eight 
facilitation aspects of the pre-crisis stage, namely: (1) monitoring and recognition of 
emerging risks; (2) general public understanding of risk; (3) public preparation for the 
possibility of an adverse event; (4) changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm; 
(5) Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat, such as evacuation notices, 
take shelter warnings, product recalls, etc.; (6) alliances an cooperation with agencies, 
organizations, and groups; (7) development of consensual recommendations by experts and 
first-responders; and (8) message development and testing for subsequent stages. The pre-
crisis stage is pivotal during the life-cycle of the crisis because it is the stage experts, as 
communication leaders, can play the largest role in preparing and educating the public and 
providing warning messages so that individuals have time to take the appropriate measures 
to protect themselves. Currently, earthquake communicators do not adhere to a 
communicative guide based on the principles of effective communication for earthquake 
risk communication.  
The aim of the current study is to explore the complexities earthquake scientists 
face in communicating earthquake risk during the pre-crisis stage of crisis and emergency-
risk communication. Such exploration seeks to grasp earthquake scientists’ complex and 
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multifaceted experience of communicating about earthquakes, and combine and make 
usable the in-depth knowledge with the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. This study 
employs qualitative in-depth interviewing with earthquake scientists (N = 21) to understand 
the current challenges they perceive in communicating technical and probabilistic 
statements to diverse publics including the lay public and stakeholders. In an effort to meet 
these objectives, the researcher answered the following research questions:  
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face 
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC? 
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they 
face in communicating with non-experts? 
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with 
communicating probability to non-experts? 
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with 
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Earthquake risk is increasing as humans extract natural resources and subsequently 
face environmental consequences. Technological advances in communication help to 
reduce per capita earthquake risk, however little is known about the challenges experts 
experience in communicating such technical and intricate information to non-expert 
audiences. As earthquake communication is similar to the environment in which CERC 
describes, the researcher sees the potential of CERC as a useful tool for earthquake 
scientists providing recommendations for communication during the pre-crisis stage and 
helping to facilitate earthquake communication. A literature review ensues on the current 
state of earthquake forecasting; the CERC model; communication leadership inherent to 
CERC; and expert and non-expert risk perception and communication. 
The Current State of Earthquake Forecasting 
According to the ICEF final report, “earthquake forecasting and prediction involve 
statements about the location, time, and magnitude of future fault raptures” (Jordan et al., 
2011, p. 325). Earthquakes commonly occur closely in time and space as earthquake 
“clusters” or sequences. A main shock is the term for the biggest earthquake to occur in an 
earthquake sequence. Foreshocks are the earthquakes that occur prior to the main shock 
and aftershocks are the earthquakes that occur after the main shock. Background seismicity 
cannot be set apart from the individual events in a sequence, although they are unrelated to 
the main shock. “Background seismicity can add considerable uncertainty to the process 
of delimiting of foreshock and aftershock sequences in space and time, as can the 
overlapping of seismic sequences” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 325). Almost all big earthquakes 
are followed by aftershocks, and “the number of aftershocks is observed to increase 
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exponentially with the magnitude of the main shock, and the aftershock rate is observed to 
decrease approximately inversely with time” (p. 326). It is only in retrospect that scientists 
are able to identify the earthquakes for what they are in the sequence. 
Mulargia and Geller (2003) argue earthquake prediction can be defined four 
different ways and say, “The absence of a clear and agreed-upon definition is one of the 
main reasons for the lack of consensus on earthquake predictability within the scientific 
community” (p. 14). The first definition they offer for prediction they call the ‘time 
independent hazard.’ Earthquake scientists who use this definition view earthquakes as 
random events in time and use existing knowledge on typical earthquake locations and 
typical frequencies to narrow future long-term seismic hazard. The second definition, 
called the ‘time-dependent hazard,’ assumes that earthquakes occur due to rifts in the 
Earth’s crust induced by tectonic strain. As such, earthquake scientists who use this 
definition of earthquake prediction believe earthquakes can be calculated as a function of 
time.  The third definition earthquake scientists employ is the ‘forecast’ definition. This 
definition implies that “earthquakes are probabilistically predictable at medium and short 
term with better than random accuracy due to their tendency to cluster in time and space” 
(Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 15). The final conceptualization of prediction is known as the 
‘deterministic prediction.’ Deterministic prediction most closely mirrors the type of 
prediction CERC requires. Earthquake scientists employing this conceptualization attempt 
to provide predictions based on “high accuracy and reliability in size, location and time, so 
that drastic actions such as evacuations can take place” (p. 15). However, the authors 
caution, “It is widely accepted that such predictions are presently impossible, since 
physical models of earthquakes are lacking and since reliable, unambiguous empirical 
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earthquake precursors have never been identified” (p. 15). Thus, a great deal of uncertainty 
is inherent to current earthquake forecasting methods. 
Messages about the potential of an earthquake always carry a weight of uncertainty 
because they are based upon the probability of the event to occur. Probability inherently 
implies uncertainty. Jordan et al. (2011) assert, “Because uncertainty is expressed in terms 
of probabilities, both deterministic predictions and probabilistic forecasts need to be stated 
and evaluated using probabilistic concepts” (p. 328). The probability of an earthquake to 
occur is almost never zero because natural variability in the system behavior includes 
aleatory uncertainty that occurs when, for instance, conditions of the system change often 
from additional information being added to the system. For example, say the authors, a 
forecast based on long-term seismicity rates would produce a 0.01% chance of an 
earthquake to occur, while another forecast with the same information but with some 
additional information, such as recent foreshocks, would yield a probability of 1%. Thus, 
both probability gain and information gain can occur despite that absolute probabilities 
remain low. Epistemic uncertainties highlight these validity errors that occur in the 
forecasting method (Jordan et al., 2011). 
A difficult task with earthquake prediction is the decision of casting an alarm. 
According to Jordan et al. (2011), there are two approaches to making the decision of 
casting an alarm. The first is to find a diagnostic signal to predict the earthquakes or “to 
identify a diagnostic precursor that ensures with high probability that a target event will 
occur in a specific domain” (p. 328). The authors say, however, “the search for a diagnostic 
precursor has so far been unsuccessful” (p. 328). The second approach to casting an alarm 
of prediction is through examination of the probabilistic forecasts. Alarms are cast based 
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on probabilities rising above the advised threshold for alarm, however, such thresholds are 
seldom reached because short term forecasting probabilities remain extremely low. 
Therefore, the authors assert, “such predictions always contain less information than the 
forecasts from which they were derived” (p. 328).  
The quality of an earthquake prediction is assessed primarily through reliability and 
skill. Reliability refers to how well the model’s results match the observed frequency of 
forecasted events. Skill refers to the accuracy of one forecasting method over another. 
Often errors occur in the evaluation of the method quality. Predictions are stated generally 
and qualitatively because “they are more likely to be found reliable just by chance” (p. 
329). Jordan et al. (2011) caution this approach and advise determining operational fitness 
or the methods quality and its consistency and value to decision makers when making 
predictions. Jordan et al. (2011) say that earthquake forecasts should consist of two key 
components: (1) earthquake advisory which is expressed in terms of the probability of the 
threat, and (2) set procedures that institute how probability should be translated into action 
and preparedness (Jordan et al., 2011). The authors further advise that statements should 
translate the inherent uncertainty in probability forecasts asserting, “Probabilistic 
forecasting provides a more complete description of prospective earthquake information 
than deterministic prediction” (p. 328).  
The decision of casting an alarm based on low probability is complicated by the 
economic consequences of a false alarm. As short-term forecasts consist of very low 
probabilities, many question the usefulness of such information (Wang & Rogers, 2014). 
The debate over OEF has spawned the question: when is the probability of an earthquake 
too small to communicate? Marzocchi, Iervolino, Giorgio, and Falcone (2015) argue that 
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instead of asking when the probability of an earthquake is too small, the area of interest 
should be the expected loss from the generated probabilities. They argue that “a 
comparison of such a risk metric with some risk thresholds for individuals and/or for 
communities may help in understanding whether the risk is tolerable or not, and in choosing 
the optimal risk management decision” (p. 1674).  
In their endeavor, Marzocchi et al. (2015) utilized OEF with another tool called 
Operational Earthquake Loss Forecasting (OELF) during a two year period in Italy. OELF 
converts OEF into a risk assessment using a specific standard such as collapsed buildings, 
displaced persons, number of injured persons, and fatality rates. The authors found 
“probabilities of a large earthquake, as derived from short-term clustering models, may 
lead to individual risk of death is comparable or above a threshold taken from the literature, 
beyond which the risk may be considered intolerable” (p.1677). Given their two-year 
observance, the authors’ results support the basic idea that seismic risk assessment includes 
more than a probability statement. Rather, the probability must be paired with expected 
loss. Communicating just the hazard is more limiting than communicating the hazard and 
the expected loss because the hazard alone “does not allow (1) direct comparison with other 
risks and (2) any kind of cost-benefit analyses” (p. 1677). The authors acknowledge, 
however, that developing plans to manage unacceptable seismic risk is a challenge of its 
own, beyond the scope of their current study, and requires the aid of experts in risk 
communication.  
Considerations should be made regarding the vulnerability to hazards and disasters 
(Nelson, 2014). Vulnerability denotes the manner in which a hazard or disaster will affect 
human life and infrastructure. Vulnerability to hazards and disasters include one’s vicinity 
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to a hazard, population density in the area closest to the event, scientific comprehension of 
the hazard, public education and cognizance of the hazard, the extent of existence of early-
warning systems and modes of communication, availability and readiness of emergency 
infrastructure, construction styles and building codes, and cultural dynamics that influence 
public reaction to warnings (Nelson, 2014). Tiedemann (1994), too, outlines the cost-
benefit considerations related to earthquakes. His method and analysis, rather novel at the 
time, involved thorough stocktaking, conducting a vulnerability analysis and analyzing 
cost-benefit considerations. Tiedemann (1994) finds cost-benefit-conscious risk 
optimization is the most significant gain when socio-economic consequences are weighed. 
The author goes on to note, “it is evident that relying on the presently available earthquake 
building codes is not sufficient to judge and minimize the impact of an earthquake on 
society also because direct and indirect earthquake damage are not considered” (p. 6712).   
This section detailed the current state of earthquake forecasting. In general, the 
current state of earthquake forecasting creates a communication environment that is 
characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and temporal sensitivity. Such a communication 
environment has been illustrated by CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). A review of the 
nature of crises and the CERC framework follows.   
The Nature of Crises 
The nature of crises are too complex to neatly describe and define. Crises are 
difficult to understand because they are unpredictable, vary based on the players involved, 
and are problematic to conceptualize and operationalize. Many risk and crisis researchers 
provided definitions and approaches to studying crises (e.g., see Coombs, 2007; Fink, 
1986). Researchers’ conceptualizations of crises converge on the idea that crises can vary 
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in nature and are indiscriminate to context. That is, crises are considered to be anything 
from small-scale organizational mishaps and issues to larger-scale natural disaster and 
terrorist events (Coombs, 1999). As large-magnitude earthquakes have the potential to 
destroy buildings, lead to fatalities, and cause economic standstill, earthquake crisis is 
characterized as a large-scale crisis event.  
There are three different types of crises as conceptualized by Parsons (1996). 
Immediate crises are those that are sudden and leave the organization with little to no time 
to prepare and provide warning. Emerging crises develop slower and allow the 
organization time to prepare enabling organizations to mitigate negative effects. Finally, 
sustained crises are those that linger for long periods of time, lasting weeks, months, or 
years. Crises have been conceptualized differently and, thus, crisis response is dependent 
on such conceptualizations. Generally, however, the strategies to cope with crises vary 
based on time pressure, extent of perceived control, and magnitude of the crisis (Burnett, 
1998). Risk and crisis researchers have established stage models to help better understand 
and manage crises.   
Stage Models of Risks and Crises 
Although there are different types of crises such as environmental, technological, 
organizational, cyber, and chemical, all crises are theorized to develop in characteristic 
stages (Benoit, 1995; Fink, 1986; Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The lifecycle of a crisis is 
best characterized by Fink’s (1986) definition as the “anatomy” of a crisis (p. 20). Fink 
(1986) was among the pioneers of addressing the importance of crisis management, and he 
saw the lifecycle of a crisis – or the breakdown of how a crisis unfolds – as the crux of 
crisis management. After Fink, other scholars developed their own crisis stage models (see 
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Benoit, 1995, Smith, 1990, Mitroff, 1994, Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Stage models help 
communicators anticipate the information needs of stakeholders and the lay public 
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). 
Sellnow and Seeger (2013) assert three assumptions of all stage models. First, 
models take a developmental approach to crisis, meaning that certain actions taken, as 
prescribed by the model, will result in certain outcomes. Second, models are created 
through constant analysis of actual former crises whereby researchers take a grounded 
theoretical approach to understanding crisis phenomena. Lastly, the stage models suggest 
that social phenomena is ordered by, reliant on, and sensitive to time, and thus characterize 
time as an inherent property of crisis development.  
Stage models are useful for both researchers and practitioners of risks and crises. 
Stage models outline the lifecycle of a crisis and provide guidance to risk and crisis 
managers on what strategies to employ at the various stages (Ritchie, 2003). Further, these 
models equip organizations with knowledge of how a crisis unfolds so that they can prevent 
the crisis from moving onto the next stage, use the information to create more effective 
crisis communication plans to reduce the impact of potential crises, or prevent the crisis 
altogether (Ritchie, 2003). Social scientists have addressed the importance of effective 
communication to crisis management in their models, however, no stage models have 
placed their concentration on communication as has CERC.   
A Communication Focused Model: CERC 
A comprehensive, communication focused, and reputable crisis life cycle model 
amongst practitioners and researchers is the CERC model (Reynolds, 2002; Reynolds and 
Seeger, 2012). CERC emerged after the September 11th terrorist attacks and the anthrax 
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scare, providing a crisis plan specifically focused on communication strategies (Sellnow & 
Seeger, 2013). CERC is best characterized for prioritizing communication throughout the 
lifecycle of the crisis. While several crisis cycle models exist (e.g., Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 
1994; Smith, 1990), none focus exclusively on communication strategies during the crisis 
life cycle as does CERC. Thus, this framework is particularly useful during crisis events 
because it places communication as priority during a crisis above all else.  Just as the crisis 
moves through stages, the communication should too. The phases of the crisis models let 
the communicator know what to expect so that he or she can effectively deal with the 
media, stakeholders, and general public (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012).  
CERC Merges the Communication Areas of Risk and Crisis 
CERC is different from other crisis life-cycle models because it merges risk 
communication and crisis communication. Reynolds and Seeger (2005) argue, while the 
communication domains of risk communication and crisis communication are usually 
discussed and applied separately, the anthrax crisis brought about new forms of 
understanding communication to the public. Specifically, anthrax was a case where risk 
was continuously pending and time for risk assessment and discussion was limited, and, 
yet, public relations were necessary. In this sense, both risk communication and crisis 
communication were of upmost importance to manage simultaneously.  
Risk communication is an exchange about potential outcomes, including the 
probabilities of outcomes occurring, and it is used to help people make decisions (Reynolds 
& Seeger, 2012). Risk communication involves scanning the environment for potential 
threats, discussion amongst experts, persuading the public about the risk and making 
healthy decisions, producing warning messages, and providing post event 
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recommendations. Risk communication “facilitates decision making and risk sharing” 
(Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 45), and one of the primary goals of risk communication is 
informing the public so that they can make better decisions (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).   
Emergencies provide a communication environment that is temporally hyper-
sensitive and intended to keep the public informed in order to protect the health and safety 
of the populace and the environment. During emergencies there is a heightened sense of 
fear, uncertainty, and urgency present as the event is largely unexpected. Communication 
is useful in helping to reestablish public trust in the organization’s ability to manage the 
event (Veil et al., 2008). Crises by their very nature create an environment of chaos and 
may have a devastating effect on the public’s psychological, emotional, physical, and 
economic well-being (Seeger & Reynolds, 2007). Consequently, communication is a 
pivotal component of emergency response (Veil, 2007).  
A crisis is an unusual occurrence that cannot be foreseen but can be expected 
(Coombs, 2010). Specifically, Coombs (2010) honors the role that stakeholders play in co-
creating the meaning of a crisis and says a crisis is “the perception of an unpredictable 
event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an 
organization’s performance and generate negative outcome” (Coombs, 2007, p. 2-3). 
Following suit, crisis communication is “the collection, processing, and dissemination of 
information required to address a crisis situation” (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Crisis 
Communication has more public relations elements interwoven. Compared with risk 
communication, crisis communication is more time sensitive. The purpose of crisis 
communication is to “prevent or lessen the negative outcomes of a crisis and thereby 
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protect the organization, stakeholders, and/or industry from damage” (Coombs, 1999, p. 
4).  
CERC is founded in risk and crisis communication principles and grounded theory 
approaches (Veil et al., 2008). Although CERC is not considered a theory per se, it is a 
useful framework for understanding the communication environment of ongoing crisis 
events. CERC was developed through constant analysis of past risks and crises and, as 
such, places significant weight on lessons learned. Further, paradigmatically, this particular 
framework provides both breadth and depth of risk and crisis phenomena. Reynolds and 
Seeger (2013) say that the model provides a complete and interwoven approach to risk and 
crisis.  
Reflecting on the manner in which scholars have positioned CERC in the literature, 
two primary approaches are noted. First, CERC is positioned in the literature for its utility 
to practitioners (e.g., see Reynolds et al., 2007; Ritchie, 2003) and, thus, is discussed either 
retrospectively or prospectively. Retrospectively, scholars discuss how the model was 
applied and focus on the logistics of the model, and emergency-risk response. When 
scholars discuss the model prospectively, they discuss how the model can be applied, 
focusing on crisis planning. Second, CERC is positioned in the literature as a theoretical 
discussion (e.g., see Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Veil et al., 2008). Although CERC is not a 
theory per se, scholars have written about the crisis and emergency-risk environment, its 
characterizations, the benefits of blending risk communication and crisis communication, 
and the communication needs such an environment elicits. This study discusses CERC 
prospectively and positions CERC as a helpful framework for earthquake scientists to 
determine the needs of the disparate publics. 
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Propositions of CERC 
Veil et al. (2008) expanded on CERC to include six propositions of the model. First, 
Veil et al. (2008) say that “risks and crises are equivocal and uncertain conditions that 
create specific information needs and deficiencies” (p. 31s). Second, the authors assert, 
“Ongoing, two-way communication activities are necessary for the public, agencies, and 
other stakeholders to make sense of uncertain and equivocal situations and make choices 
about how to manage and reduce the threat(s) to their health” (p. 31s). Third, 
“Communication processes (channels, needs, information, etc.) will change dramatically 
as a risk evolves into a crisis introducing new risks and as a crisis evolves to post crisis and 
recovery” (p. 31s). Fourth, say the authors, “Risk and crisis communication are highly 
interrelated such that risk messages before a crisis occurs influence perceptions, 
expectations and behavior after a crisis erupts. In turn, these crisis responses then influence 
subsequent risk messages” (p. 31s). Fifth, “Communication is consequential to specific risk 
and crisis management outcomes by promoting self-efficacy” and, lastly, the authors say, 
“Risks and crises affect a wide variety of publics with variable needs, interests and 
resources, which in turn impacts their communication capacities, needs and activities” (p. 
31s). 
CERC is a Five-Stage Model 
The CERC model has five phases, namely: pre-crisis, initial, maintenance, 
resolution, and evaluation. Although this study focuses specifically on the pre-crisis stage, 
the researcher believes it important to first provide a brief synopsis of all stages so that a 
more complete understanding of the model is formed. The pre-crisis phase is regarded as 
the incubation stage (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The focus of the pre-crisis stage is 
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effective risk communication. The second stage of the CERC model, the initial phase, is 
when the crisis actually occurs. During this time, the CERC model would recommend that 
spokespersons communicate with empathy, being sure to provide messages particular to 
the victims of the crisis. Further, during this phase, communication should be simple and 
the focus should be to reduce stakeholder and public uncertainty by providing messages of 
self-efficacy and information about what is known about how and why the crisis occurred. 
The maintenance phase encourages that spokespersons be active in continuing to 
communicate with the public and stakeholders reassuring these audiences about the 
strategies that have been employed to improve the situation. Listening to stakeholder 
concerns, feedback, and advice is also pivotal during this time, and during this stage is 
when the public should be educated about the risks (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). The 
resolution phase is when new understandings to the risk are provided. Specifically, during 
this phase, communication should be reflective on approaches taken and persuade the 
public towards new policies implemented as a result. Communication emphasizing future 
strength, renewal, and reinforcing the organization’s identity are key during the resolution 
phase. Lastly, the evaluation phase occurs when the social buzz around the crisis has 
calmed and all response strategies to the crisis have been taken. During the evaluation 
phase, the organization reflects on the crisis in order to learn and strengthen their crisis 
plan for the future. Stakeholders, as well, reflect on the crisis and ways in which they were 
impacted in order to prevent or reduce such consequences on their organization in the 
future. For the complete model, please refer to Appendix A. 
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The pre-crisis stage.  
The pre-crisis stage is dedicated to preparing for crisis response through 
communication and education campaigns. CERC is built on the premise that effective and 
timely communication strategies are pivotal to crisis management. Pre-crisis messages 
should provide information of the potential crisis, ways to prepare, and persuade the public 
and stakeholders of the risk and encourage appropriate self-protection actions if the risk 
were to manifest. Statements of probability from experts are provided most often during 
the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model as the risk has yet to manifest. According to the 
model, communicators should be prepared by facilitate a host of responses during this 
stage. Table 2-1 provides the pre-crisis stage of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  
Table 2-1 
Stage I of the Working Model of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 52)    
Communication and education campaigns targeted to facilitate:        
 
• Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks 
• General public understanding of risk  
• Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event 
• Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy) 
• Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat 
• Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups 
• Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders 
• Message development and testing for subsequent stages 
             
During the pre-crisis stage, CERC recommends organizations take action in some pivotal 
ways (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Specifically, the model recommends that organizations 
outline the types of disasters they are likely to face. In doing so, they can better 
conceptualize the threat they face. Second, organizations are recommended to anticipate 
and develop preliminary answers to questions. Third, organizations should draft initial 
messages. These messages do not need to be perfect as specific details can be filled later 
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when more information is known. Fourth, the model suggests that organizations identify 
spokespersons, resources, and resource mechanisms well ahead of time. Fifth, 
organizations should practice following the response plan and refine the plan as needed. 
Sixth, organizations are encouraged to foster alliances and partnerships to ensure that 
experts are speaking in a coordinated manner (using one voice). Lastly, the model 
recommends that organizations develop and test communication systems and networks. 
Reynolds and Seeger (2012) also outline negative events that can occur during crisis and 
emergency-risk communication. Difficulties during crisis and emergency-risk 
communication include (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012, p. 15): 
 Demands for unnecessary treatment  
 Needless social and organizational disruption  
 Disorganized and occasionally destructive group behavior  
 Bribery and fraud  
 Reliance on special relationships for favors and treatment 
 Increased drug, alcohol, and tobacco use 
 Increased multiple unexplained physical symptoms 
 Unreasonable trade and travel restrictions 
 Loss of agency credibility and lower levels of government trust. 
The authors assert that effective communication can buffer these trials. The aim of this 
study seeks to uncover challenges unique to earthquake scientists as they face of the most 
trying crisis and emergency-risk environments, earthquakes. 
Reynolds and Seeger (2012) assert that during the pre-crisis stage is when 
communication objectives should target information dissemination, provide effective 
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warning messages, and create education campaigns in order to inform the public and the 
response community of the present risk. Some of the main roles of the communicators and 
experts during this time are to “provide warning messages regarding and imminent threat” 
and “develop and test communication systems and networks” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). 
Other important roles during this time include finding effective ways to communicate the 
same message multiple ways in order to serve diverse audiences (Sellnow, Ulmer, Seeger, 
& Littlefield, 2009).  
Experts’ messages of probability are most relevant to the pre-crisis phase of the 
CERC model.  Risk and crises are interrelated (Veil et al., 2008), so naturally risk 
communication is relevant to every stage of the crisis models because risk is always present 
(Sellnow & Seeger, 2012). Risk communication is most relevant, however, to the earliest 
stage of a crisis because experts and practitioners have the chance to use communication 
strategies to prevent the crisis, prepare the lay public, and mitigate the consequences of the 
crisis. Moreover, during the pre-crisis stage of a crisis are when people are seeking to 
relieve their uncertainty regarding the risk and, thus, turning to experts for more 
information. Risk messages presented before the crisis greatly influence publics and 
stakeholders’ perceptions, expectations, and actions (Veil et al., 2008).  
CERC assumes that the person or persons using this framework in practice are in 
positions of leadership. The model is tailored for use by risk and crisis communicators who 
act as leaders. With the responsibility of communicating earthquake hazard and risk to 
others, earthquake scientists become communication leaders. A literature review of crisis 
and emergency-risk communication leadership ensues.  
25 
 
Crisis and Emergency-Risk Communication Leaders 
Leadership is an underlying premise of CERC. A crisis is an unexpected event 
which dramatically shifts old perspectives, approaches, and ways of doing that existed in 
the previous system. A crisis is also socially constructed through messages; that is, a crisis 
in-and-of itself is not a crisis until it is perceived, agreed upon, and voiced as one (Venette, 
2008). So, leaders, or those persons whose voices are heard, listened to, and valued, play a 
key role in how a crisis is perceived and subsequently handled. Stemming from Ulmer, 
Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2015) definition, leadership during risk and crisis is a process in 
which a person or persons are able to manage uncertainty inherent to risk and crisis, and 
use appropriate communication strategies towards diverse groups and publics to achieve 
their goals and complete tasks. Effective leadership becomes crucial during times of risk 
and crisis because uncertainty abounds. 
 Reynolds (2004) assert that crises change the way in which leaders should 
communicate with their publics. Natural disasters create a unique social environment, and, 
thus, the manner in which leaders typically communicate with their community will likely 
be different during crisis events (Reynolds, 2002). During crises, the public desires that 
leaders explain what they know (Reynolds, 2004). Via effective communication, leaders 
can help to mitigate the negative consequences of such large-scale events by providing 
appropriately tailored instructional and supportive messages. Reynolds (2004) assert, “As 
a leader in a crisis you can have a real, measurable effect on the wellbeing of your 
community through the words you say and the speed and sincerity with which you say 
them” (p. 4).  
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 Reynolds (2004) asserts that leaders underestimate the amount of time they need to 
spend on communication focused strategies during the pre-crisis stage. The author asserts:  
Leaders who have faced a crisis in their community readily admit that in their 
planning for a crisis they may have invested only about one percent of the pre-crisis 
funding to public communication planning and then training about 10 percent of 
their time in drills or exercises on the public education component. They then found 
that when the crisis occurred they were spending about 90 percent of their time 
dealing with decisions about communicating to the public. (Reynolds, 2004, p. 5) 
In this sense, leaders must be prepared to facilitate communication and education 
campaigns in the pre-crisis stage in order to better prepare themselves for crisis response. 
Such preparation also involves deciding what information to provide, when, where, to 
whom, and the reasoning behind providing it (Reynolds, 2004).  
 Reynolds (2004) outlines five communication mishaps to be avoided by leaders 
during crisis and emergency-risk communication. First, the author asserts that mixed 
messages from multiple experts should be avoided. Instead, it is important that experts 
speak with a unified voice so that the public does not have to choose which person to 
believe. Second, information should be provided from leaders in a timely manner. The 
author warns that if such information is not provided on time, other parties whose interests 
do not align with those of the public may persuade the public of incorrect information or 
advice. For example, post the 9/11 attacks, numerous members of the public bought gas 
masks because the CDC took about three weeks to investigate and issue a statement on 
whether the masks were necessary for protection. Third, the author warns against 
paternalistic communication whereby communicators fail to provide specific strategies for 
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self-protection. Instead, the author asserts, leaders should help the public understand how 
you came to the conclusions and advice you came to by providing reasoning behind the 
conclusion(s). The author advises never to tell the public to ‘not worry’ as this comes across 
as paternalistic and fails to consider the complexity of the situation at-hand. Fourth, the 
author discusses the importance of actively monitoring real-time rumors or myths that may 
persuade the public to take ineffective or inappropriate actions. Fifth, the author warns to 
guard against power-struggles that make the public confused and have to choose between 
leaders communicating on the risk and crisis. For example, such perceived power struggles 
can occur when a governor and a mayor are providing two different press conferences at 
the same time in different places. The author asserts that such actions ask the public to 
choose to which person’s messages to attend and may debilitate public trust in the 
organization.  
Establishing Risk and Crisis Planning into Organizational Culture 
An important arena of crisis leadership is the role that organizational culture plays 
on dealing with and overcoming the crisis. Culture is the constructed norms, rules, 
processes which are co-created through communication. These established norms, process, 
and co-created realities are established and maintained in large part by the leader. 
Regarding effective crisis leadership communication, it is important for the leader to 
establish a culture that is ‘resilient’ to negative [inside or outside] forces to deconstruct it. 
Alder (1997) conducted two case studies which examined the Mann Gulch and Storm King 
Mountain fires to understand why the crises unfolded as they did. He found one of the key 
reasons the men did not know what to do in the midst of the crisis is attributed to the 
organizational culture of which they were a part. Specifically, in the case of the Mann 
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Gulch fire, the organizational culture prior to the crisis was one in which there was little 
communication between the members of the team. A lack of strong organizational culture 
beforehand explained why communication, obedience, structured process, and trust were 
missing during the crisis itself. Further, the leaders of the team failed to establish a 
legitimate authority during the crises; that is, the leaders lacked in providing their team 
with clear instructional communication messages during the crisis and, therefore, many of 
the men were in a chaotic and disorganized state with no set processes in place for handling 
the crises.   
Establishing a Culture of Preparedness  
Establishing a culture of preparedness should be of upmost importance to the leader 
as soon as they enter their position. Leaders must realize that crises are inevitable events 
in a system, and they can come in ‘all sizes’ or levels of repercussion. Threats will naturally 
vary depending on the field in which the leader is housed. Nonetheless, active 
environmental scanning of threats is necessary to successful outcomes (Mitroff, 2004). 
A culture of preparation in an organization should be established during the earliest 
stages of the crisis development. The leader should communicate to the organizational 
members the importance of establishing crisis management and planning. Further, leaders 
should encourage a culture of active preparation. Active preparation includes developing 
early warning systems and identifying emerging issues early. Crisis preparation also 
includes: “(1) recognizing danger signs through scanning the external and internal 
environments; (2) identifying trouble spots or vulnerabilities; (3) developing a crisis 
management plan (including a crisis management team); and (4) building organizational 
credibility” (Hackman & Johnson, 2010, p. 435). Proactivity may also include tracking 
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“media articles, industry reports and legislative actions on these potential issues” and 
conducting “a vulnerability audit to identify internal weaknesses” (Gainey, 2010, p. 36). 
Other activities include establishing a formal written crisis plan and appointing members 
who would be well suited to lead the endeavor, and undergoing frequent training to put 
processes into place.   
Embedding a culture of risk and crisis planning can be challenging. Many leaders 
fail to acknowledge their role as affected by crises (Gainey, 2010). Buckle (2003) proposes 
that the manner in which crises are imagined should change. He asserts that this process 
includes, “examining ways in which we share knowledge – vertically from governments 
with communities across different disciplines; and from formal disciplines to traditional 
knowledge” (Buckle, 2003, p. 121).  Buckle’s view is especially pertinent as systems 
become more interdependent on each other. That is, the more interwoven systems become, 
the more likely it is that a crisis that occurs halfway across the world has an effect on other 
components of the system near and far.  
Communicating with Stakeholders 
Inevitably, leaders will have to address stakeholders. Stakeholders in the context of 
risk and crisis include, but are not limited to, the lay public; the media; non-profit 
organizations; government officials at both the federal, state, and local levels; corporations; 
and emergency response teams. Evident is that the aforementioned group of possible 
stakeholders all come from varying fields, and thus may have varying levels of expertise, 
hold different values, and have varying tolerance to uncertainty management (Gregory & 
Dieckmann, 2014). Thus, risk and crisis planning for a leader means being able to wear a 
variety of ‘hats’ when maneuvering through the network and meeting stakeholder needs. 
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Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) emphasize the significance of leaders in 
building strong relationships with stakeholders well before anything occurs. These 
established relationships before the crisis help the leader to be perceived as credible, 
personable, and open. Thus, when risk and crises emerge, the leader has built a reservoir 
of goodwill amongst the stakeholders, enabling him or her to better ‘weather the storm’ of 
the crisis.  
Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) also emphasize the role that communication 
plays in leadership crisis. The authors assert that communication aids in creating the 
impression the crisis is being actively managed to the best of the organization’s ability. 
Further, communication throughout the crisis development helps to reduce stakeholder 
uncertainty about the event. When uncertainty is high, stakeholders will look for 
information anywhere they can to help relieve their uncertainty about the risk or crisis. 
Consequently, it is best if the information which these stakeholders seek comes directly 
from the organization rather than from some other unaffiliated source where information 
can be misconstrued. As such, the leader should be able and willing to provide information 
to stakeholders when appropriate. The provided information should be strategic in the sense 
that the leader provides information to each stakeholder that is relevant to their particular 
needs. When the communication flow between the leader and the stakeholders is constant 
and well-established prior to the crisis, the stakeholder begins to build trust in the leader 
and his or her organization and is likely to turn to the leader as their first source of 
information during the crisis itself. 
 Leadership is pivotal to ensuring stakeholders feel involved in the process 
especially during risk assessment. In the pre-crisis stage, communicating with stakeholders 
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regarding the uncertainty present in an impending crisis can be difficult because 
uncertainty must be comprehendible to diverse participants, discussed, and considered with 
other important issues (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014). Lundgren and McMakin (2009) say 
that stakeholders are increasingly seeking to be involved with the risk assessment – they 
seek to understand how it is done and be directly involved with the decision making 
process. Thus, the authors argue that it is not surprising to find organizations meeting and 
discussing with stakeholders before making risk decisions. For instance, the leader of a 
company may act as an emergency response manager, provide comfort to employees, hold 
together the internal systems of the organization, speak to the media, and enact renewal 
discourse.  
A key way that leaders have engaged in the process of involving stakeholders is 
through facilitated deliberation. Facilitated deliberation involves two methods that have 
been particularly helpful to risk assessment namely, Citizens Juries and study circles 
(Lundgren & McMakin, 2009). The Citizens Juries are “designed to enable citizens to 
engage in informed discussions, generating findings for decision makers and the broader 
community” (p. 241). The process of forming a jury involves randomly selecting a 
representative panel of citizens to meet for four or five days and to hear from ‘witnesses’ 
and consider their various positions surrounding a risk. Citizens Juries are unique in that 
“they are independent of the organizations that formed them. Sessions are open to 
observers, and the final report is in the public domain” (p. 242).  Study circles are 
community groups, consisting of persons holding a variety of diverse perspectives that 
come together several times a year to discuss risks and how they should be handled. These 
meetings are usually facilitated by trained member and the focus is on discussing the risk 
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issue from a variety of perspectives so that all ideas are out on the table (Lundgren & 
McMakin, 2009). Proponents of the study circles say that the meetings help to reconnect 
leaders with their community, and help to make the community become more involved and 
understanding of the complex nature of risk decision-making.  
Another way leaders have involved stakeholders is through third-party facilitating. 
Third-party facilitating involves having a neutral member partake in the communication 
exchange between discussing parties. The third-party facilitator acts as a moderator, asking 
for respondents to clarify their messages, helping to continue the negotiation process. There 
are three different types of third-party facilitating methods namely, facilitation, mediation, 
and negotiation. Lundgren and McMakin (2009) assert that the goals of this general process 
are the same regardless of method and “allow voluntary participation by the disputants in 
a fair process, craft a creative and mutually satisfactory resolution, and enhance the parties’ 
relationships while enabling them to save face” (p. 243). 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder participation in risk 
communication of which leaders should be aware and employ appropriately. Lundgren and 
McMakin (2009) break down the benefits and drawbacks of stakeholder participation by 
the eight types of communication interaction employed. I focus on four of the interactions 
the authors outline as they specifically pertain to strategies that can be employed by 
earthquake scientists – who act as leaders - when earthquake forecasting during the pre-
crisis stage of the crisis cycle. 
Formal hearings are advantageous because they are easy to form and allow for 
groups dispersed across regions to participate. The drawbacks of formal hearings is that 
they can increase hostility around the issue and may make some members upset. Lundgren 
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and McMakin (2009) assert that this approach is the least effective of all approaches across 
the crisis cycle. Next, advisory groups can be advantageous for leaders to enact because 
these events afford the stakeholder more time to learn about the risk and help them make 
better decisions. The drawback of advisory groups are that they require great effort from 
the organization to implement and may include abundant amounts of time, money, and 
staff. Third, risk-assessment interactions can be advantageous because they “increase the 
chances of acceptable assessment” and provide a trustworthy review of the process (p. 
247). The disadvantages of such an approach is that these interactions can be challenging 
for technical experts to undergo, and the assessment requires that the audience has some 
knowledge of the technical complexities of the risk. Lastly, decision-making interactions 
are “the highest form of involvement” and are advantageous to employ because they can 
lead to more agreeable decisions where people know what to do and when to do it. The 
drawbacks of this approach are that it takes the control away from the organization and 
may not always be legal (Lundgren & McMakin, 2009).  
Communicating with the Media  
The media is particular important stakeholder that leaders must address during risk 
and crisis as they play a large role in shaping the narrative of the risk or crisis. Ulmer, 
Sellnow, and Seeger (2015) say that while it may go against natural instincts to avoid the 
media or provide short answers or worse yet ‘no comment,’ leaders should be at the 
forefront of media stories. Specifically, the authors assert that leaders must be actively 
engaged with the media during the entirety of the crisis development cycle. They say that 
during risk and crisis events, it is especially important for the leader to emerge in the 
spotlight and serve as the spokesperson. The authors further argue for the importance of 
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being open and honest with the media. The media has to do their job, which is to provide 
what they know to the public. So, it is the job of the leader to be at the ‘front’ of the story 
because it provides the leader with more control over how the story will be written and 
perceived. Speaking with the media and being open, honest, and willing to talk does not 
mean that the leader is accepting blame or responsibility for what happened. Rather, this 
act helps audiences perceive the speaker as being empathetic, active in finding solutions, 
and being human (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2015).  
Other important lessons for leaders communicating with the media include 
disallowing the reporters to force responses onto the leader. This can be prevented by being 
mindful during the conversation and avoiding getting angry during the conversation. 
Further, when speaking to the media, leaders should express concern for those persons who 
may be most affected by the risk or crisis.  When the media asks leaders to provide an 
answer to a question of which they are not sure, it is important that the leader does not 
provide a pseudo answer or avoid the question. Rather, the leader is advised to be honest 
with the reporter and tell him or her that while they do not know at the moment, they are 
working hard on finding a solution. This type of response helps to shed the idea that the 
leader is 100-percent certain and 100-percent confident during a time when uncertainty 
prevails.   
Crises as Opportunity  
Finally, crisis can be seen as an opportunity on which leaders should capitalize. 
Fink (1986) defined a crisis as “an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decision to 
change is impending” (p. 15). Interestingly, Fink’s definition of a crisis paints it as both a 
threat and an opportunity (Massey & Larsen, 2006). Therefore, a crisis should be studied 
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not only in terms of how it is perceived but also how it is addressed (Massey & Larsen, 
2006). This opportunity for positive growth post-crisis has been termed as renewal. 
Specifically, Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger (2009) define renewal as a shift away from 
previous approaches to newer and stronger ways of doing. Renewal is more than simply 
the end of a crisis, it is the ability to seize the opportunity – in whatever form it may come 
– to create a better and newer name for the organization after the crisis. Renewal for a 
company can lead to increased sales, as was the case for Johnson and Johnson after their 
1982 crisis involving their product Tylenol, and even policy change, as was the case for 
the United States government in the September 11th implementation of the Patriot Act.  
There are four characteristics of renewal discourse namely, organizational learning, 
ethical communication, prospective vision, and sound organizational rhetoric. 
Organizational learning refers to the leader displaying in both paradigmatic and behavioral 
forms that the organization has learned from the event. Ethical communication refers to 
communicating with integrity so that stakeholders have a great deal of trust in the leader 
and the organization. This means the leader should be honest and accountable throughout 
the life cycle of the crisis. Prospective vision is arguably at the heart of renewal as it asks 
the leader to employ communication that is forward looking and optimistic. This means 
the leader does not focus on what happened, but rather what could be accomplished. Lastly, 
organizational rhetoric involves using persuasive strategies when communicating in order 
to appeal to the audience and convince them that they should move beyond the event. 
Organizational rhetoric also involves encouraging the audience to ‘see’ the event in the 
optimistic and opportunistic way in which the leader and the organization sees it. 
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In sum, leadership is an important and growing field in risk and crisis 
communication research and an underlying premise to CERC. Leaders play a key role at 
every stage of CERC, but they play the largest role in the pre-crisis stage where they 
facilitate communication and education campaigns about the risk. Leaders are pivotal in 
constructing perceptions of the risks and crisis to stakeholders. While leadership during 
crisis can be difficult, stressful, and overwhelming, with effective communication 
employed, the leader should capitalize on ways their organization can emerge from the 
crisis renewed and with a better sense of purpose for the stakeholders and public they serve.   
Expert Risk-Perception and Communication 
Expert risk assessments could be vastly different from one another if experts 
disagree on the conceptualization of risk and their calculated probability and magnitude of 
harm (Bostrom, 1997). Risk assessment is the process by which experts calculate the 
magnitude of the risk and its chances to occur. Experts are often asked to provide their 
assessments to non-experts (e.g., government officials, the lay public, emergency 
responders, insurance companies, etc.). Attending to non-experts with varying levels of 
expertise in the area of earthquake forecasting can be a challenging task. This task is 
exceptionally challenging considering earthquake scientists are trained in the natural 
sciences and may pay little attention to the principles of effective communication outlined 
by the social sciences.  
Expert risk assessment involves two general areas: estimating the probability of the 
risk and assessing the magnitude of harm. Bostrom (1997) asserts that “even restricting 
risk to these two dimensions leaves the problem of how to combine the two undefined” (p. 
103). For example, said the author: 
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Defining harm as carcinogenicity and excluding reduction of ecological 
functionality in this definition of harm could lead to different risk management 
priorities than if both were included. Even if experts agree on the nature of the 
harms to be included and the probability distributions of those harms, experts who 
focus only on the worst outcome may reach different conclusions than those who 
calculate and use average expected. (Bostrom, 1997, p. 103) 
Disagreement amongst experts may occur in the simplest of stages over the 
conceptualizations of the risk itself. Other problematic areas of expert assessment include 
too strong of an emphasis on mortality rates over all other consequences, advancing risks 
from the scientific laboratory to the real world, and how to operationalize risks using a 
single all-explanatory dimension (Bostrom, 1997).   
Expert assessment within the context of earthquake risk can vary, too, based on the 
manner in which probabilities are assessed namely, using the Frequentist approach or the 
Bayesian approach. Experts who take the frequentist approach define probability as “the 
limit of the relevant frequency with which the event occurs in repeated trials under the 
same conditions” (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 202). The Frequentist approach asserts that 
data alone can provide objective understanding of the risk, and that by examining the 
frequency of events, experts will be able to understand the likelihood of their future 
occurrence. On the other hand, Bayesians, or those taking the Bayesian approach, define 
probability as “degree of belief” (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 202). Bayesians use prior 
experience and understanding in their analysis of the evidence. Further, Bayesians believe 
that probability is not something inherent in a system, rather it is a consensus of judgement.  
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Mulargia and Geller (2003) assert that both the Frequentist and the Bayesian 
approach are insufficient for interpreting earthquake forecasts. Thompson (1990) also 
claimed that neither approach is adequate for risk assessment. He asserted, “The objectivist 
view makes it too hard for us to be right in making a risk judgement, while the subjectivist 
view makes it too hard for us to be wrong” (para. 26). As a result, experts may find areas 
of disagreement amongst themselves. Specifically, Bostrom (1997) said that experts 
disagree because: “they rely inappropriately on limited data; impose order on random 
events; fit ambiguous evidence into predispositions; omit components of risk, such as 
human errors or common mode failures; [and] are overconfident in the reliability of 
analyses” (p. 104). Kahneman (2011) concluded disciplined Bayesian reasoning can be 
summarized in two points: first, experts should anchor their judgment of the probability of 
an outcome on a reasonable base rate. Second, experts should “question the diagnosticity 
of [their] evidence” (p. 154).  
Risk assessment by experts is based on both objective and subjective criteria. That 
is, while data and models help experts understand the risk objectively, risk assessment 
involves a great deal of uncertainty upon which experts must make decisions. As Wynne 
(1987) noted, many dimensions of risk analysis by experts involves informal judgement 
and decision-making, and these expert judgements are perceived objective. Kahneman 
(2011) conducted a synthesis of humans’ two systems of thinking that guide decision 
making and risk judgement. He asserted, “Democracy is inevitably messy, in part because 
the availability and affect heuristics that guide citizens’ beliefs and attitudes are inevitably 
biased, even if they generally point in the right direction” (p. 145). He concluded that 
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research should inform the design of risk policies that combine the experts’ knowledge 
with the public’s emotions and intuitions (Kahneman, 2011).  
Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (2000) say that experts should be aware of their 
own limitations with risk assessment. They advise experts to take into consideration “the 
important qualitative aspects of risk that influence the responses of laypeople, and 
somehow to create ways in which these considerations can find expression in hazard 
management without, in the process, creating more heat than light” (p.120). Additionally, 
Slovic (2000) said that technical limitations and divergence among experts play a role in 
how risks are perceived. He warns:    
Risk communicators must be fully aware of the strengths and limits of the methods 
used to generate the information they are attempting to convey to the public. In 
particular, communicators need to understand that risk assessments are constructed 
from theoretical models that are based on assumptions and subjective judgments. If 
these assumptions and judgements are deficient, the resulting assessments may be 
quite inaccurate. (p.183)  
Experts may fail to consider the influence of the behavioral and social conventions upon 
which their judgements are grounded (Wynne, 1987). 
Differences in risk assessment amongst even experts has led some scientists to the 
conclusion that science is, at least in part, socially constructed. For example, while one 
may assume that all experts, regardless of scientific field, will be able to judge risks 
similarly based on their educational background, researchers have shown that cross-
discipline scientific differences in risk judgment exist. Barke and Jenkins-Smith (1993) 
found that life scientists believe nuclear power and radioactive waste as much more 
40 
 
dangerous than scientists of other disciplines. Consequently, many scholars have come to 
the conclusion that science is partial to societal norms. That is, scientific findings are 
influenced by theoretical, methodological, cultural, and temporal constraints. Scientific 
findings are also influenced by institutional and political demands on scientists the 
organizations they serve (Bostrom, 1997).  
Ensuring that the earthquake scientists are not living in fear of broadcasting a 
‘wrong call’ is important to being able to provide honest forecasts of the earthquake risk. 
Gigerenzer (2014) described the act of ‘defensive decision making.’ Defensive decision 
making occurs when “a person or group ranks option A as the best for the situation, but 
chooses an inferior option B to protect itself in case something goes wrong” (Gigerenzer, 
2014, p. 56). Defensive decision making most often occurs when the decision makers lack 
the appropriate amount of information and lives in a ‘negative error culture’ or a culture 
“in which everyone lacks the courage to make a decision for which they may be punished” 
(p. 55). Forms of defensive decision making include failing to make a decision, 
procrastinating in order to escape responsibility, and providing the second best option. 
Defensive decision making has become increasingly common for experts because of legal 
repercussions that could ensue (take for example, the devastating aftermath for scientists 
in the wake of the L’Aquila earthquake). In a survey conducted of 824 emergency doctors 
in Pennsylvania, ninety-three percent disclosed that they practice a form of defensive 
decision making with their patients, called defensive medicine, in which they prescribe 
tests or treatments that have the potential to harm the patient because of fear of legal 
repercussions.    
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In their study on communicating probability to diverse stakeholders, Gregory and 
Dieckmann (2014) noted that problems in the communication process arise when scientists 
are confronted with communicating to multiple stakeholders. The authors find that 
scientists take three common approaches to communicating probability to diverse 
stakeholders. The first common approach is the communicator will fail to communicate the 
uncertainty of the risk altogether because he or she feels that the audience will not be able 
to understand it or, conversely, the communicator will assume that the audience knows that 
the uncertainty is implied when discussing risk and, consequently, fail to explicitly discuss 
it. Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) found that the second common approach for 
communicating probability is that the communicator will provide the probabilistic 
information in an oversimplified manner, presenting the probability in a single-format 
approach.  
Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) assert there are nine different ways to present 
uncertainty: verbal probability statement, verbal evaluative label, numerical probability 
expression, frequency or odds, simple ranges, three-point ranges, figures, and box and 
whisker plots.  The authors assert, rather than using multiple formats to communicate the 
probability so to meet the needs of the diverse audience, the communicator will typically 
rely on just one format. Usually the format the communicator chooses is one in which he 
or she is most comfortable with explaining or believes will generate the desired 
interpretation. The single-format approach can be troublesome as it provides an over-
simplified view of the risk, and presentation in this format could lead to stakeholders failing 
to take the required action in order to mitigate the crisis or prevent the crisis from 
happening. Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) say when scientists choose to communicate 
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probability using multiple formats, stakeholders may interpret the information differently 
based on the format they chose.  
Communicating technical information is also challenging and involves 
communicating the strength of the evidence. The strength of the evidence refers to 
statements indicating how strongly the communicator feels about the information being 
presented. For example, researchers may use hedging phrases such as ‘it is unlikely, but 
possible,’ ‘it is rather unlikely,’ or ‘a lack of occurrence cannot be excluded’ to 
communicate that contradictory or inconclusive evidence may be present and that they are 
careful to not indicate their complete certainty. Other current approaches to communicating 
the strength of evidence include, Institutional Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) five 
group grading schema, California EMF degree of certainty, a GRADE system, and the 
AGREE collaboration (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). These approaches vary in 
their qualitative and quantitative presentation of information. That is, while some of the 
formats present information in purely qualitative form, others are a mixture of qualitative 
and quantitative providing a number inclusive with the marker indicating the strength of 
evidence. While formats and templates exist for communicating the strength of the 
evidence, it is not known how frequently they are used by scientists when communicating 
the probability of an earthquake. Further, the effectiveness and outcomes of these formats 
and templates needs further investigation.  
Translating scientifically complex evidence into less technical information can be 
compared to the experience bi-cultural persons experience when they go back and forth 
from the worldviews of their audiences. The term, ‘code switching’ is usually associated 
with Intercultural Communication literature to mean a bi-bilingual or multi-lingual person 
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being able to go back and forth between their languages and the different worldviews that 
come with the language. Within the context of risk and crisis communication, the 
researcher finds the term code switching appropriate to describing the ability for risk and 
crisis communicators to tailor their message based on their audience needs. Code switching 
is also the ability of communicators to assess beforehand the worldview and experiences 
of the audience prior to presenting their message. Navigating between the two different 
“codes” of talk (technical and non-technical) is no easy task, but being able to effectively 
do so can increase interpretation of information for the audience.  
Risk communication challenges arise with communicating the main arguments 
around the risk (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). While scientists may be comfortable 
in dealing with inconsistent or contradictory evidence surrounding risk, communicating 
such information to diverse audiences with varying degrees of expertise can be 
problematic. “As in the other areas of risk communication, reporting inconclusive evidence 
has to take into account insights into human information processing of probabilistic 
information and uncertainty” (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014, p. 40). When 
communicating risk, scientists should take into consideration that strength of evidence 
usually does not include arguments associated with the risk. Information is often vital for 
the public “who wish to consider whether a given classification of the strength of evidence 
is reasonable” (p. 46). Evidence reporting must consider four important areas. First, the lay 
public may have difficulty understanding how scientific institutions validate certain 
sources over others and thus may be too trusting on evidence that is unreliable. Second, the 
negativity effect takes hold during processing of risk communication. Third, incoming 
information is always analyzed in the context of existing information and beliefs. And, 
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lastly, people tend to place more weight on the probability of the event occurring rather 
than the probability of the event not to occur.  
Recently, evidence maps have been a helpful resource to stakeholders and the 
public when assessing information (Wiedmann, Boener, & Schutz, 2014). Evidence maps 
help readers understand how experts came upon their judgements, and the maps do two 
effective things when displaying evidence. First, the map outlines remaining uncertainty 
that helps to remind the reader that there is still uncertainty present with the risk. Second, 
the map provides information on the number of studies used to provide assessment for the 
risk—allowing the reader to make a more informed decision. Evidence maps are helping 
to make analyzing risk easier for stakeholders and the public, however, these maps are 
rarely used.  
The communicator often fails to account for the varying ways in which non-experts 
will interpret the information. Members of the lay public interpret risk communication 
differently based on various factors such as their previous experience with similar risks, 
their age, media reporting of the risk (framing effects), cultural influences, and their 
numeracy comprehension. Venette (2008) studied the newspaper reporting of the 2005 
hurricane season in order to understand how the reporting may have reinforced 
reconstructed decisions not to evacuate the affected area. Venette saw risk as a socially 
constructed view of a probability of a negative event occurring. He found that the publics’ 
pre-existing beliefs and past experiences of similar risks will have more weight than risk 
messages from scientists. As a result of his findings, Venette (2008) suggested some 
important approaches to risk communication. First, he recommends that scientists should 
be active in attempting to comprehend how the public will receive the messages they 
45 
 
provide paying particular attention to understanding how the public will deem the risk as 
affecting their lives. Second, he recommends that when scientist communicate the current 
risk, they should not compare it to previous risk because people will taint the current risk 
with the outcome and processes of the previous. Third, Venette suggests that scientists 
should provide evidence to the public in a strategic manner so that the public takes action 
because they perceive as doing it because they so desired. Lastly, Venette prescribes that 
scientists and communicators conduct heavy audience analysis on their targeted audience 
to better meet their communication needs. Audience analysis should be conducted in such 
depth, he says, that scientists can predict the alternative constructions to the presented risk 
that the audience may make.  
Lastly, aside from knowing how to communicate probability, scientists must also 
know when it is appropriate to communicate probability (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014). 
There are times when communicating probability is not always appropriate. Gregory and 
Dieckmann (2014) assert that “there are times when communicating probabilities may not 
work well as part of the multi-party environmental decision-making process” such as 
“when uncertainty is severe, when extremely low probabilities are at issue, or when the 
assignment of probabilities fails to improve insights for decision-makers” (p. 61).  During 
these times, a statement of certainty may be better suited in order to motivate the audience 
to take the desired actions. Or, it may be better to not communicate the uncertainty at all if 
the risk is of low probability.   
Regardless of the barriers experts may experience in risk judgment, experts have 
more specialized knowledge of the topics they study and the appropriate resources and 
tools to help them understand phenomena with better accuracy. While non-experts may not 
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have academically-based understandings of risk, their risk judgements do carry value, 
nonetheless. Although the aims of the current study are to explore expert risk judgment 
(specifically that of earthquake scientists), it is important to ascertain the current state of 
knowledge on non-expert risk judgment in order to fully understand why experts may 
experience difficulty communicating to non-experts.  
Non-Expert Risk Perception 
Slovic (1987) emphasized the important role both scientists and the lay public play 
in risk perception. He asserts, while scientists are guided by more rational decision-making 
than the lay public, understanding numbers with better clarity and allowing numbers to 
guide their judgements, non-experts have important contributions to risk perception that 
should not be overlooked (Slovic, 2010). In order for effective crisis and emergency-risk 
communication, experts should consider how their perceptions of risk may differ from 
those of non-experts. 
The public, albeit guided by emotion, past experience, and risk comparison, have 
something to offer when it comes to risk perception. Slovic (1987) asserts: 
Lay people sometimes lack certain information about hazards. However, 
their basic conceptualization of risk is much richer than that of the experts 
and reflects legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk 
assessments. As a result, risk communication and risk management efforts 
are destined to fail unless they are structured as a two-way process. Each 
side, expert and public, has something valid to contribute. Each side must 
respect the insights and intelligence of the other. (p. 285) 
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Slovic (2010) stresses that messages of probability are incorrectly interpreted because 
human decision-making regarding risk is dependent on more than numerical 
representations. Rather, human decision-making during risk is determined by a number of 
forces including educational background, affect, and prior experiences with similar risks.  
 Perhaps one of those most prominent scholarly work of the differences in risk 
perception between experts and non-experts is that of Peter Sandman. Sandman (2012) 
argues that risk can be measured as a sum of hazard and outrage and that this equation can 
help to understand the public’s apathy towards some risk opposed to others. Hazard is 
essentially the statistical probability the event will occur. Outrage, on the other hand, 
describes all of the other factors on which people base their perceptions of risk. For 
example, some components of outrage include whether the disaster is natural versus 
industrial, familiar or exotic, memorable or unmemorable, dreaded or desired, chronic or 
catastrophic, knowable or unknowable, controlled by self or controlled by others, fair or 
unfair, and morally relevant or morally irrelevant (Sandman, 2012). Sandman argues, while 
scientists attend to hazard, the public attend to outrage. The author argues that such 
conceptualization of risk, as a sum of hazard and outrage, can help to understand why 
situations arise where experts perceive a hazard as high and the publics’ outrage is low, the 
experts will be alarmed and the public will be indifferent.  
Crisis and emergency-risk communicators should caution against discounting the 
risk perception of non-experts. Sandman argues that the public’s perceptions of risk are as 
objective as the experts’ technical conceptualizations. Non-experts’ risk perceptions are 
less numeric, but they are grounded in scientifically-backed feelings of control and 
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familiarity. Sandman (2012) also says that scientists who deem outrage as “irrational” are 
failing to acknowledge the scientific evidence of outrage (p. 109). He explains: 
We [social scientists] already know more about outrage genesis than, say, 
carcinogenesis—not because social science is more powerful than natural science, 
but because outrage is a simpler phenomenon than hazard. Outrage is increasingly 
predictable and manageable. A scientist or engineer who persists in seeing it as 
inscrutable is simply ignoring the data. (Sandman, p. 110) 
Considering Sandman’s conceptualization of risk, communicators must reflect on the 
public’s perception of the hazard even if they believe such perceptions are illogical or 
unjustified. Communicative response must follow suite. That is, as the public perceive 
some risks as more acceptable than others, communicative response should be based on 
the manner in which these risks are perceived by non-experts.  
Summary 
This literature review provided insight into the current state of earthquake 
forecasting and an exhaustive review of the CERC model. This literature review also 
reviewed risk and crisis communication leadership as earthquake scientists act as 
communication leaders during the earliest stage of the crisis. Lastly this literature review 
included describing expert and non-expert risk perception and risk communication. All 
reviewed components of this literature review help to inform the researcher on the topics 
pertinent to providing context to earthquake scientists’ challenges and experience with risk 
communication.  
The current state of earthquake forecasting is one that is extremely complex and 
unpredictable. Earthquakes are unique natural disasters in the sense that they are an 
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ongoing crisis whereby one earthquake is usually followed by aftershocks. Further, those 
earthquakes have varying levels of intensity such that the first earthquake in a sequence is 
not always the largest magnitude. Lastly, earthquakes sequences are distributed differently 
in time and space (i.e., the earthquake sequence does not occur simultaneously in time nor 
space).  
CERC is a crisis stage model that provides focus on communication throughout the 
life-cycle of an event. The model has effective in the context of public health crisis and 
emergency-risk communication response and shows promise for continued effectiveness 
in other contexts, such as earthquake communication. CERC merges the areas of risk 
communication and crisis communication. The model has five stages: pre-crisis, initial, 
maintenance, resolution, and evaluation. During the pre-crisis stage is when experts, such 
as earthquake scientists, play the largest role in facilitating communication.  
In the process of communication facilitation in the pre-crisis stage, earthquake 
scientists take on the role of crisis and emergency-risk communication leaders. 
Communication leaders are conceptualized as persons who effectively manage uncertainty 
surrounding the crisis event and/or risk and use appropriate communication tools to achieve 
their goals. This literature review also discussed the importance of a healthy organizational 
culture to effective communication. Leaders play a large role in how such organizational 
cultures are developed and maintained. Leaders should also have healthy relationships 
established with their stakeholders and follow guidelines for effective communication with 
such stakeholders.  
While experts have a more scientific understanding of these events helping to guide 
their judgement, non-experts’ risk judgment is also valuable and cannot be discounted. 
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Non-experts base their risk judgement on a variety of components such as their previous 
experience with such risks and their feelings about the risk itself. Experts are cautioned to 
refrain from holding superior views of risk judgement and rather seek greater 
understanding into how non-expert audiences perceive the risks they communicate. The 
subsequent section details the methodological approach of this study.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter explains a study design that addresses the communicative experiences 
and challenges of earthquake scientists who communicate scientific information 
surrounding earthquake risk to the public and other stakeholders. Exploring the challenges 
earthquake scientists perceive they face in communicating technical or expert information 
to non-experts helps to understand their experience and provide communication 
recommendations based on their particular challenges. Given the developmental nature of 
the current study, a qualitative in-depth methodology is appropriate to uncover challenges 
earthquake scientists face during the earliest stages of the crisis cycle. The current study 
seeks to answer the following research questions:  
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face 
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC? 
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they 
face in communicating with non-experts? 
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with 
communicating probability to non-experts? 
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with 
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model? 
Qualitative Interviews with Earthquake Scientists 
The process of interviewing can be described as both a science and an art (Lindlof 
& Taylor, 2011). It is through the process of interviewing that the researcher is able to 
uncover systems of meaning, understand participants and topics in more depth, and build 
knowledge inter-subjectively (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In order to capture individuals’ 
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lived experiences, in-depth qualitative interviews are most appropriate (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2016). Paget (1983) eloquently describes the unique attributes of in-depth 
interviewing:  
What distinguishes in-depth interviewing is that the answers given continually 
inform the evolving conversation. Knowledge thus accumulates with many turns at 
talk. It collects in stories, asides, hesitations, expressions of feeling, and 
spontaneous associations… The specific person interviewing, the “I” that I am, 
personally contributes to the creation of the interview’s content because I follow 
my own perplexities as they arise in our discourse. (p. 78) 
Qualitative interviewing serves some pivotal purposes including: understanding another’s 
worldview and perspective through their account; gaining insight into language forms used 
by others; gathering information about a topic or a group that cannot be attained effectively 
through other research means; probing about the past; authenticating, validating, or 
remarking on information acquired from other sources; and efficiently collecting large 
amounts of data (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011).  
Specific to this study, a qualitative approach is most appropriate for three key 
reasons. First, gaining perspective from earthquake scientists on their communication 
challenges is extremely important as there has yet to be coherent understanding of the 
communicative experiences of experts on the topic of risk judgement. While researchers 
have sought evidence in the form of quantitative surveys and experimental designs, there 
remains ample uncertainty about expert and non-expert risk judgement and decision 
making as it differs so widely amongst groups and between individuals within groups. 
There has yet to be a rich and comprehensive understanding of the experiences of experts 
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on risk judgement. Moreover, no such studies have examined earthquake scientists, a 
population most vulnerable to this issue. Through the method of qualitative interviewing, 
the researcher is able to gain an in-depth understanding, exploring the dimensions of this 
complex, dense, and multi-facetted experience. Such an exploration is especially pertinent 
to the experiences of earthquake scientists because they face some extreme risk judgement 
experiences considering the enormous uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting, the 
time gap between the risk judgement and the crisis event itself, and the various audiences 
to which the earthquake scientists must communicate this complicated information.  
Second, because this particular line of research examining earthquake scientists’ 
communicatory experiences is in its earliest stages, a qualitative approach enables to 
researcher to explore the topic in great depth. The researcher is able to understand the 
phenomena in-depth as the participants are not limited to survey responses based on pre-
orchestrated operationalization of variables. In this sense, the researcher is able to fully 
explore the topic at hand without the confines of preconceived conceptualizations and go 
beyond the theoretical walls of understanding, if the data warrants. While a theoretical 
framework is used in this study, CERC, the researcher is able to expand beyond this lens 
and follow the path of the participants’ responses. The researcher is able to explore the 
whole range of the phenomena – gaining more depth and breadth than a quantitative study 
could provide (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). In this endeavor, the researcher is able to build a 
more contextualized understanding of the participants’ responses gaining a more holistic 
understanding. 
Third, the researcher is able to understand the phenomena through the eyes of the 
participants (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Qualitative interviewing provides a unique 
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experience in which the interview subject provides insight into his or her social world, 
inviting the researcher to view the situation, issue, or topic through their inimitable lens 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). If executed properly, in the process of the interview, the 
researcher is able to gain perspective of the difficulties, joys, and hardships of the topic for 
the participant. Further, the researcher is able to probe for more information from the 
participant if the response provided was unclear, insufficient, especially important to the 
research study, or if new information emerged that the researcher found important to the 
study.  
Informant Interviews  
There are several different types of interviews in Communication research that are 
distinguished by their context, content, length of interview, type of discourse produced, 
and the relational emphasis of the interview (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Informant 
interviews are one such type and are used when the researcher seeks to gain deep and 
extensive knowledge about their research topic. Given the nature of this study, the 
researcher employed informant interviews. Informants provide the researcher with insight 
“about the scene - the scene’s history, customs, and rituals; the local lingo; the identities 
and actions of the key players; and so forth” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011, p. 177). Lindlof and 
Taylor (2011) outline the attributes of a good informant as a veteran of the scene, 
knowledgeable about the topic, respected by others because of their membership, and 
possess understanding into the language and processes of the group. Informants can act as 
gatekeepers of both knowledge and membership, and they can help the researcher gain 
valuable insight and access into both realms. In the present study, earthquake scientists 
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acted as informants as they provided the researcher with access into a social world she 
otherwise would not have access or knowledge about.  
The researcher can come across some challenges when conducting informant 
interviews. Marshall and Rossman (2016) provide some noteworthy difficulties of 
informant interviews or what they call elite interviews including difficulty contacting the 
informant as they usually under time constraints or may be traveling. Another challenge 
they note is that the researcher may need to accommodate to the wishes of the informant 
during the interview. Typically, informants are familiar with the interview process because 
they may have been interviewed in the past and thus may be “sophisticated in managing 
the interview process” (p. 160). Another challenge in informant interviews is that the great 
pressure placed on the researcher to be well versed and knowledgeable of the topic so that 
they may be able to converse with the informant (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Or, if the 
researcher is not well versed or knowledgeable on the topic, it is important they ask their 
questions in such a way that involves sensitive and competent questioning (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2016). Lastly, Marshall and Rossman, (2016) acknowledge the power dynamic 
present in informant interviews that can cause tension or difficulty. These challenges are 
often amplified when the world-view or cultural orientation of the researcher differs from 
that of the informant. Being able to build rapport and build an open and engaging 
environment helps to combat such challenges (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).   
Interview Participants  
For the current study, 21 members of the Southern California Earthquake Center 
(SCEC) were interviewed inclusive of earthquake scientists and other persons who work 
closely with earthquake scientists to provide risk messages. SCEC was selected because 
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the organization attracts the leading scholars in the study of earthquakes. Membership in 
the organization is diverse. Members are located throughout the United States, and other 
earthquake-prone countries. Thus, the membership of SCEC provides a broad selection of 
scientists whose knowledge and experience are relevant to this study. 
The annual SCEC meeting was the ideal place for data collection for the aims of 
the current study for three primary reasons. First, SCEC is at the center of earthquake 
research and advancement, and the SCEC annual meeting is held in order to bring together 
the SCEC community, foster relationships among its members, and discuss and overview 
current problems and future steps in earthquake knowledge. Led by Dr. Thomas Jordan, 
SCEC’s annual meeting is the main event related to SCEC membership and is a required 
meeting for its multitude of reputable researchers and practitioners. Second, as the SCEC 
director, Dr. Thomas Jordan has made a call to advancing the research on communicating 
the uncertainty surrounding earthquake forecasting and the complex task that earthquake 
scientists have in working with stakeholders in providing effective messages and ensuring 
public safety. The researcher spoke with Dr. Thomas Jordan on a few occasions over the 
phone and through email exchange, and the researcher worked with him on previous 
research projects. Dr. Jordan has made it clear that the researcher’s current research aim is 
important, timely, and necessary to advancing and improving earthquake risk 
communication and its technologies, such as OEF. This study is especially appropriate 
following the devastating aftermath of the L’Aquila earthquake where six scientists and 
one public official were charged with manslaughter for failing to appropriately 
communicate the risk to the public. Lastly, SCEC’s annual meeting brought together in one 
place all of the SCEC members who come from various fields. This meeting allowed the 
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researcher an invaluable and irreproducible opportunity to meet and interview the SCEC 
members on the research topic. Further, as all members were in one location at one time, 
the researcher was able to interview many more members than the researcher could if she 
were to solicit and conduct these interviews through any other method.  
The Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC). 
The Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC) houses the leading earthquake 
scientists from around the world. Specifically, SCEC was founded in 1991 and is: 
 A community of over 600 scientists, students and others at over 60 institutions 
worldwide, headquartered at the University of Southern California. SCEC is funded 
by the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Geological Survey to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of earthquakes in Southern California and elsewhere, 
and to communicate useful knowledge for reducing earthquake risk. (SCEC, 2015, 
para. 1) 
One of the most distinguishing features of SCEC is their emphasis on interdisciplinary 
research on earthquakes. SCEC is a model organization for fostering and encouraging 
interdisciplinary work. SCEC houses researchers from across the disciplinary spectrum 
including communicationists, sociologists, computational scientists, geologists, and 
seismologists.  
SCEC has three primary goals. SCEC’s first goal is to collect information on 
seismic activity occurring in California and around the world. Their second goal is to 
incorporate the collected data on seismic activity into an inclusive, all-encompassing, and 
physics-based understanding of earthquake phenomena (SCEC, 2015). SCEC’s third goal 
is to actively promote research across disciplines to understand effective communication 
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of earthquake risks to the public and society at large. That is, they seek to “communicate 
understanding to the world at large as useful knowledge for reducing earthquake risk and 
improving community resilience” (SCEC Annual Report, 2014, p. 2).  
Interview Questions 
Interview questions were grounded in the earliest stage of the CERC theoretical 
framework in order to understand how earthquake scientists were meeting the 
communication goals as outline by CERC. For example, questions in this category 
included: To what extent does current technology allow for earthquake forecasting? And, 
to what extent does the public understand the limitations of earthquake forecasting? 
Additionally, questions were posed that inquired about the challenges the earthquake 
scientists experience when communicating technical information to others. For example, 
questions in this category included: What do you perceive are the key communication 
challenges with earthquake forecasting? What forms of communicating probability to the 
public do you believe to be better understood by the general public? Moreover, three 
pivotal demographic questions were posed to better understand the context behind the 
experts’ statements. Specifically, the following demographic questions were posed: (1) 
How many years of experience do you have in your field? (2) How much experience do 
you have with earthquake forecasting? And, (3) what is your current position? For the 
complete questionnaire, please refer to Appendix B. 
Recruitment Procedures 
Upon approval from Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of 
Kentucky, recruitment letters were emailed to earthquake scientists attending the 2015 
SCEC meeting in Palm Springs, California. The researcher attained a list of members 
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attending the meeting through the SCEC member’s online website. The research identified 
potential research participants through purposive sampling methods in which participants 
are chosen non-randomly and strategically on the basis of particular features (Frey, Botan, 
& Kreps, 2000). To increase the sample size, the researcher asked participants of the study 
to refer her to other persons who met the criteria for inclusion for this study, thereby, 
employing snowball sampling. The list of qualified participants was developed and 
contacted via email to participate in a recorded face-to-face semi-structured interview using 
an interview guide.  
Data Collection Procedures 
Data was collected during the annual SCEC meeting held in Palm Springs, 
California September 12, 2015 through September 16, 2015. Thus, all of the initial 
interviews (N = 21) were conducted face-to-face in the Palm Springs Hilton Hotel and 
Resort’s conference and meeting rooms. Stemming from the CERC theoretical framework 
and from relevant extant literature, the researcher prepared 20 interview questions. The 
researcher chose to enact an etic approach to the research process because she is acting as 
a purposeful observer and not a participant (Gibbs, 2007). At the time of the interview, the 
interview script was read. The researcher also included a brief reminder of the purpose of 
the study, a reading of the informed consent statement, a verbal request for their consent to 
participate, and offered a brief synopsis of the questions from the interview guide. Each 
interview, lasted between 20 to 60 minutes. The researcher recorded all interviews using a 
digital audio recorder in order to adequately capture all relevant content as well as the 
handwritten notes of the researcher during the interview. The audio recordings were used 
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as references for written notes and not all of the material was transcribed verbatim. Gibbs 
(2007) says,  
It is not necessary to transcribe all or even any of the information you have collected 
in your project in order to analyze it. Some levels and forms of analysis can be done 
quite productively without any copy of the interviews, texts or observations you 
have recorded. (p. 11) 
Transcribing only relevant data aids the researcher in focusing on the important aspects of 
the interview rather than being preoccupied with small and insignificant aspects of the 
interview material (Gibbs, 2007). At the conclusion of the interviews, notes were entered 
into a word processor without personal identifiers. Audio files were subsequently reviewed 
to ensure that no applicable details were missed (Gibbs, 2007).  
To assure that sufficient information related specifically to communication 
challenges was collected in the interview process, the researcher identified eight 
participants whose position involved regular public communication. With IRB permission, 
the researcher contacted each of these individuals and invited them to share additional 
information related to their communication challenges. Initially, two of the eight 
participants accepted the researcher’s invitation to share additional information about 
communication challenges. This additional information is incorporated in the researcher’s 
analysis. Subsequently, the researcher sent a follow-up invitation after which none of the 
individuals responded with additional information. For the complete log of interview data 
gathering activities, please refer to Appendix C.  
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Data Analysis Procedures 
One such way researchers can organize their qualitative report is by creating “an 
account structured around the main themes identified, drawing illustrative examples from 
each transcript (or other text) as required” (Gibbs, 2007, p. 33). Thus, once the researcher 
completed the interviews and transcribed relevant data from their written notes, she 
conducted a thematic analysis among the responses. Thematic analysis included reading 
and re-reading her interview notes and looking for themes, especially those that support 
the theoretical framework (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The thematic analysis yielded 
understanding into common strategies taken by scientists communicating technical 
information and probabilistic statements to various stakeholders including the public. The 
researcher also had another Communication expert examine the categories and emergent 
themes to gain greater insight into other forms of interpretation of the analyzed data.  
Due to the nature of the topic of this study and the researcher’s own paradigmatic 
standing, the researcher sought to examine the data through multiple points of view and 
without constraints. Thus, the researcher employed crystallization (Ellingson, 2009). 
Crystallization acknowledges the complexity in the human experiences and the process: 
Combines many different forms of analysis and multiple genres of representation 
into a coherent text  or series of related texts, building a rich and openly partial 
account of a phenomenon that problematizes its own construction, highlights 
researchers’ vulnerabilities and positionality, makes claims about socially 
constructed meanings, and reveals the indeterminacy of knowledge claims even as 
it makes them. (Ellingson, 2009, p. 4) 
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With crystallization, rather than seeking one dimension of truth, scholars can embrace and 
discuss multiple points of view all while remaining conscious of the context from which 
the data came (Ellingson, 2009). In this pursuit, the researcher takes a reflexive approach 
to the data, considers the temporal and cultural influences of the responses, contrasts their 
understanding with other scholarly work, and seeks to understand the plausibility and 
verisimilitude of the data to the informants’ perceptions (Ellingson, 2009). The researcher 
examined a range of participants, reviewed organizational documents (some published by 
the participants of the study), and incorporated extant knowledge to form a crystallized 
understanding of the topic. Further, the researcher also looked for exemplars or evidence 
from the interview data that supported and helped to advance the researcher’s argument 
(Atkinson, 1990).  
Validation Procedures 
In order to gain validation of the interpreted data, the researcher employed member 
checks (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Member checks are when the researcher discusses their 
findings with the participants of the study to ensure the participants consent to the 
researcher’s perceptions of the data collected. In this endeavor, the researcher did a couple 
of different things. First, the researcher had the opportunity to present preliminary findings 
of this study at the International Crisis and Risk Communication conference in Orlando, 
Florida. In the audience were four earthquake scientists, three of whom were participants 
of the study. The researcher was also presenting on a panel alongside another earthquake 
scientist who witnessed the researcher’s presentation of her preliminary findings. Thus, in 
total, five earthquake scientists along with a room full of other scholars from diverse 
backgrounds, listened to the presentation and were asked to provide their feedback. The 
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researcher also called select participants from the study (those whose work involved 
regular earthquake communication) and inquired about their thoughts. Questions in the 
member check process included: Do you believe this to be an accurate portrayal of your 
experience? Is there anything you find untrue? What else do you believe is missing from 
the researcher’s understanding of your experience? 
Summary 
In sum, the researcher took a qualitative approach which involved in-depth 
interviews with earthquake scientists in order to understand challenges experienced by this 
group when communicating risk during the earliest stage of the crisis cycle. In-depth 
interviews allow the researcher to gain deep understanding into the topic as experienced 
by the participants because the interviewee is able to describe in more detail his or her 
perspectives and experiences (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). Qualitative interviews align with 
the interpretive paradigm and allow the researcher to explore the topic without 
preconceptions, expectations, and preconceived conceptualizations of the communication 
phenomena.  
The researcher employed informant interviews with members of SCEC (N = 21). 
The researcher collected data at the annual SCEC meeting as it brings to one location the 
leading earthquake scientists. The researcher yielded rich in-depth data from the 
participants. In order to ensure that she covered the basis of Communication issues in full, 
the researcher identified participants whose position involved frequent public 
communication. The researcher inquired about any communication-related challenges she 
may have overlooked in the first interview process. Additional interview information was 
subsequently incorporated in the findings. The results of this study are presented next.   
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Chapter 4: Results 
In addition to the usual complexity with which risks and crises can be characterized, 
earthquakes pose a unique set of communication challenges for earthquake scientists. This 
chapter summarizes the content generated by the subject matter expert in relation to the 
four research questions that guided this study: 
RQ 1: What are the general challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face 
during the pre-crisis communication stage of CERC? 
RQ 2: What are the communication challenges earthquake scientists perceive they 
face in communicating with non-experts? 
RQ 3: What are the challenges earthquake scientists perceive they face with 
communicating probability to non-experts? 
RQ 4: To what extent do scientists’ perceptions of their communication align with 
the communication recommendations of the pre-crisis stage of the CERC model? 
The interview process is fluid (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011), and this study was exploratory in 
nature. The researcher would ask a question and the participants would talk in length, often 
entering other dimensions of the topic the researcher did not foresee. Thus, the results of 
this study capture the common themes that resulted from the interview. The researcher 
identified eight prominent themes based on the transcripts generated by the interviews with 
participants in the study. Although the content for each theme overlaps somewhat with the 
four research questions posed for this study, each theme aligned predominantly with one 
of the first three research questions (see Table 4-3). Data generated in response to RQ 4 
required input from multiple themes to answer.  
65 
 
 The researcher generated an overarching name for each theme to best categorize 
the experience of earthquake scientists. Each theme contains evidence from the 
participants. Some themes contain sub-themes in order to better capture components of the 
experience in more specific terms. The themes represent the eight unique challenges or 
experiences of the earthquake scientists in the endeavor of risk communication. The eight 
main themes are as follows: Communicating Uncertainty, Earthquake Risk Perception and 
“Not Writing on Blank Slates,” Hazard Communication versus Risk Communication 
Responsibilities, Outrage Inciters, Boundaries of Earthquake Communication, Keeping 
Public Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods,” The Economic Value of an 
Earthquake Message, and Code Switching.  
To paint a crystallized interpretation of the experience, the researcher also 
incorporated extant knowledge, helping to create a more dynamic view of the data 
(Ellingson, 2009). For each generated theme, the researcher provided exemplars from the 
interviews, building upon extant knowledge, and using relevant published works to build 
a more thorough understanding and create a crystallized picture of the experience. The 
process of forming a crystallized picture of the phenomena can be achieved to the extent 
desired by the researcher (Ellingson, 2009). The researcher drew from various published 
sources related to the theme to help further explain problematic areas of risk 
communication for experts. By reviewing the transcripts of multiple interviewees with 
varying degrees of specialization in earthquake science as well as documents relevant to 
earthquake probability and early warning, the researcher was able to identify the areas of 
crystallization that are detailed in this chapter. 
  
66 
 
Table 4-3 
 
Interview Themes Aligned with RQs 1, 2, and 3       
 
Research Question     Themes     
 
RQ 1:  General Challenges during the Pre-crisis   Earthquake risk perception and “not 
Stage      writing on blank slates” 
 
Boundaries of earthquake 
communication 
 
Keeping public attention during 
earthquake “quiet periods” 
       
RQ 2: Communication challenges with   Outrage Inciters 
 non-experts       
Code switching 
  
RQ 3: Challenges with probabilistic statements Communicating uncertainty 
 
Hazard communication versus risk 
       communication responsibilities 
 
      The economic value of an earthquake  
message 
             
Note. RQ 4 is answered using a combination of all themes listed above. 
General Challenges during the Pre-Crisis Communication Stage of CERC 
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 1. For the first 
research question, the researcher inquired about the general challenges earthquake 
scientists faced. The researcher categorized “general” challenges as any hardships 
unspecific to communication or probability earthquake scientists perceive they endure. The 
following themes fell under this category: Earthquake Risk Perception and “Not Writing 
On Blank Slates,” Boundaries Of Earthquake Communication, and Keeping Public 
Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods.”  These themes are explained next.  
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Earthquake Risk Perception and “Not Writing on Blank Slates” 
One of the general challenges the earthquake scientists expressed is accounting for 
the varying ways in which the public and stakeholders could interpret their earthquake risk 
message. The participants discussed how difficult it was to provide messages of earthquake 
risk because their audiences already had preconceived notions of the risk. A general 
challenge, thus, with earthquake scientists’ experience of communicating earthquake risk 
was the idea of communicating to non-experts who already had ideas and various 
experiences with earthquakes. Those non-experts were interpreting the risk based on a host 
of influences of which the participants felt they had little to no control.   
The participants all described their experience with this challenge. For example, 
participant nine described the experience in the following manner: 
I know you're not writing on blank slates. The people you’re trying to 
educate already have opinions and so you can’t just tell somebody 
something and they just believe you. You have to figure out what it is they 
believe and then walk them from where they are to where you want them to 
be. That’s a whole other level besides trying to explain things to people and 
them having the numeracy or background to understand. But, if they already 
have own belief, then I think none of us really have training on how to 
effectively communicate. 
Similarly, participant 21 said, “people don’t understand their hazards very well. It’s hard 
for people to perceive their risks. You'll get different responses when you ask people to 
perceive risk.”  
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Regardless of the various perceptions the experts perceived that their audiences 
held about earthquake risk, the participants found it important that the public and 
stakeholders continue to receive earthquake risk information. For example, participant one 
compared responses to risk communication of earthquake risk to the risk of smoking. The 
participant explicated: 
 You can communicate the risk of smoking, and some people stop smoking, 
other people keep smoking and say, ‘this is something I can manage.’ But, 
we don’t have any other option. We have to communicate something, and 
we have to communicate it in an appropriate way. 
Thus, a pressing challenge was addressing differences in earthquake risk perception. 
Although, the participants expressed that if audiences “already have their own belief” then 
none of the scientists “really have training on how to effectively communicate,” the 
participants felt it important that the message was out there. 
In the case of L’Aquila, too, the scientists and government officials failed to 
consider how the lay public would interpret their risk communication. L’Aquila was 
receiving a swarm of smaller earthquakes prior to the main shock. The residents had dealt 
with earthquakes in the area before and may have compared the risk of the present 
earthquake to risks prior. The presented over-simplified message worked in the favor of 
confirmation bias whereby the residents interpreted the messages in overly optimistic 
ways. This may have been due, in part, to a lack of evidence to support the main argument. 
Evidence reporting is important so the public can better comprehend the source of the 
message, its credibility, and opposing arguments (Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014). 
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Considering ways in which non-experts may interpret risk messages is influenced 
by a host of differences. Data from the participants highlighted a particularly prominent 
influence in the context of earthquake risk communication: regional differences in risk 
perception. 
Regional differences in risk perception. As SCEC members came from all over 
the world and are international and national participants of earthquake response, the 
participants discussed the regional differences they noticed in risk perception. Regional, in 
this case, refers to any area: international, national, or local.  
The participants discussed ways in which regional differences made 
communicating earthquake risk challenging. Participant one described the differences in 
probability comprehension and infrastructure of different regions, saying: 
For instance, messages in America are tailored very differently than the 
messages in Italy. People in the United States are used to hearing messages 
of probability. For instance, the weather is given as a message of 
probability, and, in Italy, it is not. Also, in Italy, their buildings are much 
older-- so a small earthquake can yield large consequences. For this reason, 
we face completely different background knowledge of the people [based 
on region] related to the meaning of probability.  
Regional differences in risk perception also included the region’s experience with 
earthquakes. For example, participant one said, “California for instance is much more 
educated about earthquakes.” Similarly, participant 14 said,  
An example of the issues we're currently dealing with are areas where 
induced earthquakes are occurring primarily. In these areas, people are 
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feeling earthquakes and they've never felt them before. So, they are 
probably pretty low on their learning curve. But, at the same time, this is an 
area that has high hazard from tornadoes and other wind events which they 
do have to cope with, so it think it’s a matter of using the things they already 
use and understand and translate it into a hazard they are less familiar with. 
Participant 21, too, described how regional risk perception plays into earthquake 
preparedness. Specifically, participant 21 said, “In California, you have a very high chance 
of the ground shaking, in Kentucky you have some chance. You have to make sure 
consequences aren’t devastating to you and your family. We want to help the public 
prioritize their preparedness.” Likewise, participant 18 asserted,  
I feel like in California, there is a pretty good balance now. There are drills 
every year, there is material available, and there are websites available. 
Other places in the country are harder because the earthquakes come less 
often […]. It’s a little bit of an impossible task because the dangers are lower 
in some places. We need to keep earthquakes on people’s minds, but not as 
much as in California. It’s hard to strike that balance. 
Participant 14 said, “It depends upon where you are in the country. I think in California, in 
particular those who have experienced an earthquake in their memory, perhaps have a little 
better understanding.”  
Participant 12 was more optimistic about the public’s perception of earthquake risk. 
The participant asserted, “My view is that the public taken in aggregate is much more 
sophisticated than we give them credit.” The participant continued by providing an 
example of a field poll in 2012 in California that is conducted every few years, on what 
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people think is the biggest hazard for them personally. The participant stated, “every time 
they do this, earthquakes emerge at the top of the list, as you can imagine. About seventy 
percent of the population, as I recall, said it was the hazard they were most concerned 
about.” However, the survey unveiled something interesting, asserted the participant.  
The survey divided up their poll into Northern California and Southern 
California, San Francisco and L.A. basically. They asked people, when do 
you think the next big earthquake is going to occur? And, there was a 
statistically significant difference in the answer between L.A. and San 
Francisco - with L.A. saying it was going to come sooner. It was consistent 
with the earthquake forecast we posed earlier which said that southern 
California does have a higher probability than northern California for a large 
earthquake. Whether people understand that or not, I do not know. But, their 
intuition is correct: there is more hazard in Southern California. 
While intuition may play an integral and scientifically immeasurable role in risk perception 
(Slovic, 2010), publics of southern California may be primed to earthquake risk as they 
experience more earthquakes and may be more familiar with messages of earthquake risk.  
In sum, the earthquake scientists expressed they were not simply imprinting on 
“blank slates,” rather differences in risk perception varied. Notable differences in 
earthquake risk perception were especially prominent regionally. Another prominent 
theme, entitled Boundaries of Earthquake Risk Communication, describes the 
communication restrictions that the participants experienced. 
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Boundaries of Earthquake Risk Communication 
The participants noted the restrictions of their communication based on the 
communication boundaries set up in different regions. In other words, the participants 
described the experience of having to navigate between the various communication 
systems and standards in place. If communication were to be viewed as something that 
exists in open space, humans have created boundaries on who receives such information, 
who sends it, and when it is received. Each boundary houses its own legislative rules that 
govern communication rules and boundaries. Boundaries are usually set up in a couple 
different ways. Most obvious of boundaries is that of nations (Anderson, 2006). That is, 
nations create communication borders in which information is ‘imported and exported.’ 
Nation-states also include internal boundaries of communication so that there is a 
procedure in place for what should be communicated by whom and when. Other ways 
boundaries are created are through legal systems. Legal systems uphold nation-state 
boundaries.  
Participants described their experience with communication boundaries and the 
impact on their risk communication. For example, participant one explained their 
experience with such boundaries in the following manner:   
Communication is not like in the U.S. where you only have the United 
States Geological Survey. In Italy you have a very clear separation. You 
have a seismology department that communicates scientific information 
like the probability of earthquake or probability of ground shaking then 
there is some other institutions like those of engineers that translate this into 
a probability to be killed into, for instance, the risk of death. Both are linked 
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to the civil protection so the Civil Protection receives information from both 
sides and they have to communicate to the people in a coherent way.  
Participant six also described their experiences with boundaries of communication. 
Participant six explained that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) has the statutory 
responsibility and that regional emergency services, both at the state and the regional level, 
are “the ones that actually have to do it [communicate to non-experts].” Participant 15 
described the communication boundaries set up in New Zealand, saying “we have a New 
Zealand earthquake commission and they assume responsibility for preparing earthquake 
messages. They have advertisements ready to reach public. In New Zealand, before 
anything goes public on website, they check with stakeholders first.”  Participant 16 further 
described communication boundaries they noticed about New Zealand and stated imposed 
limitations placed on earthquake scientists to communicate. The participant stated,  
We provide forecasts when called on by a government agency. After a 
recent big earthquake, we [earthquake scientists] were banned from saying 
anything. We couldn’t say anything without it going through governor’s 
office. But things loosened up afterwards. 
Thus, earthquake scientists perceived they must be cognizant of boundaries of risk 
communication when communicating about earthquakes and those boundaries varied by 
country.  
 The participants also described boundaries in terms of legal protection for their 
communication. For example, the earthquake scientists discussed the implications of the 
L’Aquila earthquake disaster outcome as a lesson for scientists worldwide on different 
boundaries and legal protection offered. Participant 18 said: 
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 I don’t think [the scientists] did anything wrong. The buildings collapsed, 
and the seismologists were blamed. We can learn to blame somebody else 
first. They should have done a number of things better. They didn’t defend 
themselves. One of the lessons is our [America’s] legal system protects us. 
Theirs [Italy’s] doesn’t. 
Similarly, participant 11 shared similar sentiments: 
After an earthquake, the public thinks FEMA comes in and repays them for 
their losses, and that’s not true. So, keeping people realistic is a problem. 
We also face issues with people struggling to gain control in the aftermath. 
So, they'll blame the responders. These are the pressures we face. 
Navigating communication boundaries was a prominent experience of the earthquake 
scientists. These boundaries were exceptionally notable considering the aftermath of the 
L’Aquila earthquake for experts in Italy. While this was standard procedure for Italy, such 
consequences would be unimaginable in other nations who may have legal protection for 
scientists.  
In conclusion, the earthquake scientists expressed that one of their challenges was 
understanding the communication boundaries in place for scientists. As many of the 
earthquake scientists are global researchers working with seismological projects across the 
world, what they can say and to whom differed depending on the communication structures 
in place. Further, legal repercussions for communicating imprecise or contradictory 
evidence was apt to change based on the nation. Another theme that emerged, entitled 
Keeping Public Attention During Earthquake Quiet Periods,” describes the scientists’ 
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perceived challenge in maintaining the publics’ attention during periods of extremely rare 
high-risk seismic activity.  
Keeping Public Attention During Earthquake “Quiet Periods” 
Earthquakes are unpredictable events. Short-term earthquake forecasts yield 
extremely low probabilities, and long-term earthquake forecasts are typically delivered 
within a 30-year time frame. Thus, the participants expressed a dilemma of ensuring people 
are taking the threat of an earthquake seriously, despite these barriers. Specifically, one of 
the challenges expressed by the participants was keeping the public’s attention during such 
long periods of time and convincing them the threat of an earthquake is real and preparation 
strategies are important now. “Quiet periods” is a term one of the participants used to 
describe the times that the risk of an earthquake was extremely low and the public was 
unlikely to be paying attention to earthquake risk.   
Keeping the lay public’s attention during earthquake quiet periods can be a difficult 
endeavor. Participant nine explained the situation as,  
We can try to educate portions of the public that are paying attention to us 
and that have enough education and background to understand it. However, 
communicating to the fraction of the public that are not paying attention to 
us most of the time, except when something happens, is hard. 
Similarly, participant 20 said: 
 If you didn’t have some sort of exercise or drill, there would be no personal 
relationship with earthquakes at all. They happen infrequently. I feel 
scientists need a higher profile during those quiet periods in order to give 
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the public some sort of intuition. So, when something happens, people have 
a better understanding. 
The participants discussed ways that campaigns have been helpful to eliciting excitement 
and interest in earthquake risk. Thus, the researcher coded these portions of the interviews 
as ways to help keep public attention during earthquake quiet periods. These sub-themes 
are not considered challenges, but rather these sub-themes provide insight into the 
earthquake scientists’ perceived ways of keeping public attention.  
The first manner was how the earthquake scientists’ perceived campaigns as helpful 
to preparing the public and keeping them engaged and informed. The other subtheme that 
arose was how the San Andreas (2015) movie helped to bring the publics’ attention to 
earthquakes. Thus, the researcher generated the second subtheme entitled, “Popular 
Culture” to capture the influence that popular movies, television shows, and music can 
have on risk perception. The two sub-themes are described in detail below.   
Campaigns. When the researcher asked the participants about the effectiveness of 
earthquake campaigns, all of the earthquake scientists discussed their positive impact. For 
example, participant three asserted, “I think campaigns are immensely helpful to letting 
people know this threat exists and giving people information about what they can do to 
protect themselves.”  
One campaign, in particular, was mentioned throughout the interviews: the Great 
ShakeOut Earthquake Drill (from here after referred to as ShakeOut). ShakeOut is an 
annual earthquake drill conducted in various regions in the United States and abroad 
(SCEC, 2016). ShakeOut requires participants to “drop, cover, and hold on” among other 
strategies for self-protection. Regions seeking to implement ShakeOut require “significant 
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local or regional coordination, typically by an emergency management agency or an 
alliance of many organizations” (SCEC, 2016).  
Campaigns, such as ShakeOut, can be aligned with Earthquake Early Warning 
(EEW), according to the participants. EEW is a current campaign that provides a warning 
message minutes before the onset of an earthquake. For example, participant 18 said,  
ShakeOut is effective. Most people have a better sense of orientation when 
something happens. We are trying to develop earthquake early-warning 
capability. The idea is that in the worst case, people are confused and not 
thinking clearly, and don’t protect themselves as they should. So, the more 
they can be prepared, and go through the motions of where they can find 
answers, the better off they are when an earthquake happens. 
Similarly, participant 19 described the ShakeOut campaign as a “gateway drug to broader 
preparedness” and that their post-ShakeOut simulation survey results indicate that people 
are taking further actions in preparedness after the ShakeOut drill. The participant further 
added that “Surveys are voluntary after ShakeOut and we know we're likely getting those 
who are more interested in the process and so it’s challenging. We know people are 
reporting they are doing more than just the drill.” Of similar nature, participant 10 said,  
Something like ShakeOut is an opportunity to test early warning and OEF. 
So, it puts responsibility on the individual to think about earthquake risks, 
and in particular, it puts responsibility on the government, FEMA, and other 
similar organizations. And, in terms of taking responsibility and making 
communities more resilient, the campaign is critical. 
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Participant six asserted that ShakeOut has been effective in “getting people to talk about 
earthquakes once a year. It was intended to educate people on an earthquake scenario.” 
And, the progression of ShakeOut is one that is largely disconnected from the scenario, 
such that members of the lay public are doing the drop, cover, and hold on apart from the 
scenario. Participant six also explicated that “Drop, cover, hold on, is visually captivating, 
with a very distinct picture. The visual helps towards the bigger picture of preparing for an 
earthquake.” The drill also acts “as a psychological reinforcement because people see 
others doing it and they do it” (participant six).  
The participants expressed that ShakeOut has been immensely successful in 
preparing the public for earthquakes. Participant seven said,  
I am blown away by what ShakeOut has done. It’s more successful than we 
ever envisioned. ShakeOut started relatively small – among schools and 
then grew beyond Los Angeles. It’s amazing how it’s grown and how many 
people know about it and how its translated earthquake risk to the public.  
Participant eight said, “I think ShakeOut has been really successful. It puts people in a 
tangible situation. It gives them specific actions to act out which is extremely useful.” 
Participant 13 believed that ShakeOut was “very successful for two reasons.” Specifically, 
they said:  
 One, it provided an opportunity for people to talk about it. Two, it has given 
everyone the idea that you drop, cover, and hold on, and it becomes a snap 
response, and that's a life-changing response. It has also been impetus for 
organizations to talk about earthquake response and preparedness. 
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ShakeOut provides information to companies to run the exercise. It is 
helpful to management.  
The participants also discussed ways to improve ShakeOut. Participant seven said, 
“I hope people don’t become jaded by [the drill]. We have to find ways so people don’t 
become complacent.”  Participant eight believed the future of ShakeOut included providing 
help to city planners. The participant said, “I think we need to take ShakeOut a step further. 
There are efforts underway to help improve building codes by providing resources to city 
planners so they could have sense of scale of evacuation and planning needed. And, give 
people scenarios of the impossible to help them plan better” (participant eight). Participant 
nine said,  
ShakeOut is opportunity to have discussion of what happens next. We have 
a lot of trouble conveying to people that maybe you want to wait to enter 
the building until the aftershocks have diffused. Something like ShakeOut, 
when you have people’s attention, you can give them more information. 
Participant 12, “There are always issues about what’s the best way to do a ShakeOut. Now, 
it’s not scenario-based. The original ShakeOut in 2008 was scenario-based; I think 
scenario-based exercises are more real to people. So, that’s one of the debates we have had: 
should we have more scenario-based ShakeOuts?” Additionally, participants discussed 
other influencers to the publics’ perception of earthquake risk namely, the influence of 
popular culture on creating accurate and inaccurate perceptions. 
 Popular culture. Interestingly, almost all of the participants brought up the San 
Andreas movie in their interviews due in part to the movie’s release date close to the time 
of the SCEC meetings. Thus, the researcher generated the sub-theme of Popular Culture 
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to help explain ways in which non-experts’ attention to earthquake risk could be kept 
during “quiet periods.” Sellnow (2010) says that popular culture is “comprised of the 
everyday objects, actions, and events that influence people to believe and behave in 
certain ways” (p. 2). Mediated popular culture is experienced through movies, television, 
and music (Sellnow, 2010).  
The San Andreas (2015) movie is about a magnitude 9 earthquake triggered by the 
West Coast’s San Andreas Fault. The earthquake is so devastating that shaking can be felt 
across the country all the way to the East Coast of the United States. According to 
seismologist, Lucy Jones, who was interviewed by the National Public Radio (NPR), the 
movie portrayed earthquake risk accurately in some ways and inaccurately in other ways. 
Specifically, said Jones, the movie accurately portrayed the “triggering” effect of 
earthquakes whereby one earthquake can “trigger” another one in a distant location. Some 
ways in which the movie inaccurately portrays earthquakes is by implying that they can be 
predicted, which according to Jones, they cannot (NPR, 2015 May 30). Other ways the 
movie inaccurately portrayed earthquakes is by portraying self-protection strategies. Jones 
asserts in the interview that the best protection is to “drop, cover, and hold on” in order to 
protect oneself from flying objects (NPR, 2015 May 30).      
Participant three described the influence of the San Andreas movie on an increased 
earthquake hazard. Participant three said,  
But really, we relied on news media to get the message [of increased hazard] 
out there. The challenge is getting the media to get the message right. It was 
either hurt or helped by the San Andreas movie. The day we released the 
model, the San Andreas movie was released, and so that helped in the sense 
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that it got us more publicity. More people noticed our study because the 
media was all over it. They were running our clips of our study with the 
movie.  
Participant one advocated “If we have training on how to communicate, there can be a 
greater presence of scientists on screen.” Participant one also said that “People like to see 
that” referring to public wanting to see more of the earthquake scientists on screen 
communicating about earthquake risk. Participant nine said,  
I think we could do better job of capturing peoples imagination more. 
Obviously NASA does a great job of capturing the imagination of space 
travel-- that has no real day-to-day bearing of people’s lives or well-being-
- but people get very captured by the science. Maybe if we could do better 
job of that, perhaps earthquakes would feel more real to people and they 
would take more action.  
Some of the participants also noted how the recently released movie, San Andreas, 
helped to both bring awareness to earthquakes and also created misperceptions about the 
risk. Participant 10 said, “The San Andreas movie provided the opportunity for the subject 
to be talked about. But it also causes a lot of damage because of the misconceptions.”  
Similarly, participant three said, “The movie doesn’t get the science right, though. We may 
have spent too much time talking about what the movie doesn’t get right and not about the 
reality. That’s what we were dealing with today.”  
In conclusion, general challenges the earthquake scientists experienced included 
communicating to non-expert audiences with varying perceptions of earthquake risk. It also 
included understanding their boundaries of communication. Keeping public attention 
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during quiet periods involved campaigns. The earthquake scientists further discussed the 
influence of campaigns, such as ShakeOut, in helping to prepare the public for the 
possibility of an adverse effect. Some also discussed the implications of the San Andreas 
movie on generating attention and excitement for earthquake risk albeit the misconceptions 
it simultaneously created.  
Communication Challenges with Non-Experts 
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 2 which inquired 
about the communication challenges earthquake scientists faced with non-experts. The 
researcher categorized “communication” challenges as aspects of participant’s experience 
with non-experts that was communication specific but unaligned with communicating 
probability.  The following themes fall under this category: Outrage Inciters and Code 
Switching. The themes are detailed subsequently. 
Outrage Inciters 
“Outrage Inciters” describes the challenge earthquake scientists’ experience when 
outside voices, such as local citizens, interfere with their risk communication to the public. 
For example, one of the most publicized outrage inciters was Iben Browning. Browning 
was a successful consultant and author who held interest in weather forecasting. Browning 
predicted that a large-magnitude earthquake would occur on the New Madrid Fault on 
December 3, 1990. His prediction was incorrect and widely criticized by the scientific 
community. Nonetheless, he received wide-spread attention for his prediction and caused 
public alarm (Spence et al., 1993).  
Almost all of the participants discussed the negative consequences of outrage 
inciters, particularly that of the local citizen in the period leading up to the L’Aquila 
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earthquake. They felt that non-experts should not enter the conversation and sway 
audiences of illegitimate information. Specifically, when asked about what lessons 
earthquake scientists took away from the L’Aquila earthquake, participant 10 said, “one of 
the lessons of L’Aquila is this local citizen was a problem, so scientists should have 
oppressed this outsider.”  
Participants believed the L’Aquila resident created a distraction from the scientists’ 
messages. Participant 17 stated:  
We can’t allow an inform vacuum to develop. Giuliani, the local citizen 
making predictions during the pre-crisis environment of L’Aquila, claimed 
he could predict an earthquake, and it got a lot of attention. I think that led 
them to ineffectively communicating the risk because of the distraction.  
Participant 16, too, discussed the influence of outside voices at the time of the Canterbury, 
New Zealand earthquakes. During the Canterbury earthquakes, there was a local citizen 
who “became known as the moon man” because he believed that the phases of the moon 
could be used to forecast Canterbury aftershocks. The participant continued to say that this 
local citizen, like Giuliani in the prelude of the L’Aquila earthquake had “attracted some 
following among public and even convinced some people to leave town” (participant 16). 
These outrage inciters “always attract media attention and are believed to some 
perspective” (Participant 16). Participant nine discussed the difficulty of the situation and 
the repercussions of outrage inciters to earthquake scientists’ messages saying, “It’s very 
hard to change beliefs. I think L’Aquila is extreme version of that where there’s someone 
out there that is advocating for something very different than what scientists are trying to 
say.”  Another expressed communication challenge for scientists is that of code switching. 
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Code Switching: Translating Hazard into Understandable Terms 
 Risk communication advocates to tailor your message to your audience needs 
(Sellnow et al., 2009). The earthquake scientists, too, expressed the importance of code 
switching and the challenges that come with it. By naming this theme Code Switching, the 
researcher does not imply the theme to be grounded in the principles of the interculturally-
based idea. Rather, the researcher found the term and its general connotation to be 
appropriate to describe the experiences of the participants.  Code switching can be an 
automatic response, meaning the sender of the message is unaware that they are changing 
their language based on their audience, or it could be deliberate meaning that the sender is 
deliberately changing their message to meet their audience’s needs. Code switching is 
important for earthquake scientists as they are often having to discuss with engineers, 
reporters, and other stakeholders about the earthquake risk and must phrase terms that are 
understandable to the receiver of the message. Further, code switching is important 
because, often times, earthquake scientists are the first in line in a long line of receivers of 
earthquake risk messages. That is, the earthquake scientists generate the earthquake risk 
message depending on their forecast and passes the message along to others. Similar to the 
game of “telephone,” the relayed message may get manipulated in the process and the end 
message may result in something much different than what the earthquake scientists 
intended. The devastating outcome of L’Aquila earthquake perfectly exemplifies this idea. 
Thus, it is important for earthquake scientists to code switch appropriately, ensuring that 
their intended message is received accurately.  
The scientists talked about the difficulties of others understanding their technical 
information presented and that sometimes they omit or present the information in different 
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ways depending on with whom they are speaking. For example, participant three said, 
“Probabilities are hard for humans and are particularly hard for people with no scientific 
background, which is most of the public.” The earthquake scientists discussed changing 
their message based on their audience. For instance, participant 20 discussed the difference 
in communicating with engineers about building codes versus the public: 
We make probabilistic maps for the building code. We make a map that’s 
called, ‘two percent probability of exceeding 50’ Nobody understands what 
that means. But it has a probability of being exceeded. Super hard to 
understand except by those people doing building codes. We take 
probabilities off when we're talking to the [general] public.  
Participant 20 described discussing risks with non-experts and said, “Usually we just take 
the probabilities off. We typically just show colors and no probabilities. In general, people 
just want to know what their risk is relative to everything else.” 
One participant discussed how they are implanting more simple language on the 
USGS website. Specifically, participant 21 said:  
The public needs to know the risk they face. Then they need to know how 
to react before, during, and after earthquakes. So, that’s why we're trying to 
learn more from social scientists. We just recently made a new section on 
our website that’s called ‘101’ for non-experts. 
Similar to how language proficiency improves with time and bi-lingual individuals learn 
to better code switch, the earthquake scientists too expressed their communication with 
non-experts as improving over time. For example, participant seven said: 
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The way in which our research results are presented are much better 
formulated now they were, let’s say, 20 years ago. So, now when we give 
presentations to the public, we know how to present our graphics and we 
know how to talk about what we do in terminology they will understand. 
The biggest challenge in the pursuit of communicating the information to non-
expert audiences was providing information that was simple and accurate. Participant 19 
elaborated upon their experience in the following manner: “a balance is trying to be 
achieved between the simplicity of information and improving the accuracy of scientific 
information being given.” Participant 15 said:  
We are most comfortable with providing the numbers. There is a lot of 
discussion in terms of how to translate the numbers into words, and we don’t 
have agreement on that yet. There is still a lot of work on how to 
communicate these small numbers and probabilities.   
Participant 11 expressed, “What makes you a great scientist is being a great 
communicator.” However, participant 10 described potential complexities that could arise 
even with word choices when translating the probability into words,  
I think what was missing in my opinion is when you use words like ‘likely’ 
or ‘extremely likely’ I think you have to be careful because what I find 
likely and what other people find likely is different. 
Similarly, participant 16 explained:  
It is difficult to convert probability into words. The suggestion we receieved 
was to use a scale of 90 percent or higher which means extremely likely, 50 
percent means likely and five percent means unlikely. We've been told to 
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use this type of scale. The problem is the words seem to be welded into the 
numbers meaning that if you told someone there is a 5 percent chance of 
their house catching fire, that’s not a serious threat. So, if you have low 
probabilities, it appears as nonsense to people. This is the difficulty we face.  
Thus, the participants realized the sensitivity involved with communication: even 
providing certain words, such as “likely,” could elicit different risk perceptions.  
Tailoring the message to the audience’s communication needs also depended on the 
probability of the earthquake risk. Participant nine explained,  
At the time you issue a forecast, depending on how dire the forecast, your 
message is different. If the risk is low probability, a preparedness message 
is appropriate that reminds everybody to be prepared. If the risk is higher 
probability, like the aftermath of a large earthquake, and you want to keep 
people out of large buildings, then the message is very different. Then the 
message entails that the main earthquake is over, but we are still in an 
ongoing sequence. I think there are different most important messages. 
Other participants describe the difficulty of translating the hazard into risk. 
Participant eight provided a common analogy they like to give of a house hanging at the 
edge of a cliff.  
I ask the audience, would you want to live in that house? And they say, no. 
Right? Because it’s precarious, it could fall anytime. Well, do you expect a 
scientist to tell you exactly the time and place where that cliff is going to 
fall off at any given time? It's very simple physics, it is gravity working on 
the ground. But the thing is, the land is held together in such a complicated 
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way, even in that one spot, that you can’t expect a scientists to tell you 
exactly when that will happen because it’s very complicated. So, with 
earthquakes, imagine now it is slipping, so now it’s even more complicated. 
So, you can’t expect a scientist to come in and say, okay this will slip at two 
pm in five days. So when you put it in that context, people say oh, okay! 
One of the participants brought up communicating the probability in terms of 
comparison. Participant three suggested:  
People must take risk into perspective with other risks in their lives. The 
key to describing probabilities is to relate it to something else in their lives. 
For example, people choose whether or not to ride a bike to work. Low 
probability but high consequence. 
For example, participant 14 believed: 
It’s useful to do comparative analysis among other types of hazards. So it 
can put earthquake hazard into context. I’ve been trying to find ways to put 
the hazards into perspective, and it turns out by if you think about any 
particular spot in Oklahoma, which is part of Tornado alley, the chance that 
a tornado will go through that spot, is about the same as what we use for the 
building codes, 1 in 2,500. So there may be some ways that we can make 
some bridges there to explain what is going on. So by analogy to other types 
of hazards that people have had experience with, might be a way of trying 
to communicate these low probabilities hazards and why we should pay 
attention to them. 
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Participant 10 said that scenarios help people visualize the earthquake situation. But, 
warned the participant, “Scientists worry whether the scenarios reflect epistemic 
uncertainty, but I think they go some ways towards helping people visualize the range.”  
Similarly, participant 13 discussed context based approaches but was dubious of 
their effectiveness. Participant 13 stated,  
A lot of it is simply people have a lack of context. Some people feel that it’s 
important to put things into contexts with other hazards. I don’t know how 
useful that is because, for example, I have no idea what the likelihood of 
getting struck by lightning. 
Participant seven, too, believed that the average person would have difficulty digesting a 
message such as 50% probability in the next thirty years. “In that case, put it in more 
deterministic terms or put it into more qualitative terms rather than quantitative. However, 
I wouldn’t want anyone to get in trouble. Ultimately, put the message in action terms if 
needed” (participant seven).  
Moreover, the participant explicated why continuously disseminated probabilities 
are advantageous to stakeholders as much as they are for scientists.  
So, you negotiate with stakeholders and say, ‘okay if we get to this level 
we’re going to do something.’ So, that way we turn the probability into 
actions. But, those thresholds need to be continually revised and adjusted to 
situations. Those thresholds depend on aversion to risk as much as the 
hazard. That’s why it’s not just an issue for OEF, but it’s also an issue for 
the stakeholders. (Participant 12) 
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Participant 12 also advocated for the importance of feedback to assess the effectiveness of 
earthquake messages.  
I would roll out a system and in places where people are more informed 
about the earthquake hazard problem and have a publicized event about this 
system we are interested in to gain feedback from the community. These 
systems that provide two way communication such as ‘did you feel it?’ have 
been highly successful and people like to participate in those things. So I 
think messaging could be built in. 
The participants also discussed the challenges of code switching with media 
correspondents. Participant 18 said,  
Reporters are always trying to find something sensational. So, we have to 
make sure whatever comes out, we are leaving people more informed rather 
than less informed. If some press report comes out with some odd 
perspective, we have to scramble. We need to have common message. If we 
don’t agree with each other as experts, that is what the press likes to play 
up. An argument among experts: it’s not understood or it’s something that 
is being hidden. [Scientists] need to coordinate early and get the right 
talking points. 
Participant three said, “We rely on news media to get the message out there. The challenge 
is getting them to get the message right.” Similarly, participant 14 said,  
A lot of our communication works through the media as a filter. So, with 
the media in particular, there’s a sensationalism that they may want. So we 
have to get them to dial back from that. To guide them to resources to help 
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people understand the risk. I think this is the reason why things like putting 
down the roots is so valuable so that there is a messaging that goes out. 
Participant 20 believed there needed to be “more communication and more anecdotes.” 
However, the participant felt that the style of news stories oversimply the complexity of 
earthquake risk. As a result, the participant suggested that more anecdotes were needed to 
help clarify the complexity of earthquakes and the risk they pose. The participant 
explained: 
Unfortunately, anecdotes are not the type of language used in news stories. 
It’s always, ‘the earthquake struck at this time.’ Okay, well it’s there at that 
time, but they don’t explain that because of the waves it’s over there and 
over there later. I think we should never miss an opportunity to change the 
conversation. How these earthquake happen and how you feel them. 
(participant 20). 
Participant 11 touched light on the power of humanizing scientists and what it can do for 
how others view scientists and their message. Specifically, participant 11 brought up how 
during some tremors, a seismologist was being interviewed by the news for the first time: 
“She was holding her toddler and being interviewed. And it was so reassuring for the 
public” (participant 11).  
Participant seven discussed how they believe working with the media is getting 
better with time. They explained:  
The media has gotten so much better, too; 25 ago, L.A. writers got it wrong 
or sensationalized it. Now, stories are being written very well. There is 
usually a partnership between the author and the scientists, so they don’t go 
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off and write things on their own agenda. Things are much stronger now 
than they were. But, we have to make sure people are not getting 
complacent. (Participant seven) 
In sum, participants described current ways in which they adjust their message to 
meet their audience communication needs and worldview. The term “code switching” is 
used by the researcher to categorize this experience. While the earthquake scientists 
understood the importance of code switching, they experienced difficulty in doing so and 
sought to find more appropriate means of getting their messages across. Technical 
information was particularly difficult to translate into more simple forms for the earthquake 
scientists.  
Challenges with Probabilistic Statements 
This section details the themes that aligned with answering RQ 3. The researcher 
inquired about the challenges earthquake scientists faced with probabilistic statements. The 
researcher categorized “probabilistic” challenges as those which focused specifically on 
communicating the likelihood of the risk. The following themes fall under this category: 
Communicating Uncertainty, Hazard versus Risk Communication Responsibilities, and 
The Economic Value of an Earthquake Message. The themes are detailed subsequently. 
Communicating Uncertainty 
The theme entitled “communicating uncertainty” refers to the difficulty the 
earthquake scientists experienced when attempting to communicate the uncertainty 
involved with the nature of earthquakes and in the outcomes of their models. In the process 
of communicating uncertainty, the earthquake scientists perceived a struggle between the 
desire to communicate uncertainty and maintaining credibility with their non-expert 
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audience. That is, the earthquake scientists perceived that if they communicate uncertainty, 
will non-experts decrease their trust towards scientists’ messages? Moreover, earthquake 
scientists wondered if non-experts will perceive scientists to be less credible if they 
communicate the uncertainty of their findings. Participant one described the experience of 
communicating the uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting in the following 
manner, “Your credibility is harmed. If you say something and something else occurs, it 
ruins your credibility with the public.” 
Communicating uncertainty in the realm of earthquake risk meant two different 
things. First, communicating uncertainty for the earthquake scientists meant 
communicating the uncertainty involved with the nature of earthquakes and it meant 
communicating the uncertainty involved with the tools the scientists used to arrive at the 
earthquake forecast. Participants expressed the dilemma involved in communicating 
uncertainty. For example, participant one said: 
I would like to emphasize again that this kind of issue is hotly debated in our 
community because people realize that our credibility is it at stake. If we 
communicate something that is misunderstood, our credibility could drop. This is 
something people don't want. 
Similarly, participant six said, “You get people who have heard us say we can't predict 
earthquakes and then they say, well you can't predict anything. Then when we say there's 
a ten percent chance today of the San Andreas earthquake, they discount it.”  
The following sections explain one of the participants’ greatest perceived perils of 
communicating earthquake risk: communicating the uncertainty surrounding the nature of 
earthquakes and the uncertainty of the models used to generate forecasts. The researcher 
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also generated further relevant sub-themes to communicating uncertainty namely, 
perceived inter-expert variability in understanding uncertainty, and perceived variability 
between experts’ and non-experts’ tolerance to uncertainty.   
Communicating the uncertainty of the nature of earthquakes. Communicating 
the uncertainty involved with the nature of earthquakes means being able to explain their 
unpredictable nature. Earthquakes have no identifying precursor and, thus, are extremely 
difficult to foresee in the short-term (Jordan et al., 2011). Earthquake scientists can only 
make probabilistic statements years in advance that an earthquake is due in a certain region 
and in a certain interval of time (Jordan et al., 2011). Forecasting in the short-term is nearly 
impossible and earthquake scientists are only able to make very low probabilistic forecasts. 
In essence, the public is largely unaware of the important considerations of earthquake risk 
assessment (i.e., temporal decay, magnitude differences relative to the largest earthquake 
in the sequence, and spatial distribution). 
The participants noted the difficulty that arose with understanding earthquakes 
given their unpredictable nature. Specifically, participants noted that earthquakes have no 
diagnostic pre-cursor and, thus, are extremely difficult to forecast. For example, participant 
12 explained the situation in the following manner:  
We don’t have techniques that provide diagnostic precursors. In other 
words, it would be nice if there was some signal that would happen. Instead, 
what we have are statistical techniques that are validated for use and based 
on seismic activity. What we know are that earthquakes are highly clustered 
phenomena. In other words, if we have one earthquake, we are likely to 
have more. 
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Participant six expressed that due to the unpredictable nature of earthquakes, making 
deterministic predictions may never be possible. Specifically, the participant said:  
There are good theoretical reasons for believing there will never be any real 
precursors to earthquakes. So having deterministic predictions that an 
earthquake is going to happen tomorrow, I don't think will ever happen. I 
don't see the research improving our ability to process all the information 
quickly and make defensible statements. I don't see anything that's likely to 
increase the probabilities because it goes back to the issue of all the 
earthquakes seem to start in the same way. 
Participant six noted that earthquake scientists can, however, rely on earthquakes to occur 
in “earthquake-prone regions” and “every earthquake makes another earthquake more 
likely.” As such, earthquake scientists can make forecasts with more confidence in those 
regions. For example, participant six provided an analogy of the clustered-nature of 
earthquakes stating,  
It's essentially like predicting rain in Kauai. I don’t need to see the radar, its 
Kauai, it'll probably rain today. The day after magnitude seven, we are 
probably having magnitude fives. It would be a very rare magnitude seven 
if it were not followed by some magnitude five. So, we can predict it without 
knowing anything else.  
Participant nine commented, too, on the clustered nature of earthquakes and said, “There’s 
sometimes more ability to forecast than others. So, after large earthquake there will most 
certainly be some aftershocks, we can give estimates of aftershocks sizes we think there 
will be.” Thus, two characteristics of earthquakes the participants expressed was more 
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predictable were the idea that earthquakes occur in clusters and earthquake prone regions 
are likely to have earthquakes. When asked about the limitations of earthquake forecasting, 
Participant 10 said, “It’s limited not by technology, but by our physical understanding of 
the earth’s crust. We're not able to predict earthquakes with any certainty. We are able to 
make very low probabilistic statements about the future.”  
While earthquake scientists are comfortable with the idea that every earthquake 
makes another more likely, one of the participants explicated this is not common 
knowledge for non-experts. Specifically, participant 10 explained the difficulties of 
communicating the nature of earthquakes: 
If I tell you the most likely time for an earthquake is right after an 
earthquake, you’re much more comfortable with the idea that with the first 
earthquake you've somehow released stress and energy, but that's not what 
we see in the data. So, communicating that after a new earthquake, the risk 
of another is going to shoot up is challenging.   
Participant three believed the public was aware of aftershocks but they did not know much 
more. Participant three explicated, “All the public knows is there is such a thing as an 
aftershock. And they know that an aftershock can be largely damaging. But that’s about 
it.”   
Another unique characteristic of earthquakes expressed by the participants as 
difficult to communicate was the temporal nature of earthquakes. The temporal nature of 
earthquakes refers to the hyperbolic decay that is characteristic of earthquakes. Participant 
10 explicated that while the public may understand that earthquake scientists are unable to 
predict earthquakes with certainty, “When it comes to time-dependent earthquake 
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forecasting, I think the public doesn’t understand temporal decay.” Participant six 
explained temporal distribution characteristic of earthquakes in the following manner:  
People don't understand the nature of the temporal distribution. So, if there 
is a 10 percent chance of an earthquake in the next three days, what that 
actually means is that there is a really high probability right now. But, that 
probability is dying off with time, and three days from now the probability 
is essentially all gone. That's a hyperbolic decay. 
Participant 20, too, explained the temporal nature of earthquakes, saying:  
Earthquakes evolve over time and happen in miles…and those waves 
propagate to you at different times. So, your intensity is different than 
others’ intensity. Our entire language of earthquakes are one number, one 
size fits all. And, that’s not how earthquakes are. It’s a function of space 
and time that produces effects at different times with different amounts of 
intensity and the amount of damage that happens is a function of the 
engineering of infrastructure. 
Participant six explained most people compare earthquake risks to the “weather 
conditions they are used to hearing” which use a different distribution and does not take 
into consideration temporal decay. Misinterpretation of hyperbolic decay includes the 
public believing that there is an even probability of an earthquake for the next three days, 
or that the most likely time for an earthquake is three days from now. Participant six 
explains, “Both of those have been misinterpretations that have been made of those 
statements. I have advocated that we need to spend more time explaining the nature of the 
time decay.”  
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Communicating the uncertainty of models. Participants disclosed that in addition 
to communicating the uncertainty surrounding the unique nature of earthquakes, they 
experienced difficulty communicating the uncertainty of their models to non-experts. 
Participant 10 expressed the situation in the following manner, “How do you communicate 
the range of possibility and the uncertainty of our models? I think we don’t train scientists 
how to communicate uncertainty.”  
Participant 16 explained that earthquake scientists typically work with the two 
different models to arrive at their findings. “So, there are basically two sorts of models. 
There are the short-term models on aftershocks. Then the other sorts of models that are 
based on precursory seismicity patterns and they’re more long term” (participant 16).    
Regardless of the model, however, uncertainty abounds. Participant three said, 
“The problem is all models are an approximation of the real system. So, all models are 
ultimately wrong, but are right in certain ways.” Participant nine explained the extent of 
uncertainty in the process:  
I think we’ve been phrasing it in terms of providing a range. For example, 
we will say, ‘we think there will be two to seven earthquakes of magnitude 
five or greater.’ I think people can understand that the range is our 
uncertainty. I think it’s a lot more difficult in situations where we’re talking 
about aftershocks – we’re talking about multiple events and we’re trying to 
say something quantitative about how many events. But, in situations where 
we’re talking about something that may or may not happen and having to 
give a probability is difficult. And then communicating that there is 
uncertainty in our computation of that probability. 
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 Participant six, too, advocated: 
I don't think we should not be kidding how much we don't know. I think we 
should be communicating how random the process is, and, in fact, we 
understand it very well. People need to hear that we understand it because 
that reduces the fear. The focus on certainty should be the focus on the 
random. 
In this sense, expressed participant six, explicating the randomness would, in essence, be 
expressing the certainty of the model used to generate the forecasts. Participant six said:  
The big earthquakes are infrequent enough that when people try to look for 
patterns with limited data, human beings are very good at finding patterns 
in random distributions. So, we think we found something and then you 
have to wait years before you confirm it with other earthquakes and then 
you discover that in fact it was coincidence. So, we have been misled a lot 
of times because of that. 
Low probabilities. Given the nature of earthquakes and the difficulty to predict 
with certainty, earthquake scientists are often dealing with very low probabilities an 
earthquake will occur. For example, the participants described that the likelihood for a 
short-term earthquake forecast to reach five percent probability was extremely rare. Most 
earthquake forecasts yielded probabilities to the order of 1 percent or less.  Thus, another 
component of communicating uncertainty of the nature of the risk involves being able to 
work with and communicate low-probability statements.  
The participants discussed the difficulty of communicating low probabilities to 
non-experts. For example, Participant 10 described it as “So, even when there is lots of 
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activity, it will still be below five percent. Our models now show, instead of a one percent 
probability of an earthquake, now we have five percent.” Similarly, participant 12 
explicated the situation in the following manner: 
The probability of having a big earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, let’s 
say during the week of the SCEC meeting, is something on the order of 10 
to the minus seven in average probability. But, if we had seismic activity 
occurring on the San Andreas Fault, let’s say an earthquake of magnitude 
four had occurred near the San Andreas Fault, then those probabilities 
would jump up by a factor of a thousand. Now, that still means they would 
be a tenth of a percent. That’s still a small probability. 
Participant nine said, “Right not we can give a probability that something might happen. 
We cannot say anything with any certainty. We are constantly misjudging between 
something will happen and nothing will happen.”  
Communicating such small probabilities to other audiences is extremely 
challenging. For example, participant 15 said: “I think the main thing is people find it 
difficult to understand probabilities, especially small ones.” Participant 14 asserted, 
“Dealing with heavy tail probabilities is really a challenge for people to internalize a hazard 
they don’t see. Earthquakes are mysterious you get no warning, and being able to convince 
people they are real, even though they have no experience with them is a big challenge.” 
Participant 13 explicated that earthquake probability are particularly troublesome for others 
to interpret, saying: 
The users are making different kinds of decisions based on their pre-
knowledge. If you’re talking to reporter or government official or fire chief 
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or emergency responder - probability may mean nothing to them. They 
don’t have a lot of familiarity with very small probability and almost none 
with earthquake probability. 
Further, the participant discussed the difficulty of communicating such small chances of a 
big event occurring to engineers and public health officials helping to create more resilient 
infrastructures in preparation for earthquakes. For example, participant 14 described the 
challenge of working with such small probabilities by explaining the process of building 
the earthquake design elements in building codes. Participant 14 said building earthquake 
design elements in building codes involves acknowledging that they are preparing for an 
event that has the probability of occurring once every 2,500 years. Participant 14 continued 
to say: 
We are working with low probabilities that something will happen even 
during the lifetime of a structure or a person’s life. Nonetheless, should they 
occur, they would be extremely serious. So, this is the tradeoff. For 
example, trying to get people to deal with the 100 year flood - that’s an 
enormous probability from an earthquake standpoint! 1 in 100 chance per 
year is big in our business. Occasionally, we'll have things that will rise to 
that level and maybe we can learn things from working with these other 
communities where the hazard is much more.  
Learning from communities whose hazard is increased may help to understand how to 
handle similar situations.  
Low probabilities are extremely difficult to communicate: one may either get the 
reaction of apathy or, conversely, one may give the reaction of fear of such an unlikely 
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event. With probabilities that small, it is difficult to get people to pay attention. However, 
if such an event were to occur, it could have detrimental effects should the individual not 
take action to protect oneself. Participant 14 said,  
We are concerned about extremely unlikely things. But the extremely 
unlikely things are where the big effects are going occur. So all these heavy-
tailed distributions. So, the ordinary earthquakes maybe get people’s 
attention, but they don’t really present a hazard. It’s the very unlikely event 
that we really worry about. 
Participant nine said,  
“On a more practical side, if people understood a little more about the 
science and what we are trying to do and kind of what we know and don’t 
know, they might have better sense of what’s going on. Have more of a 
sense of the uncertainty.” 
Participant 11, too, believed that the “whole story must be told” regarding earthquake 
science and risk. The participant said, “I think there is an overall need to have people 
understand context of earthquakes. I don’t think you can have a successful campaign that’s 
just around elevated probability, this would be too narrow.”  
The participant believed that painting the “whole picture” included adding science 
to the curriculum, having science be talked about in news so that people “understand it, 
believe it, have it personalized, and can take actions.” The earthquake scientists concluded 
with “This is something we have to continue to promote.”  
Expert and non-expert acceptance of uncertainty. Another noteworthy sub-
theme the researcher generated was the level of acceptance for uncertainty in earthquake 
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forecast messages the participants perceived between themselves and the lay public. The 
earthquake scientists perceived that the public has lower levels of acceptance for 
uncertainty and preferred more deterministic statements than did experts. Participant 11 
explained the situation in the following way, “When you’re talking about probability, 
scientists want to say, ‘here's what we don’t know’ but that for the public to trust science, 
they get confused – they really want some confidence in what you’re saying.” Similarly, 
participant nine said, “A lot of the public does understand we can’t predict with certainty- 
that we have to give them something in between. My sense is there is not a lot of 
quantitative understanding.” Participant five noted, too, scientists are much more accepting 
of uncertainty and even question forecasts made with too much certainty saying, “We’re 
always criticizing each other if we see there is not enough statement of uncertainty.” 
While the earthquake scientists perceived that the public had lower levels of 
uncertainty acceptance than did they, one of the participants noted that it was a balancing 
act for scientists in terms of ensuring their non-expert audience felt confident to take 
actions based on the forecast. Specifically, participant seven said,  
Scientists have to be careful not to present a picture to the public that things 
are so bad because this is often not the case. Things may be bad in certain 
area, but there are always things you can do to mitigate your risk. 
Probabilities are really important, and it’s how we keep each other honest. 
We’re always stating how much we know, but we’re always criticizing each 
other if we see there is not enough statement about uncertainty or error and 
the probability. Most of the public doesn’t understand probability or they 
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may misinterpret it or think if the probability isn’t really high, why do 
anything about it? 
Participant one said, we “must be honest” and “we shouldn’t over emphasize or under 
emphasize our knowledge.” However, said participant one, “finding the balance is a 
challenge. The balance between communicating that we can’t predict earthquakes but that 
we aren’t completely clueless.” The participant continued to say that science is: 
A continuum of knowledge. On one end is being able to predict earthquakes 
and on the other is knowing nothing. Although we cannot predict 
earthquakes, there is a large space in that continuum in which we exist. So 
we know a great deal, but it’s difficult communicating this. (Participant one) 
The earthquake scientists perceived themselves as having more acceptance for uncertainty, 
however, they did not want their criticism of determinism to overshadow their messages to 
the public about earthquake risk. Thus, there was a delicate balance for earthquake 
scientists as they attempted to communicate what they knew, maintain their credibility, and 
make the public feel confident in taking action while also ensuring that they are not 
oversimplifying the complexity of earthquake risk.  
Expert-to-expert challenges. Participants expressed that the problem of 
communicating uncertainty was an internal problem (between experts) as much as it was 
an external problem (expert to non-expert). A challenge that emerges in the earlier stages 
of communicating technical information is coming up with a consensus of the risk at-hand 
among experts. Once an expert has determined there is a risk of an earthquake, he or she 
may consult with other experts in order to gain reinforcement, approval, or feedback of 
their risk assessment. Experts may not agree with one another, take time to provide a 
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consensual assessment of the risk, and may disagree on the best forms to communicate the 
probability. Attaining agreement amongst experts can be a grueling and time-consuming 
task in any discipline, however, it is especially pertinent to earthquake scientists due to the 
immense uncertainty involved in earthquake forecasting.  
Participant one explained their experience:  
Probabilistic illiteracy is not only among the public it is also among our 
community. Usually seismologists are trained for determinism in the sense 
that they are trained to find the physical law that can predict exactly what is 
going on. So, probabilistic models are not very well used among our 
community. Some people do not fully appreciate what probability is and 
how it can be helpful. For this reason, they won’t communicate any 
probability at all. 
When discussing the challenges in communicating probability to non-experts, participant 
10 noted, “It’s a real challenge. I mean it’s already a massive challenge to communicate to 
even people on the same level, people not too far removed from it, exactly what our models 
are.” Similarly, participant 12 said, “Probabilities are tricky business. In some ways, it is 
very simple, but in some ways it is very complex. So, even the scientists that are deeply 
involved in this problem, I would say sometimes mess up in understanding probability.”  
When asked about the challenges of communicating probability, participant 14 asserted, 
“that’s the problem we haven’t solved… and [laughter] even people in the sciences have 
not solved with probability.” 
Recently, scientists debated about disseminating more deterministic statements of 
earthquake risk when such determinism is impossible. In August of 2015, scientists at 
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NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory released an article in which they assert a 99.9% 
probability of a magnitude five or greater earthquake in Los Angeles by April of 2018 
(Donnellan et al., 2015). The NASA scientists came to this prediction using the Gutenberg-
Richter law which states that for every 1,000 magnitude three earthquakes, there are 100 
magnitude four earthquakes, 10 magnitude five earthquakes, one magnitude six earthquake 
(Mulargia & Geller, 2003). The forecast, however, was “immediately disputed by the U.S. 
Geological Survey, the nation's lead agency overseeing earthquake science, which says 
there is an 85% chance of such a quake” (Lin, October 2015, para. 3). Usually the forecasts 
generated are low, and thus any highly predictive statements are considered illegitimate.  
The USGS claimed that such high certainty predictions could not be made and that 
the NASA scientists implied time to Gutenberg-Richter relationship when no such time 
component exists. USGS scientist, Lucy Jones, stated in an interview for the Los Angeles 
Times, “He's [referring to Donnellan] put a time feature into this, and Gutenberg and 
Richter did not have time in the equation" (Lin, October 2015, para. 17). In the interview, 
Lucy Jones goes on to discount the published research on the grounds of the lack of 
uncertainty in a 99.9% prediction saying that, “we don’t believe this is proven well enough 
to be worth any change in advice to local governments. It’s not justified. It’s not tested.” 
(para. 23). Thus, advocates against NASA’s recently released evidence are weary of such 
information and hesitant to disseminate such certainty surrounding earthquake prediction. 
In conclusion, one of the biggest challenges the earthquake scientists faced in their 
endeavor of communicating earthquake information was communicating the uncertainty 
involved in the process. Specifically, the earthquake scientists faced complications 
communicating the uncertainty of the nature of earthquakes and the uncertainty of the 
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models used to generate their earthquake forecasts. Further, the earthquake scientists were 
aware that the issue of understanding uncertainty was as much an internal problem 
(amongst experts) as it was an external problem (expert to non-expert). Another prominent 
theme that the researcher generated from the interview data was the distinction the 
earthquake scientists made between seeing their role as communicating hazard and not 
communicating risk. This theme is discussed in further detail next.  
Hazard versus Risk Communication Responsibilities 
Another theme that the researcher generated from her interviews was the distinction 
the earthquake scientists made between communicating hazard and communicating risk. 
The difference between seismic risk and seismic hazard is an important one from which to 
distinguish in earthquake forecasting. Seismic hazard is a forecast of the intensity of the 
natural event at a specific location during a specific interval of time. Conversely, seismic 
risk is a forecast of “the damage to society that will be caused by earthquakes, usually 
measured in terms of casualties and economic losses” (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 327). Jordan 
et al. (2011) assert that risk depends on the hazard but is also dependent on a community’s 
exposure (i.e., its population’s understanding of the risk and the actual built environment). 
Risk is also dependent on the community’s vulnerability to additional hazards taking place 
such as fires and dam failures. Community resilience is the term for “how quickly a 
community can recover from earthquake damage,” and resilience is inversely related to 
risk (Jordan et al., 2011, p. 327). Thus, risk quantification can be extremely difficult and 
complex as it involves “detailed knowledge of the natural and built environments, as well 
as highly uncertain predictions of how regions will continue to develop economically” (p. 
327).   
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Almost all of the participants discussed explicitly their responsibilities as scientists 
in these terms. They made it clear that the role of an earthquake scientist is one in which 
they communicate the hazard. The risk, on the other hand, was up to government officials 
or other stakeholders to communicate. Participants one and 12 explained the difference 
between hazard and risk and explained the role that scientists played with the two. 
Participant one said, 
The situation is a little bit complicated because scientists only calculate 
hazard. Hazard is assessing the probability of the ground shaking. But, 
that’s not all— there is also another aspect to this, what we call risk. It’s not 
just probability to have the ground shaking but also the probability for 
individuals to get killed from an earthquake.  
Participant 12 compared risk and hazard, saying:  
Risk is a much more subjective issue. Taking risk actions means making 
risk decisions and those decisions must be balanced among many issues like 
political considerations and other difficult things to quantify. And, one does 
not want to make those decisions.  
Participant 16 took the example of L’Aquila earthquake disaster to illustrate the 
communication responsibilities of scientists, saying:  
I think it’s important to have a separation of scientific advice from the use 
of it. I think in the L’Aquila situation, it was mixed up. There should have 
been some sort of quantitative statement of hazard from the scientists and 
not just a judgement from civil defense people. I think we need to be quite 
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formal in separating roles. A scientist’s role is not the same as the 
government’s role.  
Similarly, participant 15 said, “I see our goal as providing information and then it’s up to 
other people to see that information and distribute it further. Our goal as scientists is to 
make information available.” And, participant 18 asserted, “The managers are there to 
make decisions. Scientists should be separated from taking actions. As far as talking to the 
public, some scientists should never talk to public. Decisions of risk should not be made 
by scientists.” Similarly, participant one said:  
They [stakeholders] have different responsibilities because they are the 
decision makers - we are not. Their job is even more critical because it’s not 
only enough to communicate what's going on but also possible actions 
people can take. So we have communication problems at different levels, 
but we are working on that. It is really challenging. 
Participant 14 went on to discuss whether or not scientists should cross the line 
between risk and hazard, asserting:  
I think we can do it in a generic way in the sense that we can identify 
building types that are going to be more vulnerable, and through working 
with earthquake engineers and others to describe what those solutions might 
be. But, I don’t think we could go all the way to risk, that’s a risk. In some 
ways, we're going to have to go there in terms of scenarios. I think that’s 
important in terms of communication. For example, if we take a case of 
small city in a state like Oklahoma, that currently has high hazard because 
of earthquake that are being induced. They need to have something that 
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describes what would happen if a large earthquake were to occur. They have 
a lot of old and historic and unreinforced buildings. So just providing 
ground motions is not enough. We have to go all the way through to help 
them understand what the issues may be and what they can do. 
In this sense, communicating risk would be dependent on the audience’s experience with 
the hazard and would dictate the extent scientists should go with communicating risk. 
Participant 17 said, “Policy makers want to know, what to do, and we can only provide an 
answer to part of that which is telling them what the earth is likely to do. So, people who 
understand what the risk is have to be involved such that government gets the information.” 
Participant one said that while risk is difficult to communicate and not the responsibility 
of the scientist to do so, it is incredibly important for scientists to communicate the hazard. 
Participant one said,  
Scientists only know part of the story and that is the hazard. They don’t have 
to claim to have a solution. But, hazard should be communicated. Take for 
example the case of Ebola. I wouldn’t want a medical doctor to hide the 
probability of me contracting Ebola, no matter how small it is. Someone 
else should not be deciding that information for me. 
Communicating hazard meant being able to outsource a probability of the ground shaking 
and make this information available to the public. However, such information is currently 
unavailable and there have been discussions among the scientists whether or not to make a 
continuously operating system communicating hazard available to the public.  
As a means of separating hazard and risk communication responsibilities, the 
earthquake scientists discussed the current deliberations around implementing Operational 
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Earthquake Forecasting (OEF), a system that would provide constant communication of 
seismic hazard (Jordan et al., 2011). This system would be “an open source of authoritative, 
scientific information about the short-term probabilities of future earthquakes, and this 
source needs to properly convey epistemic uncertainties in these forecasts” (Jordan & 
Jones, 2010, p. 573). The goal of OEF is to “provide the public with authoritative 
information on the time dependence of regional seismic hazards” (Jordan & Jones, 2010, 
p. 571). While OEF works on the basis of low probabilities for short-term prediction, it 
provides transparent and timely information to the public regarding the current status of 
seismic activity. Earthquake scientists would discuss with stakeholders to establish 
thresholds for warning messages based on the probabilities (Jordan & Jones, 2010). Such 
threshold warnings would likely seldom be cast because reaching even a 5% (level B) 
threshold is rare. Thus, say Jordan and Jones (2010), “reliable and skillful earthquake 
prediction—i.e., casting high-probability space-time-magnitude alarms with low false-
alarm and failure-to-predict rates-- is still not possible (and may never be)” (p. 573). 
Regardless, such a system would allow individuals accessing the information to make their 
own decision based on the current probability of short-term earthquakes.  
Proponents of OEF also claim the age for advanced communication systems, like 
OEF, in the seismic field is now. Jordan and Jones (2010) assert, “In this age of nearly 
instant information and high bandwidth communication, public expectations regarding the 
availability of authoritative short term forecasts appear to be evolving rather rapidly” (p. 
573). Jordan and Jones (2010) also caution what can happen if authoritative information is 
unavailable in such an age of continuously available information. Specifically, the authors 
warn against “information vacuums” which can occur when authoritative information is 
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unavailable and rumors surrounding earthquakes and false information begin to become 
prominent beliefs in the social sphere (p. 573). Information vacuums can be dangerous to 
earthquake scientists’ messages. For example, if an earthquake scientists were to disagree 
with a local citizen’s popularized prediction that an earthquake was highly probable, the 
public may believe earthquake scientists are denying the truth. Specifically, Jordan and 
Jones (2010) say:  
These rumors [about an increased earthquake risk] pose a particular challenge for 
seismologists because they posit that we will deny the truth; to many people, an 
official denial suggests a confirmation, the best defense against such tautology is to 
demonstrate that the scientific information is always available through an open and 
transparent forecasting process. (p. 573)   
While a large body of scientists agree with implanting OEF and believe in its goals, there 
are other scientists who provide a counter argument to its effectiveness. Wang and Rogers 
(2014) released a published article in response to Jordan and Jones’ (2010) call for OEF, 
and argued that the public may gain a false sense of security if such continuous information 
of low-probability earthquake hazard was released. Specifically, Wang and Rogers (2014) 
highlight two main problems they foresee with OEF. The first, they say, is that OEF is 
based largely on analyses of earthquake clustering or potential foreshock sequences which 
sometimes do not occur before the onset of earthquakes. For example, they note the 1976 
Tangshan and 2010 Haiti earthquakes who all arrived without recognizable foreshock 
sequences. They assert, “OEF would have had difficulty forecasting anomalously high 
probabilities prior to these events” (p. 569).  
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Second, Wang and Rogers (2014) warn against OEF and its overall practicality 
considering social-economic consequences. The authors assert, “a change from practically 
impossible (0.001%) to very unlikely (5%) is not useful for saving lives. The most 
objective measure of the usefulness of a short-term forecast is whether it can guide pre-
seismic evacuation of unsafe buildings” (p. 569). With a 5% probability of an impending 
earthquake or even the extremely rare probability gains of up to 40%, it would be “a 
gamble” to decide to evacuate-- one “which society and economy could hardly afford” (p. 
569). The authors conclude that OEF would ultimately discredit reliable long-term 
earthquake predictions and would disrupt economic functions. The authors propose instead 
that organizations, communities, and the government should make increased efforts to 
retrofit or replace buildings to conform to earthquake resistance provisions (Wang & 
Rogers, 2014). They say countries that have implanted this strategy have benefited, and 
“As a result, fatalities due to building collapse were relatively small given the size of the 
earthquakes” (p. 570).  
The current state of earthquake forecasting is one in which short-term earthquake 
prediction with high certainty is impossible. Discussions over how to improve earthquake 
prediction despite this barrier involve implementing advanced communication 
technologies, such as OEF. However, seismologists disagree on the helpfulness of such 
technologies.  Expert risk judgement aids in the evaluation of generated probabilities from 
earthquake forecasts. 
Despite the controversy, participants were vocal about the benefits of OEF. 
Participant 12 noted, “there is no scholarly debate here. The best protection against 
earthquakes is better and more resilient buildings. Some say that OEF detracts from this 
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because it places focus on short term action versus long term action. I don’t agree.” 
Advocates for OEF are optimistic about the public’s probabilistic comprehension. For 
example, participant 12 noted: 
We should make probabilistic information public all the time. For example, 
at the race track people know to expect probabilistic statements and they 
can use them in that context. So, I think the public can handle statements of 
probability. What we don’t want to do is spring these statements on them 
during a crisis. Through usage and repetition is how the public becomes 
better with this. 
According to participant 12, OEF was “popularized through a series of publications 
in the past 5 years or so.” OEF emerged because 
The problem was everyone was looking for earthquake prediction to 
provide the information to society they needed to prepare for earthquake. 
And, prediction was defined as being very high probability statements that 
earthquake were going to happen. And, seismologists were not able to figure 
out, and still haven’t figured out, how to predict earthquakes with high 
probability. And, so, everybody sort of wasn’t thinking about the possibility 
to provide society with at least some information. So, if you had a big 
earthquake, what was the probability of having a big aftershock? And, that’s 
really the beginning of OEF is providing that type of information. 
(Participant 12) 
There are two objectives to OEF namely, transparency and hazard risk separation. 
The Transparency Principle of OEF essentially states that scientists must provide the public 
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with validated and authoritative scientific information (Jordan et al., 2011). Participant 12 
explained the transparency principle,  
We shouldn’t hide anything we know scientifically, even if what we know 
cannot be stated in simple terms. What that means in practice is that we 
really have to deliver probabilities to the public. That’s the way we 
characterize our information and, so in its purest form, that’s the 
information that’s available.  
Participant 13 said,  
We don’t put out information consistently only after big event happens. So 
we don’t put out information a lot. We always get questions about 
aftershocks and we say something general. One of the goals of an 
operational system is that it’s always there. It’s like weather forecasting. 
You can always get a daily forecast. We get sense of how to understand that 
forecast in terms of reliability. I think the more continuous information 
people get, that’s how we get people familiar with what we know, and what 
we can do. 
The Hazard-Risk Separation principle is based on the notion that estimating the 
probabilities of having an earthquake or estimating hazard is a scientific problem. Risk is 
seen as being subjective and, thus, not the responsibility of the scientists to assess. Instead, 
risk is the task of each individual receiver of the information to determine for him or herself 
(Jordan et al., 2011). 
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Participant six explained the benefits of OEF saying that it allows scientists to 
communicate what they know instead of focusing on what they do not know. Participant 
six asserted: 
 Most of this can be quantified. That's the idea behind what we call OEF. We take 
how much time explaining uncertainty? I think that scientists feel like they need to 
express every qualifier and every statement of uncertainty that by the time we get 
done, we spend too much time focusing on what we don't know. (Participant six) 
Other participants discussed the eventual outcomes of OEF. Participant eight hopes 
through OEF, scientists “can provide forecasts that increase people’s awareness” and 
through the process of providing continuous information it would “get people thinking and 
maybe make sure people are prepared. Maybe it would create the dialogue between 
scientists and the public.”  
OEF is an effort to provide the most complete information possible from earthquake 
scientists at any given time. The main goals of OEF are to provide transparency of 
information, keep scientists’ responsibilities to communicating hazard. With OEF, 
scientists can discuss appropriate thresholds with each stakeholder given their needs. 
According to participant 12, “Well defined procedures should be in place well before a 
crisis.”  
The participants also touched on the idea that OEF became a popularized idea 
following past failures of earthquake communication. The participants perceived the 
L’Aquila earthquake crisis of 2009 as an “opportunity” for OEF (participant 12). OEF 
would be a way for the individual users to assess their own risks and benefits of the 
presented forecast and it would protect scientists. Participant 12 said,  
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The notion of formalizing it into a system that is there and operating, not 
just after aftershock sequences, did not take hold until after the L’Aquila 
earthquake. Frankly we deliberately used L’Aquila as an opportunity to lay 
out an operational system even if the info had low absolute probability 
because we knew we could get high probability gain. 
Participant 14 discussed how there was a “large increase in awareness of earthquakes 
following large crises. These crises events were important in terms of informing the public 
about earthquake safety issues and really beginning to get people to focus on things they 
need to do in the long term.”  
Given how the earthquake scientists saw their responsibilities as those of 
communicating hazard and not risk, the participants provided recommendations for risk 
communicators who translate messages of hazard into risk. Participant one described the 
way they believed earthquake probabilities should be communicated by placing them in 
context because “People are not able to perceive low probabilities.” For example, says 
participant one, “if I were to hear the statistic that there is a one percent chance of having 
a flight accident, I may never get on a plane.” For this reason, participant one advocated 
that numbers should be put into context. “No adjectives. Instead, we should put things in 
terms of how they do the lottery. For example, 1 per 1000 chance or 1 in 100 chance. The 
public is familiar with this type of context.”  
Jordan et al. (2011) provide some important recommendations for the future of 
earthquake forecasting. Among the recommendations, the authors say that objectively set 
thresholds should be established and should aid in justifying actions taken in the decision 
making process. Such a recommendation is critical because, as of late, there is no formal 
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procedure in place for translating earthquake probability into particular actions to employ 
in order to mitigate harm. Participant 12 explicated the process as:  
 You can’t evacuate a city because you have 1% chance of an earthquake. 
So, one of the things we need to do is formulate a series of things that can 
be done… kind of like a menu of actions that can be taken.  
The participant continued to explain that earthquake scientists would generate earthquake 
hazard probabilities and help their stakeholders formulate thresholds based on their 
particular needs.  
Thresholds are not specified by people that do OEF, those thresholds are 
negotiated with the stakeholders in advance. So, that information is 
provided in advance and there is a negotiation. Moreover, those actions have 
to be fine-tuned to the [OEF] system. (Participant 12) 
In conclusion, the participants of the current study described another of their 
challenges as that in relation to their identity as a scientist. The earthquake scientists 
described themselves, in large, as being responsible to generate the numbers related to 
earthquake science. They did not want to engage in the process of risk assessment. They 
felt that risk communication was too subjectively anchored for them to take part and make 
a difference, and they felt as if this was the duty of others such as emergency mangers or 
government.  
Given the outcome of L’Aquila, the scientists push forward the idea of OEF in 
which continuous information of earthquake hazard would be available for stakeholders 
and the public to access. The participants argued that OEF would help to ensure that they, 
as scientists, have done their part in providing messages of hazard. It was then up to each 
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individual user of the information provided to assess his or her own risk. Another theme 
the researcher generated from the research data was the economic value of an earthquake 
message. The theme is discussed next.  
Economic Value of an Earthquake Message 
 Another theme expressed by the participants was the economic value of a message 
or the financial and infrastructural consequences of an earthquake forecasting message. 
The participants inquired about the impact of their forecasting message on the economic 
structure of the region. For example, when asked about what types of message testing 
would be most helpful regarding earthquake forecasting, participant 10 asserted, “One 
thing that would be gratifying for scientists is accurate predictions of risk or [predictions] 
linked to some sort of economic value or something like that.” Similarly, participant 15 
expressed, while scientists are “working on producing the numbers” because they “need to 
find out what do people and our stakeholders want,” the participant expressed the 
frustration that while they can produce the numbers, “the outcome of the numbers can mean 
lots of different things them [referring to individual stakeholders]” and some sort of 
outcome of the message would be helpful. 
The participants suggested that each individual has different costs associated with 
a risk. For example, participant 20 said: 
How do uncertainties translate into real issues for a person? For example, I 
could give a statement and it could be a false alarm. And then, how does 
that uncertainty translate into a cost to you? You might want to know if 
you’re going to have shaking and if it’s going to affect you directly. 
Participant 20 explained,  
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So, if you could boil [cost] down to set of few questions like: how much 
does it cost for you to take this action and for it to have turned out to have 
been unnecessary? And how much does it cost for you to have not taken 
this action and it turns out there was an earthquake? And how much time do 
you need to take action? From those questions, you can do the math. It 
becomes a yes-no function of time. At this moment in time, should my 
device be yelling ‘open the fire house doors’ which may or may not be the 
same thing the device next door is saying.  
Participant 16 believed that the best risk preparation was “to have safe buildings.” They 
believed that “the campaigns being done are great in terms of drop, cover, and hold.” 
However, they believed that practically speaking, “there is a certain level where there are 
bound to be fatalities.  So, we also need to make our cities safe.” However, participant six 
asserted that deciding to evacuate in a business economy could have huge economic 
consequences that it may not in other countries with less weight on their economy. Every 
country has a different economic structure such that evacuation would have different 
economic consequences associated depending on the country. Participant six recommends 
that earthquake scientists are able to “take the scientific information and package it with a 
probability and hand it to an emergency manager who understands all that social science 
and can make a decision on which ones are worthwhile.”  
The economic value of a message also meant that each individual user would have 
different needs associated with their cost. Although the earthquake scientists did not see it 
as their role to prescribe an action to the hazard, they did discuss that this would be a 
challenging task. Participant 18 described the difficulty of this process,  
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It’s not as determinist as people think. There are a range of scenarios, there 
are different levels of danger people might be in, the options they have, the 
preparation, and how they should react. I think it’s hard to give a recipe of 
what people should do and shouldn’t do. 
For example, participant 10 said: 
We can develop consensual recommendations, but it is so complicated 
hashing out who is responsible for what and when and in what kind of 
situation and what do you do with the information, and making sure 
whatever you communicate is well understand by the person 
communicating it as well as integrating best practices and lessons that we 
have from communicating risk is a challenge. Perhaps most important is 
make sure people aren’t freaked out, that people don’t panic. Make sure 
they are confident, and whatever message you communicate leads to some 
action but, again, that may be difficult to test because it is hard to quantify. 
Similarly, participant 20 said, “we can be wrong about what's going on and what you should 
do. The right probability product isn’t the same for everybody. Think for example, an 
engineer versus an insurance company. They have different risk interests.” Participant 11 
responded, “One of the most challenging things is knowing what mitigative actions are the 
right ones to give. People are looking to scientists to tell them what happened, but they 
look to emergency management to keeping them whole.” 
 In conclusion, the earthquake scientists faced challenges in understanding the worth 
of communicating earthquake messages for their stakeholders and the public. They 
expressed that they would find helpful a representation of the costs and benefits of their 
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earthquake message. In this endeavor, they sought to know when the probability of 
earthquake was too small to convey or, in other words, when it was not economically 
advantageous to convey a probability. Further, the earthquake scientists expressed the 
difficulty in outlining which action to prescribe as it correlated with the probability of an 
earthquake occurring and its economic consequences.  
Earthquake Scientists’ Communication and CERC 
For the final research question, the researcher inquired about the extent scientists’ 
perceptions of their communication aligned with the communication prescriptions of the 
pre-crisis stage of the CERC model. CERC advocates that communicators should be 
prepared to facilitate the following: monitoring and recognition of emerging risks; general 
public understanding of risk; public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event; 
changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy); specific warning 
messages regarding some eminent threat; alliances and cooperation with agencies, 
organizations, and groups; development of consensual recommendations by experts and 
first responders; and message development and testing for subsequent stages. The 
researcher used a combination of the themes to help answer RQ 4. The details of the 
findings of RQ 4 are provided next.  
Monitoring and recognizing emerging risks. During this stage, communicators are 
advised to identify and address the types of crises they are most likely to face (Reynolds & 
Seeger, 2012). Challenges in the endeavor of monitoring and recognizing emerging risks 
included forecasting an unpredictable natural disaster, and expert-to-expert discrepancy in 
risk judgment.  Limits of earthquake technology, as described by the participants, was not 
the problem to effective earthquake response. The participants indicated that earthquake 
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technologies allow scientists to provide estimates about the location, magnitude, and timing 
of earthquake risks. Importantly, however, participants indicated that monitoring and 
recognizing emerging risks was not limited by technology, rather it was limited by the risk 
itself. This finding is best exemplified by participant 10 who said, “[Forecasting] is limited 
not by technology, but by our physical understanding of the earth’s crust. We're not able 
to predict earthquakes with any certainty. We are able to make very low probabilistic 
statements about the future.” Thus, the main challenge with adhering to CERC’s first step 
of the pre-crisis stage, monitor and recognize emerging risks, was dealing with the 
unpredictability and uncertainty of earthquakes.  
Problems with monitoring and recognizing emerging risks was further 
problematized by expert-to-expert challenges of communicating the hazard. That is, in the 
process of facilitating monitoring and recognizing emerging risk, the earthquake scientists 
experienced a discrepancy among experts in risk recognition. Even though earthquake 
prediction is an “impossible” task (Mulargia & Geller, 2003, p. 15), the earthquake 
scientists expressed that not all of their colleagues had the same understanding of the 
limitations of earthquake science. Some participants explained the discrepancy was due, in 
part, to the challenge of understanding probability, even at the expert level and that 
scientists are trained for determinism.  
General public’s understanding of the risk. During this stage, communicator’s 
should facilitate providing answers to anticipated questions of the general public regarding 
the risk. Challenges in the endeavor of facilitating answers to anticipated questions to the 
general public’s questions resides primarily in the public’s lack of understanding of the 
limitations of earthquake forecasting and differences in earthquake risk perception. The 
124 
 
earthquake scientists expressed that they perceived the public as largely unaware of the 
limitations of earthquake forecasting. For example, participant nine said, “A lot of the 
public doesn’t understand we can’t predict with certainty and that we have to give them 
something in between.” In addition to lacking familiarity with low probabilities, the 
earthquake scientists further perceived that the public did not understand that there was 
uncertainty inherent in the generated forecast.  
Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event. During this stage, 
communicator’s should facilitate the use of preparation strategies and tools for protection. 
Challenges in facilitating the use of preparation strategies and tools for protection included 
appropriately using popular culture references of earthquake risk and ensuring that 
vulnerable audiences receive the message and are taking preparation strategies. The 
earthquake scientists expressed that current information campaigns are aiding educating 
non-experts. For example, one of the participants expressed, through the ShakeOut drill, 
she encountered stories of members of the lay public correcting previously held 
misperceptions of earthquake preparedness, such as standing at the doorway during 
shaking. The participants perceived that information campaigns can make a positive impact 
on earthquake forecasting because campaigns such as ShakeOut would draw attention to 
earthquake risk during quiet periods. Such campaigns are helping to not only correct 
misperceptions of earthquake preparedness and action, but they are also aiding in helping 
to keep people’s attention on earthquake risk during “quiet times” (participant 20).  
Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy). During this 
stage, communicator’s should facilitate preparedness actions to increase public safety. The 
earthquake scientists perceived that campaigns were extremely helpful in instilling positive 
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behavioral changes for self-protection. Challenges that emerged in the process of 
facilitating preparedness actions to increase public safety include preventing participation 
bias and supplementing current campaigns, such as ShakeOut, with other information to 
increase self-protection during earthquake emergency risk and crisis. One of the challenges 
with earthquake preparation and response is ensuring that all members of the population – 
especially those most vulnerable – feel equipped and efficacious to enact self-protection 
behaviors. The earthquake scientists perceived that current campaigns, such as the 
ShakeOut drill, were extremely effective in helping the public feel self-efficacious during 
earthquakes. Specifically, information campaigns, such as ShakeOut, provided the general 
public with step-by-step instructions for behaviors for self-protection should an earthquake 
occur. ShakeOut provided simple instructions for protection and was widely disseminated 
throughout earthquake prone regions in the United States, such as California. The 
earthquake scientists perceived that non-experts felt more efficacious in taking actions as 
a result.  
The earthquake scientists expressed that such campaigns could be coupled with 
earthquake forecasting messages and have positive implications for individual self-
protection, organizations, and building community resilience. For example, the participants 
believed that popularized campaigns, such as ShakeOut, were an opportunity to introduce 
other earthquake technologies to the public and educate the public on earthquakes. 
Participant 10 believed that, “Something like ShakeOut is opportunity to test early warning 
and OEF… And, in terms of taking responsibility and making communities more resilient, 
it is critical.” Participant 13, too, articulated the benefits of information campaigns. The 
participant said that because of ShakeOut people have the “idea that you drop, cover, and 
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hold on and it becomes a snap response - and that's a life changing response” (participant 
13).  Further, the participants believed that such campaigns gained people’s interest on 
earthquake risk and prompted them to visit OEF websites. Explicated by participant 13, 
“[ShakeOut] has also been impetus for organizations to talk about earthquake response and 
preparedness…We always get questions about aftershocks and we say something general. 
One of the goals of an operational system is that it’s always there.” 
Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat. During this stage, 
communicator’s should facilitate providing the public with messages of an impending 
threat and encourage them to take action. Challenges in this endeavor included dealing with 
unauthorized communication and developing warning messages that were convincing 
enough to the receivers of the message to take action given the low probabilities 
earthquakes yield. According to the participants, the most important information to 
communicate in an earthquake forecasting messaging depends largely on the audience’s 
needs. Thus, the earthquake scientists expressed that one of the challenges of 
communicating earthquake risk is deciding what is most important for the receiver of the 
message. The earthquake scientists explained that every stakeholder and individual 
member of the public has varying “costs” associated with their needs. For example, 
participant 20 explicated the challenge in the following manner:  
How do uncertainties translate into real issues for a person? For example, I could 
give a statement and it could be a false alarm. And then, how does that uncertainty 
translate into a cost to you? You might want to know if you’re going to have shaking 
and if it’s going to affect you directly. 
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Specific warning messages regarding some imminent threat should be negotiated with 
stakeholders in advance.  
OEF was proposed in order to get around the issue of deciding when warning 
messages should be issued as every stakeholder has different costs associated with risks. 
While OEF provides continuous information regarding up-to-date earthquake hazard, the 
challenge is deciding which action to prescribe with the probability. Some scientists 
question the usefulness of continuously provided low probabilities to prescribing actions 
(Wang & Rogers, 2014). However, as participant 12 stated, “You can’t evacuate a city 
because you have one percent chance of an earthquake. So, one of the things we need to 
do is formulate a series of things that can be done… kind of like a menu of actions that can 
be taken.” 
Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups. During this 
stage, communicator’s should facilitate communication and information sharing between 
agencies, organizations, and groups to coordinate response. Earthquake scientists 
expressed that successful coordination involved collaboration between experts, first 
responders, insurers, engineers, public health officials, and communication specialists. 
Alliances are especially important for earthquake scientists as they did not see their role as 
having to translate hazard into risk. Put simply, earthquake scientists saw their role as 
providing numerical representations of the hazard to interested parties who would then 
translate the numerical representation into risk for themselves. The earthquake scientists 
perceived that warning messages were the responsibility of state and local officials.   
Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders. 
During this stage, communicator’s should facilitate partnerships between agencies to 
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ensure coordination of message dissemination and providing unified and coherent 
messages to the public. The earthquake scientists expressed that collaboration between 
experts and stakeholders was imperative to working towards developing stakeholders’ 
thresholds for action.  As earthquake forecasts yield extremely low probabilities, each 
stakeholder has different thresholds for action. The participants also expressed that going 
about such collaboration could be confusing considering communication boundaries. Due 
to the outcome of the L’Aquila earthquake where six scientists faced legal repercussions 
due to their collaboration with government officials, the larger earthquake scientific 
community is cautious to providing earthquake hazard messages. The participants 
expressed that boundaries of communication make it difficult to collaborate because the 
earthquake scientists were confused by which agencies act as earthquake response. 
Confusion about communication boundaries was experienced at the national and 
international level, meaning that earthquake scientists were confused about which agencies 
they could collaborate with in the United States and which agencies they could collaborate 
with in other countries.   
Message development and testing for subsequent stages. During this stage, 
communicator’s should facilitate the development and testing of communication systems 
and networks.  Current message development and testing centers around OEF, a system 
providing constant probabilities of earthquake hazard. The participants of this study 
expressed that as risk perception varies between individuals and across groups, providing 
automated earthquake hazard would be similar to providing a weather forecast (participant 
13). The earthquake scientists indicated that avenues ripe for exploration regarding future 
message testing include assessing the economic value of a message. In other words, they 
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understood that each stakeholder and user would assess the hazard statement based on their 
own experience with the risk and their own calculation of the costs and benefits of taking 
action. Future research regarding message testing for subsequent stages should involve 
examining behavior associated with statements of probability issued in various ways (e.g., 
expression of chance, expression of dividend, expression of narrative, etc.).  
Summary 
The researcher identified several themes which captured the experiences of 
earthquake scientists in their perceived endeavor of communicating earthquake risk to non-
expert. The participants described three primary challenges that the researcher categorized 
as “general” challenges experienced during the pre-crisis stage of CERC. One general 
challenge was the varying ways in which risk is perceived. The participants were aware 
that their risk messages were being put in context of the individuals’ preconceived notions 
of the risk. Specifically, the participants discussed two prominent factors in which risk 
perception can vary in particular to earthquake perception: cross-cultural and regional 
perceptions of risk and vulnerable audiences and risk perception.  
A second general challenge participants’ experienced was navigating their 
boundaries of earthquake communication. The participants described that communication 
rules and regulations changed according to region and country and, thus, challenging was 
to understand and maneuver across these communication boundaries while still providing 
their messages to those who need it. A third general challenge the participants’ expressed 
was keeping non-experts’ attention on earthquake risk even during times no tremors or 
earthquakes were present. Due to the unique nature of earthquakes and their low probability 
yielding characteristic, the earthquake scientists felt that non-experts only paid attention to 
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earthquake risk once a tremor or earthquake occurred. The participants found it important 
that non-experts attention was on earthquake risk even during earthquake “quiet periods.”  
The participants described three primary challenges that the researcher identified 
as communication challenges. Specifically, the participants experienced difficultly 
handling a communication environment inclusive of outrage inciters that they perceived as 
harmful to non-expert’s willingness to take appropriate action. The participants also 
experienced difficulty code switching with non-experts. Code switching involved 
translating their technical information into more understandable and simple language for 
non-experts. They found code switching especially trying given the complexity of 
earthquake risk and the insufficient manner and extent to which “simple terms” can 
describe such phenomena. Given the prominent themes the researcher generated from the 
interview data and supplemental sources, several conclusions and implications can be 
drawn. The researcher discusses her conclusions and implications subsequently.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications 
Earthquake scientists are calling for the application of the principles of social 
science research to aid them in earthquake risk communication (Jordan et al., 2011). The 
aim of the current study was to explore the experiences of earthquake scientists and the 
challenges of operational earthquake forecasting based, in part, on CERC’s pre-crisis stage 
and provide recommendations for crisis and emergency-risk communication. Earthquake 
scientists are usually the first source of information during the pre-crisis stage, and they 
help facilitate communication before the onset of the earthquake event. CERC provides 
recommendations from which earthquake scientists can draw when charged with 
communicating to diverse publics. This chapter identifies several conclusions and 
implications based on the results of this analysis. The first section details conclusions based 
on the findings and the researcher provides a recommendation for earthquake scientists to 
employ when communicating during the pre-crisis stage. The second section outlines 
implications, as well as limitations and avenues for future research.  
General Challenges and Recommendations 
Publics hold different perceptions of earthquakes. In this sense, earthquake 
scientists noted that earthquake risk perception functions no differently than it does in other 
risk situations in that non-experts may hold vastly different perceptions of the risk. As 
participant nine put it, “if they already have their own belief, then I think none of us really 
have training on how to effectively communicate.” Three particularly notable conclusions 
can be drawn about the challenge of risk perception in the context of earthquake risk: (1) 
the public will compare earthquakes to other natural disasters; (2) earthquake perceptions 
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may be more or less accurate based on region; and (3) experts consider the statistical threat 
of the event whereas non-experts tend to base their perceptions on outrage.  
The publics’ perceptions of earthquake risk is often based on their experiences with 
natural disasters about which they are more familiar (e.g., tornadoes or snow storms; Nigg, 
1982). Participant 14 asserted, for example, that some members of the public may be 
experiencing an earthquake for the first time so “they are probably pretty low on their 
learning curve.” Problematic is that earthquakes are different than other natural disasters 
in ways that non-experts are unfamiliar. As experts, earthquake scientists must recognize 
that non-experts are perceiving the risk based on other risks with which they are more 
knowledgeable and familiar. Raising awareness of earthquake risk through educational 
efforts and campaigns can help to improve and create more accurate risk perceptions and 
prepare the public for self-protection. 
Participants also noted that earthquake risk perception differs across regions, and 
in some regions were better versed on earthquake risk than others. The participants 
suggested this may be due in part to the region’s previous experience with earthquakes. In 
addition, participants also claimed that people have different “background knowledge” 
about earthquakes.  As participant 21 put it, “In California, you have very high chance of 
ground shaking, in Kentucky you have some chance.” As such, earthquake scientists must 
assess their local non-experts’ experience with earthquake risk to understand which 
messages are more appropriate than others.  
Finally, the complexity of risk perception arises primarily from the differences in 
how experts and non-experts perceive risk. Sandman’s (2012) breakdown of risk into 
notions of hazard and outrage helps explain these challenges in communicating earthquake 
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risk more fully. He notes that whereas experts focus on hazard, the public focuses on 
outrage. Sandman (2012) cautions experts not to dismiss factors of outrage as unscientific 
and meaningless. On the contrary, such feelings about the risk are as real to these 
individuals as are the hazard calculations made by the experts.  
Sandman’s (2012) definition helps to understand why experts will overestimate risk 
when hazard is high and outrage is low, and experts will underestimate the risk when 
outrage is high and hazard is low. Such a conceptualization can help to explain the events 
of L’Aquila where the experts perceived the hazard as low, but the non-experts perceived 
the outrage as high. Further, risk communication best practices may help earthquake 
scientists move beyond offering accurate risk assessments by translating statistical 
information in ways that resonate with non-experts. 
In sum, although non-experts lack the technical expertise calculate to risk 
probability, experts must communicate in ways that address the outrage factors on which 
they base their risk perceptions (Sandman, 2012; Slovic, 2012). Participant 12 
acknowledged the value of understanding the public’s “intuition” regarding the probability 
of earthquake risk in their region. The pivotal takeaway is that expert risk assessment, albeit 
accurate, has the potential to fail unless it addresses non-experts’ interpretations of risk.  
Thus, based on the findings of this study, the following recommendation is proposed for 
earthquake scientists: 
Recommendation #1: Consider non-experts’ experience with the risk and how 
non-experts may compare earthquake risk to other natural disasters with which 
they are more familiar. Regional differences in risk perception may be most 
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notable. Expert risk assessment must consider public perception of the risk into 
their risk management efforts. 
Another challenging aspect of communicating low probability and high 
consequence risk is dealing with the repercussions of miscommunication. Earthquake 
scientists found the repercussions for miscommunication to be ambiguous and to vary by 
region. Many of the earthquake scientists identified themselves as part of the international 
community of earthquake scientists as they discussed their work outside of their native 
country. Evident, however, is that different regions of the world handle miscommunication 
of earthquake risk differently; the best example of this is the devastating outcome of 
L’Aquila. While Italy found the sanctions against the scientists appropriate, such an 
outcome was perceived as unwarranted by the international earthquake scientific 
community given the unpredictable nature of earthquakes and the low probabilities with 
which scientists must work. Repercussions of miscommunication can also lead to stifling 
the scientists from risk communication. Thus, it is not surprising that scientists desire to 
provide only the numerical value of the risk (as found by the theme, “Hazard and Risk 
Communication Responsibilities”) rather than having to translate the technical information 
(as found by the theme “Code Switching”). 
Given the unpredictability of earthquakes, earthquake communicators should not 
be held responsible for inaccurate forecasts. Scientists can only fully comprehend an 
earthquake sequence retrospectively and forecasting is not the same a predicting. Thus, 
blaming scientists for inadequate earthquake forecasting is unreasonable. Based on the 
findings of this study, the researcher proposes the following second recommendation for 
earthquake scientists. 
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Recommendation #2: Be cognizant of the communication systems in place and the 
potential repercussions for miscommunication.  
  Considering the unpredictability of earthquakes, keeping public attention even 
during the “quiet periods” was deemed significant to risk preparation in the pre-crisis stage. 
Campaigns were perceived to be extremely effective in helping the public prepare a 
possible earthquake. As participant 20 explained, non-experts often have no personal 
relationship with earthquake risk because these risks happen so infrequently. Exercises and 
drills, via campaigns such as ShakeOut, provide the public with “some sort of intuition” so 
they can be prepared if an earthquake were to occur (participant 20). Such educational tools 
are also appropriate considering the fact that the number of earthquakes are increasing due 
to hydraulic fracturing (Petersen et al., 2016) in areas unfamiliar with earthquakes.  
Current campaigns have been extremely beneficial for several reasons. First, the 
participants said that campaigns provided opportunity for members of the public to talk 
about the risk. Given the sporadic and rare nature of large-magnitude earthquakes, 
campaigns helped keep the risk on peoples’ minds. Second, the participants reported that 
such campaigns could be seen as an initial step or “gateway drug” towards further 
education and preparedness. For example, the earthquake scientists explained that after 
ShakeOut drills, participants of the drill are invited to take a voluntary survey to assess 
their preparedness, thus providing a nudge towards further preparedness efforts. Other 
current efforts to connect preparedness strategies to current campaigns include pairing the 
ShakeOut drill with EEW whereby drill participants would receive a text message within 
minutes or seconds before an earthquake and would know to drop, cover, and hold on. 
Third, current campaigns give users a “snap” response of what to do during an earthquake 
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(e.g., drop, cover, and hold on; participant 13). When crises occur, individuals may feel 
confused and distraught. By practicing the ShakeOut drill during the pre-crisis stage, 
publics will be reminded of the self-protection strategies to employ during the crisis itself. 
Lastly, the scientists expressed that campaigns were an impetus for organizations and 
stakeholders to create earthquake crisis plans. Given the various benefits to campaigns for 
self-protection during earthquake crisis, the use of campaigns should be continued and 
experts should seek ways to bridge further preparedness strategies with current campaigns. 
The researcher also advocates that earthquake scientists use popular culture (e.g., 
movies, music, television shows, art) to help earthquake education efforts. During the 
interviews, the earthquake scientists brought up the movie, San Andreas (2015), and 
discussed how both positive and negative outcomes for earthquake science resulted. On the 
one hand, the movie helped to generate excitement about earthquake risk and brought 
attention to it. On the other hand, the movie helped create further misconceptions about 
earthquake risk. Since popular culture has the ability to elicit both accurate and inaccurate 
public knowledge outcomes (Sellnow, 2010), the researcher suggests that earthquake 
scientists are involved in promoting accurate knowledge outcomes using popular culture. 
Scientists should be invited to clarify both the accuracy of the representation and the 
misconceptions the reference generated. Participant nine discussed how NASA captures 
the publics’ attention and informs accurate science through film (e.g., The Martian). 
Similarly, earthquake scientists could capitalize on popular culture references to increase 
non-experts’ understanding of earthquake risk. Based on the findings of this study, the 
researcher proposes the following third recommendation for earthquake scientists.  
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Recommendation #3: Use campaigns and popular culture as opportunities to 
capitalize on interest and educate and prepare the public.  
Communication Challenges with Non-Experts and Recommendations 
The researcher inquired about the communication challenges earthquake scientists 
perceived they faced in communicating with non-experts. The researcher categorized 
communication challenges as those components of participants’ experience with non-
experts that were particular to communication but unaligned with communicating 
probability.  The earthquake scientists experienced two key challenges in communicating 
with non-experts: outrage inciters and code switching technical information.  
Outrage inciters refers to communication that emerged during the pre-crisis stage 
from those persons or agencies that are not official sources of information but caused 
significant changes in the publics’ risk perception. Oppressing unauthoritative voices, like 
outrage inciters, eliminates participants from the conversation and creates a false sense of 
security for the public (Herovic, Sellnow, & Anthony, 2014). Striking a balance between 
allowing outside voices to be part of the scientific debate and maintaining more credibility 
than outrage inciters is important. This balance is especially pertinent for risk 
communication because of the subjective nature of risk. That is, each stakeholder and 
member of the public must assess his or her own risk given the information. Those 
individualized risk assessments differ and are based on the available information. The user 
should have freedom of choice in determining his or her own risk depending on the 
information available in the communication environment.   
Perhaps one of the reasons outrage inciters, such as Mr. Giuliani and the Moon 
Man, gained legitimacy, at least for a short period of time, is because they were not 
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discredited by the larger scientific community. During a time of great uncertainty, the 
public looks for information from all outlets. If authoritative information is unavailable, 
they may turn to less credible sources to gain understanding. Prelli asserts that part of the 
reason trends in science continue is because scientists are collectively determining who is 
part of the group and can make claims. Prelli (1989) states:  
The reasonableness of a scientist’s rhetorical objectives also can be 
rendered ambiguous by questioning the individual’s relationship to the 
broader scientific community. To the extent that the rhetor’s connection 
with the scientific community becomes confusing, so does the legitimacy 
of the rhetor’s aims and claims. (p. 136) 
During greater times of earthquake uncertainty, scientists can help the public consider 
outrage inciters as illegitimate and unreliable. 
Outrage inciters cause a unique communication environment that has the potential 
to make scientists feel vulnerable. Interestingly, while credible sources, like earthquake 
scientists, communicate with the public using probability statements to ensure that the 
uncertainty of their forecast is delivered, outrage inciters do not take the same precautions. 
Instead they communicate with certainty when there is no scientific evidence to support 
their claims. They also oversimply complex matters to make their points easily understood, 
despite their inaccuracy. When these outrage inciters gain visibility with the public, 
earthquake scientists may feel vulnerable and frustrated. Ignoring outrage inciters and the 
unwarranted claims they make to the public is not advisable. Rather, earthquake scientists 
should address these claims early and often with rebuttals that are both evidence-based and 
translated into language that can be comprehended by the public.  
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The takeaway for scientists in cases of dealing with outrage inciters should be to 
provide information as quickly as they can and to discredit outrage inciters. Earthquake 
scientists have the authority and command to direct the public’s attention away from 
outside voices or deem them illegitimate (Prelli, 1989). Such actions help the public who 
is viewing messages to discredit outrage inciters. Based on the findings of this study, the 
researcher proposes the following fourth recommendation for earthquake scientists. 
Recommendation #4: Publicly challenge communication from outrage 
inciters. Do not ignore it or omit it. 
A core issue with risk communication is translating scientific and technical 
information such as probability into more understandable language for non-experts. 
Earthquake risk is no exception. Converting technical earthquake information into more 
simple forms was deemed challenging because the process involves ensuring accuracy 
despite the simplification, conceptualizing the simplified terms on which probabilities are 
based, and employing humility in the process.  
Earthquake scientists discussed current code switching efforts in order to simplify 
the complexity of earthquake science to non-expert audiences. For example, earthquake 
scientists have taken out the probabilities in order to simplify the message when 
communicating to non-experts. Other ways earthquake scientists have code switched 
technical earthquake information involves color-coded formats to help increase accurate 
interpretation (participant 20). Earthquake scientists have also incorporated a “101” of 
earthquake science on their website to help simplify the technicality of earthquake risk. 
Gregory and Dieckmann (2014) assert that representing probability in more than one 
format aids in individuals choosing the format which makes the most sense to them and 
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taking the desired action. While multiple formats have the potential to confuse audiences, 
different formats of the same message help to meet the needs of a diverse audience 
(Gregory & Dieckmann, 2014).  
Code switching involves providing descriptive terms that represent the probability; 
however, such descriptions can have varying meanings for the audience. Even translating 
probability into words such as “likely” or “unlikely” becomes problematic as members of 
the public have different interpretations of those words (participant 10). These terms 
become exceptionally difficult for non-experts to interpret when one considers the low 
probabilities on which these thresholds are based. Asserting that an earthquake is likely on 
the probability of five percent may seem like “nonsense to people” (participant 16) and not 
enough evidence for emergency responders and government officials to issue warning 
messages. For this reason, while earthquake scientists believe a formal procedure for 
translating numbers into words is needed, there are no current agreements on appropriate 
means of meeting this goal (participant 15).  
Providing explanations of terms and using examples and narratives to describe 
statistics can only be afforded in the pre-crisis stage when experts facilitate education and 
preparedness. Code switching involves considering the ways in which non-experts process 
statistical information. Slovic (2010) describes how humans are not biologically 
programmed to receive risk information in the form of numbers. Slovic asserts that 
evolution has not prompted us to comprehend the risks associated with guns, fast-food, and 
smoking like it has with snakes, spiders, and heights. Further, he asserts, evolution has not 
prepared us to be sensitive to large-scale impacts; rather, we are most sensitive to small 
scale (e.g., we are better able to comprehend the risk of one death over thousands). Slovic 
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(2010) promotes “new modes of discourse” in risk communication (p. 83). Specifically, 
the author asks for “new ways of describing the experience, new strategies for translating 
statistics into stories, and new ways of articulating the meaning of both numbers and 
nerves” (p. 83). He suggests that probabilistic information be presented through images 
and storytelling. Through more qualitative means of communicating probability, the 
information can help people better understand what this risk means to them personally. 
Such explanations cannot be afforded during the crisis itself, as time is limited. By 
effectively explaining terms and statistics in the pre-crisis stage, experts prepare non-
experts for the later stages of CERC when they must provide messages of evacuation or 
self-protection.  
Employing humility helps non-experts relate to experts and aid in message 
receptivity. Participant 11 mentioned the power of humanizing scientists and what it can 
do for how non-experts view scientists and their message. Particularly, participant 11 
explained that seismologist, Lucy Jones, was holding her toddler during a live televised 
interview where reporters were asking Jones about earthquake risk. Lucy’s publicly 
broadcasted message, with toddler in hand, to the public elicited a favorable response. 
Lucy’s message likely generated a favorable response because it aligns with the idea that 
open, honest, and willing communication with the media results in positive outcomes. The 
spokesperson is likely to be perceived by the public as empathetic, active in attempting to 
solve the problem, and humanizing (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2015). Based on the 
findings of this study, the researcher provides the following fifth recommendation for 
earthquake scientists. 
142 
 
Recommendation #5: Present the same message different ways. Provide 
definitions behind terms such as “likely” and compare terms so that non-experts 
understand the difference. Use examples and narratives in addition to the statistic. 
Employ humility.  
Challenges with Communicating Probability 
The researcher inquired about the challenges earthquake scientists face in issuing 
probabilistic statements of earthquake risk. Effective probability communication to non-
experts was deemed to be the primary concern and biggest perceived challenge of experts. 
The following themes helped to answer the question: communicating uncertainty, hazard 
versus risk communication responsibilities, and the economic value of an earthquake 
message. 
One great debate in science is the one between certainty and uncertainty. While 
Isaac Newton developed laws that helped outline the predictability of the natural world, 
not all forces follow this same line of predictability. For example, at the level of atoms and 
particles, the quantum world does not abide by such instruction and certainty. According 
to Quantum Theory, scientists cannot say with certainty what will occur. Werner 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, too, is based on the notion that the world runs on 
probability and that nothing is certain (Spradlin & Porterfield, 1984). In this sense, the 
search for certainty unveils uncertainty. For scientists, this means that the outcomes of 
experiments and models are not completely predictable and there will always be elements 
of uncertainty. 
Communicating earthquake risk illustrates the complexity involved with 
communicating uncertainty to non-experts. Of all fields of science, the field of earthquake 
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science is an ideal example of the complexity in communicating science because of the 
nature of earthquakes. According to Mulargia and Geller (2003), there is great difficulty in 
using statistical models to find truth of earthquake phenomena because the problem “is 
aggravated in earthquake physics by the intrinsic impossibility of reproducing the 
experiments at will in forward time, and by the long time scale of geological phenomena” 
and because models used to explain the data are “mostly ad hoc quantitative descriptions 
of a single or at most a few cases involving a handful of data and a large number of free 
parameters” (p. 5). Experts attain advanced statistical training that non-expert audiences 
may not receive (Gigerenzer, 2014). Non-experts may lack the general understanding of 
the limitations of science and, thus, the limitations of earthquake scientists in providing 
deterministic statements regarding earthquake risk. 
Although uncertainty is inevitable in the pursuit of earthquake forecasting, 
uncertainty is often overlooked or ignored when communicated (Wiedmann, Boener, & 
Schutz, 2014). The issue is further complicated because members of the lay public prefer 
more deterministic statements to aid them in their decision-making, yet such determinism 
is difficult for earthquake scientists to achieve in the scientific forecasting process. The 
case of the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy earthquake crisis demonstrates the implications of poor 
probability communication. L’Aquila civilians did not take actions to protect themselves 
because they received messages from public officials that an earthquake was ‘unlikely.’ 
The public officials who made this public announcement had misinterpreted the inherent 
uncertainty in the earthquake scientists’ messages of probability.  
Participants discussed dimensions of uncertainty in the context of earthquake risk 
communication that were exceptionally difficult to communicate to non-experts.  Two 
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themes emerged: communicating uncertainty regarding the nature of earthquakes and 
communicating uncertainty regarding the models used to generate earthquake forecasts. 
Uncertainty surrounding the nature of the earthquake refers to a couple of different things. 
First, the nature of earthquakes is one in which reliable precursors to earthquakes do not 
exist (Jordan et al., 2011). Therefore, earthquake scientists can only make predictions about 
an earthquake being due to strike a certain region within an interval of time. Second, 
earthquake prediction differs from other natural disasters in two key ways: (a) the public 
is largely unaware of earthquake prediction abilities and technologies and (b) earthquake 
prediction is provided months or years ahead of the prediction whereas tornadoes and snow 
storms can be predicted within days or hours (Nigg, 1982). Uncertainty surrounding the 
models used to generate earthquake forecasts is another important component to 
communicate. Highly reliable earthquake predictions may never be possible (Jordan & 
Jones, 2010). Non-experts are often largely unaware of the reasons behind the 
impossibility. Earthquake scientists seek to roll out OEF in the hopes of providing 
continuous and authoritative hazard information and defending themselves against 
information vacuums (Jordan & Jones, 2010). No doubt, there are a multitude of benefits 
to OEF for earthquake scientists and the greater good. In this endeavor, however, 
earthquake scientists must ensure that uncertainty is accounted for beyond just a 
probabilistic statement.  
For some earthquake scientists, uncertainty communication meant losing 
credibility. Scientists must not shy away from communicating the uncertainty of 
earthquake forecasting and its limitations. There becomes this delicate dance experts must 
learn to perform of communicating the inherent uncertainty in the earthquake forecasting 
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process while also asserting their authority on the topic. While earthquake scientists cannot 
provide deterministic statements, they are far more familiar with the earthquake forecasting 
process than non-experts, given their extensive training, schooling, and experience in the 
area. The earthquake scientists’ skill and expertise is needed on the topic and they should 
express their credibility when necessary. While earthquake scientists risk losing credibility 
in the process of explaining what is not known or what is yet to be known, they could also 
earn credibility in the endeavor of communicating uncertainty. That is, explicating 
uncertainty may be a means of gaining credibility with non-expert audiences. If non-
experts understand the uncertainty of the process, perhaps non-experts will be less likely 
to believe outrage inciters – who often provide more deterministic predictions - during 
higher risk and crisis periods. Non-experts will understand the complexity of the matter 
and may be less willing to accept local citizens, like those seen in L’Aquila and Canterbury, 
who often sway public opinion away from reliable risk communication.  
Experts should develop consensus during the risk assessment process. As 
participant one said, “The illiteracy about probability is not only among the public it’s also 
among our community.” This finding is consistent with the general notion that coming up 
with a consensus of the risk at hand even between experts is problematic due to the varying 
ways in which the problem is conceptualized and the methods with which experts approach 
the data (Bostrom, 1997; Mulargia & Geller, 2003). Gigerenzer (2014), too, asserts that 
medical doctors face statistical literacy issues and how to best communicate complex 
information to their patients in the process of helping them make medical decisions. As 
uncertainty abounds with earthquake forecasting, it is important for earthquake scientists 
to acknowledge their limitations, discuss with one another their findings and find common 
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ground, and explicate their uncertainty. Thus, the recommendation to communicate 
uncertainty in ways that are understood begins with ensuring experts feel comfortable, 
knowledgeable and confident with uncertainty communication and that they have received 
the proper statistical training. Additionally, as argued by the participants, learning about 
earthquake risk, particularly probability, should begin in elementary school. Educational 
programs and institutions should include statistical training in their curriculum. Statistical 
training must include, too, the inherent error in models and must teach how experts may 
employ defensive decision making (Gigerenzer, 2014). Based on the findings of this study, 
the researcher provides the following recommendation for earthquake scientists. 
Recommendation #6: Communicate probability and uncertainty in ways that are 
enable the publics to understand both the degree of the risk as well as what can 
scientifically be known and what cannot be known.  
Due to the enormous amount of uncertainty inherent in earthquake forecasting, and 
the participants’ perceived responsibilities of risk communication and hazard 
communication, earthquake scientists are encouraged to take on the role of communication 
leaders. Stemming from Ulmer, Sellnow, and Seeger’s (2015) definition, this study 
conceptualized communication leaders as persons who are able to effectively manage 
uncertainty related to the risk and crisis and apply appropriate communication strategies to 
achieve their goals. While earthquake scientists play a role at each stage of the crisis life 
cycle, they play the largest role during the pre-crisis stage when communication and 
education campaigns help the public prepare. Advancements such as OEF allow scientists 
to play their role in making hazard information available at all times while also protecting 
them from the negative implications of communicating risk.  
147 
 
More than just providing an automated system that offers constant feedback, 
scientists should be encouraged to redefine their role as one in which they are 
communication leaders. Communication leadership is pivotal within the context of 
earthquake risk and crisis because messages surrounding crisis help to shape how the public 
perceives the event (Venette, 2008). To redefine their role as communication leaders, 
earthquake scientists would need to feel confident taking control of the narrative when 
inaccurate representations of the earthquake risk are being presented. Taking control of the 
narrative would be appropriate in times when outrage inciters (such as the case in L’Aquila) 
communicate risk and crisis information inaccurately to the public.  
Second, redefining earthquake scientists’ communication role would mean 
establishing healthy organizational culture in which internal communication is trustworthy, 
open, and ongoing. Alder’s (2007) case studies on the Mann Gulch and Storm King 
Mountain fires helped illuminate the consequences of poor communication. Alder (2007) 
found that because healthy and open communication among members was not part of the 
organizational culture, members were in a disorganized state and failed to establish and 
provide clear instructional messages. Healthy organizational cultures are pivotal to the 
success of managing risks and crisis when they arise (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). As 
communication leaders, during the pre-crisis stage, earthquake scientists should stress the 
benefits of implementing crisis management plans and encourage active preparation. Such 
preparation should also include scanning communication products (media, corporate 
reports, policy) and conducting audits within the organization “to identify internal 
weaknesses” (Gainey, 2010, p. 36).     
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Further, because outrage inciters are likely to emerge during risks and crises as the 
public and stakeholders seek information to relieve the uncertainty, earthquake scientists 
should prepare by establishing guidelines for dealing with unauthoritative and scurrilous 
information. Communication emerging from outside of the organization should generally 
be invited into the conversation but evaluated with caution. Earthquake scientists should 
be careful not to provide a communication environment of mutual exclusivity as unwanted 
outcomes can result as evidenced by the L’Aquila earthquake disaster (Herovic, Sellnow, 
& Anthony, 2014).   
Additionally, earthquake scientists need to take on a communication leadership role 
because they are the most informed about what is occurring.  Participant 20 said scientists 
need “a higher profile during quiet times” in order to “give the public some sort of 
intuition.” Participant 20’s response elicits another important avenue where scientists act 
as communication leaders: scientists are responsible for keeping earthquake hazard on 
people’s minds even during “quiet periods.” Acting as a communication leader of hazard 
means that scientists are not only keeping the hazard on people’s minds, but also helping 
to ensure that it is interpreted correctly and not lost in translation (Slovic, 2010). Based on 
the findings of this study, the researcher proposes the following recommendation for 
earthquake scientists.  
Recommendation #7: Earthquake scientist should assert themselves as 
communication leaders. 
Earthquake scientists saw their responsibility as one in which they communicate 
hazard; risk was the responsibility of emergency responders and risk managers. Hazard 
communication contains messages of forecasted numbers of the intensity of an earthquake 
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during a certain period of time. Risk communication was much complex, as the participants 
saw it, and it involved translating the hazard into a projected cost for the public or 
stakeholders (e.g., lives lost, collapsed buildings; Jordan et al., 2011). Following the events 
in L’Aquila, participants felt that due to potential legal repercussions, they did not want to 
be responsible for having to provide more than a hazard assessment. Further, due to the 
complex nature of risk and the many variables that are associated with the way people 
perceive risk (Slovic, 2000), providing risk communication would take significant time and 
effort that scientists may not afford. 
Emerging communication technologies, like OEF, were seen by most participants 
as a way to meet their responsibility of communicating hazard to multiple stakeholders 
throughout the lifecycle of a crisis. The OEF system would provide public, constant, and 
authoritative communication of earthquake hazard (Jordan et al., 2011). OEF’s two guiding 
principles, transparency and hazard-risk separation, align with the desires of the earthquake 
scientists’ hazard communication responsibilities. OEF would also aid in yielding 
“information vacuums” from developing during earthquake risk or crisis (Jordan & Jones, 
2010, p. 573). As each individual has their “own cost” associated with the risk (participant 
21), current efforts include negotiating with stakeholders their individual thresholds for 
action based on the hazard. Negotiating thresholds was seen by the earthquake scientists as 
the appropriate means of protecting their identity as hazard communicators and protecting 
themselves from repercussions of miscommunication. Based on the findings of this study, 
the researcher proposes the following recommendation for earthquake scientists. 
Recommendation #8: Provide hazard communication and negotiate risk 
communication thresholds. 
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Earthquake scientists believed helpful analysis of one’s risk involved outlining the 
costs and benefits of providing low probability messages and inciting action or their 
economic value. Currently, a formal and well-established procedure has yet to provide a 
standard for assessing economic values behind an earthquake forecast. Marzocchi et al.’s 
(2015) suggest risk assessment should include a metric for estimated loss and propose the 
use of OELF. An estimated loss metric would aid the various agencies in their decisions of 
evacuation. Nelson (2014) and Tiedemann (1994) also provide important considerations in 
the effort of assessing the economic value of an earthquake message. Based on the findings 
of this study, the researcher proposes the following recommendation for earthquake 
scientists. 
Recommendation #9: Probabilities should be associated with an economic risk 
metric. 
Earthquake Scientists’ Communication and CERC 
The researcher inquired about the earthquake scientist’s perception of their 
communication and how it aligned with the recommendations outlined by CERC. The 
researcher drew from the themes to gain insight into answering RQ 4. During each part of 
the communication facilitation, the researcher identified important considerations for 
facilitating communication and education during the pre-crisis stage.  
CERC advocates that communicators monitor and recognize the emerging risk. 
Monitoring and recognizing emerging risk is usually aided by technology and science; the 
process is especially complex for the earthquake scientists. The participants expressed that 
while they have the tools available to forecast earthquakes, they are limited by the nature 
of the risk itself. Earthquakes are unpredictable, and short-term earthquake forecasting 
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yields extremely low probabilities (e.g., one percent chance of an earthquake). Earthquake 
forecasting includes identifying and communicating about the location, time, and 
magnitude of future fault ruptures (Jordan et al., 2011). Earthquakes are emergent crises 
(Parsons, 1996), and, thus, provide little to no warning of their arrival. Thus, monitoring 
this risk is a complex process grounded in uncertainty. The participants expressed that non-
experts are largely unaware of the limitations and the uncertainty involved with earthquake 
forecasting. One of the goals of OEF is to help non-experts become more familiar with the 
low probabilities with which experts must work to make decisions.  
The participants recognized that expert-to-expert challenges exist and that not all 
earthquake scientists view data in the same light. The participants noted that issues of 
comprehending probability are present among scientists. Mulargia and Geller (2003) argue 
there are four different definitions of earthquake prediction and that a lack of agreement on 
the definition is “one of the main reasons for the lack of consensus on earthquake 
predictability in the scientific community” (p. 14). One of the participants noted that this 
may be the case because earthquake scientists are “trained for determinism” and look for 
the exact law to predict phenomena (participant one). Mulargia and Geller assert that 
deterministic prediction involves providing earthquake forecasts with high accuracy and 
reliability; such an approach is helpful when extreme actions like evacuations need to take 
place. 
CERC also advocates that communicators facilitate the general public’s 
understanding of risk. During this stage, communicators should educate the public, helping 
to raise awareness of the risk and its characteristics.  For earthquake scientists, educating 
the public meant providing awareness of the nature of earthquakes and how they differ 
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from other natural disasters. Further, earthquake scientists perceived that non-experts were 
largely unaware of the uncertainty inherent in statistical modeling. Thus, educating the 
public should be centered on familiarization with the nature of earthquakes and low 
probabilities.  
Facilitating preparation strategies for the public is an important component of the 
CERC pre-crisis stage. This stage involves preparing the public to respond if the risk 
manifests in serious earthquake. For earthquake scientists, facilitating preparing involves 
keeping public attention during earthquake quiet periods. Earthquakes occur sporadically, 
are unpredictable, and yield extremely low probabilities. When earthquakes are forecasted 
in the long-term, earthquake scientists are able to yield higher probability forecasts. Long-
term forecasts are provided within a 30-year time frame, however, making it extremely 
difficult to create the sense of urgency that is typical in other applications of the CERC 
model. Thus, earthquake scientists face a unique situation with preparing the public. The 
participants described the effectiveness of education campaigns, such as ShakeOut, in 
helping to prepare people and bringing excitement and awareness to earthquake risk 
preparedness. The participants also discussed the effects of the recent movie, San Andreas, 
on the lay public’s perceptions of earthquake risk. Such communication and education 
campaigns, are exceptionally important for earthquake scientists because they help to 
facilitate awareness, excitement, and understanding of earthquake risk during “quiet 
periods.”  
CERC further advises that communicators facilitate changes in behavior. Changing 
behavior can be extremely difficult as beliefs about risk are shaped by a host of influences. 
Earthquake scientists may find that affecting behavioral change in earthquake prone 
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regions, however, may be easier. In such regions, residents may be more apt to engaging 
in preparedness and behavioral changes than less earthquake prone regions. For example, 
participant 12 discussed that earthquake perception varied between North and South 
California, and that South California, a more earthquake prone region, had more accurate 
perceptions of the earthquake risk they face. The participants consistently agreed that 
campaigns could lead to positive behavioral changes. Further, capitalizing on popular 
culture that references earthquakes may be effective in gaining the publics’ attention and 
helping them understand appropriate means to prepare. By correcting misperceptions or 
reinforcing correct perceptions of the popular culture reference, earthquake scientists can 
take advantage of the reference. The participants believed that OEF should be integrated 
with such campaigns to increase awareness.  
CERC specifically advocates that communicators create and test warning systems 
and messages, including recommended response strategies, during the pre-crisis stage. 
Important considerations for earthquake scientists during this step of the pre-crisis stage 
include dealing with outrage inciters that may arise during emergency-risk and crisis times. 
This pre-crisis process also involve negotiating thresholds for warning with stakeholders. 
Earthquake forecasting is not, however, conducive to casting alarms. Although earthquake 
scientists provide probability statements which imply an increased risk, no particular 
response strategy beyond normal readiness is needed. The participants of this study 
discussed future technologies, such as EEW, that would enable warning messages within 
a couple minutes before the earthquake, allowing persons to process and engage in 
protective behavioral actions.  
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Another important step of the pre-crisis stage of CERC is facilitating the formation 
of alliances for earthquake response. The participants of this study did not provide specific 
agencies with whom alliances should be built. Earthquake response usually requires the 
help of local and state governments (and sometimes federal, if necessary), emergency 
responders, insurance companies, and engineers.  
In summary, the pre-crisis recommendations of CERC are relevant for the 
earthquake science community’s efforts to communicate OEF messages. Participants in the 
study believe the current OEF efforts are meeting CERC’s expectations for monitoring 
risk, facilitating public understanding, and advocating response strategies. At the same 
time, however, the variance in risk is small and the actions advocated are typically 
expressed without a sense of urgency. Thus, the OEF process differs from message designs 
using CERC in other risk contexts such as pre-planning for a flu season, responding to a 
hurricane warning, or preparing a strategy for responding to a growing wild fire. Further, 
the science surrounding OEF is complex and less observable than other disasters where 
CERC has been applied. Nevertheless, the general structure of CERC does provide 
earthquake scientists with appropriate objectives for pre-crisis planning.  
Adding to CERC’s Propositions 
The findings of this study also helped to generate further propositions for CERC. 
Veil et al. (2008) extracted six propositions of the CERC framework and argued that CERC 
is an “integrative framework of risk and crisis communication perspectives that needs 
further development” (p. 32s). The current study adds understanding about communicating 
technical information to non-experts during the earliest stage of CERC. Based on the 
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results of this study, three additional propositions are added to Veil et al.’s (2008) current 
list of six. They are as follows:  
 Risks and crises have the opportunity to present renewed ways of addressing 
future, similar risks and crises and bring about better communication and 
education in the pre-crisis stage. 
 Greater amounts of uncertainty surrounding the risk or crisis will call for more 
communication between involved parties to facilitate solutions and to clearly 
articulate both what can be known and what cannot be known. 
 Receivers of communication are affected by a number of influences which 
shape the way they perceive the message including, but not limited to, 
familiarity with the risk/crisis, their level of outrage, and regional 
considerations. 
These added propositions help to provide further understanding of the conditions under 
which CERC works best.  
Limitations 
 Like any research, there are limits to the claims that can be made. The researcher 
should be cognizant of these limitations and assure that they follow the standards of ethical 
research procedures. There are three primary limitations of this study.  
One limitation is the emergent nature of the topic under exploration and, 
consequently, the amount of information from scientists the researcher could evoke. As 
some of the earthquake scientists were unaware of communication issues present, while 
others were extremely aware, it was trying, at times, to generate healthy conversation on 
the topic with those less aware. Those scientists that were more aware of the 
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communication issues provided abundant information from their perspectives and 
experiences with the problem, and the researcher was able to fully explore the topic in 
depth from their interviews. The researcher then used the knowledge gained from those 
interviews to help guide the interpretation of interview information from less informed 
participants.   
Another limitation of this study is the contextual forces at play with participant 
responses. Specifically, the researcher must also take into consideration that earthquake 
scientists responses themselves were affected by context. That is, the challenges expressed 
by the earthquake scientists were based on their individual recent experiences and 
knowledge of the topic and their feelings towards the research topic and the researcher. 
These contextual forces are at play in every research study, however, they are especially 
important to highlight in qualitative studies because of the open-ended nature of the 
process.  
Lastly, another limitation of the study is that the interview sample was limited to 
those participants who attended the 2015 SCEC meeting in Palm Springs, California. 
Recruiting and meeting with participants in qualitative interview data collection can be 
time-consuming and the researcher could encounter issues with gaining entry (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2016). Thus, the researcher capitalized on the opportunity to meet with almost 
two-dozen earthquake scientists for informant interviews during one of their most 
important and well-attended conferences. The participants were extremely willing to speak 
with the researcher and negotiate meeting times for the interviews to be conducted. While 
the researcher feels that members of SCEC provided valuable insight into the project, she 
must acknowledge that these particular earthquake scientists may not be speaking for the 
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entire earthquake scientific community. Naturally, organizational ideology influences 
important and unimportant perspectives of its members. Thus, perspectives on earthquake 
risk may be slightly different for earthquake scientists who are part of other organizations.  
Future Research 
The findings of this study shine light on areas ripe for future research. The findings 
of this study helped provide understanding into the uncertainty present in earthquake 
forecasting of which earthquake scientists perceive non-experts are largely unaware. The 
findings lead the researcher to wonder, how much uncertainty communication is too much 
and can experts lose credibility if too much uncertainty is communicated? And, if scientists 
communicate uncertainty in their forecasts, including the limitations of their measures, are 
they still able to get people to take action? If so, what kinds of messages containing 
components of uncertainty are more effective than others and why? Future research should 
also examine the effect that communicating uncertainty has on individual decision making. 
Such questions were beyond the scope of the present study, but there exists ample areas for 
research examining the relationship between communicating uncertainty and maintaining 
credibility. Such a study is especially important considering that during risks and crises, 
experts are the first and often most-trusted sources of information.  
Researchers should also explore the communication needs of cultures in which OEF 
is proposed. Technological and scientific advances, like OEF, are helping to reduce per 
capita earthquake risk, however, OEF is expanding into regions most vulnerable to 
earthquake risk where little is known how cultural differences will impact risk 
communication interpretation. Developing understanding into cultural communication 
norms involves exploring the cultural group’s trust towards authoritative sources, means 
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of gaining information, and characteristics of their communication. Improved cultural 
awareness will help to strengthen communicators’ understanding of the appropriate 
communication norms of its users, providing insight into how the group will respond to 
such advancements. As geoscientists seek to make partnerships domestically and with 
foreign publics and to implement OEF systems in various partner countries (e.g., Chile, 
Mexico, Nepal, the government of Burma, and parts of Latin America), the development 
of cultural understanding is appropriate, timely, and necessary for providing tailored and 
culturally appropriate risk and crisis messages. Developing cultural awareness would also 
help determine whether communication technologies of the host country allow such 
advancements like OEF and EEW. 
Further, developing cultural awareness would aid in considering ways in which the 
lay public will process probabilistic information and uncertainty. Probabilistic information 
may be better understood if presented in ways in which humans can relate such as images 
and storytelling (Slovic, 2010). However, such descriptions are subjective in nature as 
culture largely dictates the images and stories which resonate and make sense (Sellnow & 
Seeger, 2013). Consequently, understanding communication norms of foreign cultures is 
imperative to effective risk and crisis communication (Sellnow et al., 2009). Future 
researchers could pose the following research question: What are the unique cultural 
communication needs of the regions where earthquake technologies are to be 
implemented? 
Additionally, the participants of this study indicated the implications of the recent 
film, San Andreas, on lay public’s perceptions of earthquakes. While this finding was 
unexpected, it raises an important avenue for future researchers to explore: campaigns and 
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popular culture influences on risk decision-making. Researchers could conduct pre-and-
post tests on individuals exposed to a movie on earthquake risk, examining misperceptions, 
how highly the individuals rank the importance and prevalence of earthquake risk pre-and-
post-movie, and preparedness steps individuals perceive they should make. 
Conclusion 
This study helped to uncover communication challenges experienced by scientists 
and apply the information to CERC. Earthquake scientists face immense challenges as they 
attempt to communicate an uncertain event by its nature, communicate the uncertainty of 
the models used to generate their forecasts, provide accurate and understandable hazard 
messages to non-experts, navigate among different boundaries of communication, consider 
differences in risk perception, develop economic impacts of their messages, and code 
switch with non-experts. Implications of the study include having scientists redefine their 
role as communication leaders, developing healthy and resilient organizational culture, 
taking advantage of pop culture to generate attention to earthquake hazard, and 
communicating the various dimensions of uncertainty in earthquake forecasting to less 
technical audiences. Given the results of this study, several areas of future research were 
outlined such as communicating probability and maintaining credibility and the effect of 
popular culture on earthquake awareness and preparation. Such avenues ripe for 
exploration for scholars seeking to improve earthquake communication.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
A Working Model of CERC (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005) 
Stage I: Pre-crisis (Risk Messages; Warnings; Preparations) 
Communication and education campaigns targeted to both the public and the response 
community to facilitate:  
 Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks 
 General public understanding of risk  
 Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event 
 Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy) 
 Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat 
 Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups 
 Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders 
 Message development and testing for subsequent stages  
Stage II: Initial Event (Uncertainty Reduction; Self-efficacy; Reassurance) 
Rapid communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to establish:  
 Empathy, reassurance, and reduction in emotional turmoil 
 Designated crisis/agency spokespersons and formal channels and methods of 
communication  
 General and broad-based understanding of the crisis circumstances, consequences, 
and anticipated outcomes based on available information  
 Reduction of crisis related uncertainty  
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 Specific understanding of emergency management and medical community 
responses 
 Understanding of self-efficacy and personal response activities (how/where to get 
more information) 
Stage III: Maintenance (Ongoing uncertainty reduction; Self-efficacy’ reassurance)  
Communication to the general public and to affected groups seeking to facilitate: 
 More accurate public understanding of ongoing risks  
 Understanding of background factors and issues broad-based support and 
cooperation with response and recovery efforts 
 Feedback from affected publics and correction of misunderstandings/rumors 
 Ongoing explanation and reiteration of self-efficacy and personal response 
activities (how/where to get more information) begun in stage II 
 Informed decision making by the public based on understanding of risks/benefits 
Stage IV: Resolution (Updates regarding resolution; Discussions about cause and new 
risks/new understandings of risk)  
Public communication and campaigns directed toward the general public and affected 
groups seeking to:  
 Inform and persuade about ongoing clean-up, remediation, recovery, and rebuilding 
efforts 
 Facilitate broad based, honest, and open discussion and resolution of issue 
regarding cause, blame, responsibility, and adequacy of response. 
 Improve/create pubic understanding of new risks and new understandings of risk 
as well as new risk avoidance behaviors and response procedures  
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 Promote the activities and capabilities of agencies and organizations to reinforce 
positive corporate identity and image 
Stage V: Evaluation (Discussions of adequacy of response; Consensus about lessons 
and new understandings of risks) 
Communication directed toward agencies and the response community to:  
 Evaluate and assess responses, including communication effectiveness 
 Document, formalize, and communicate lessons learned 
 Determine specific actions to improve crisis communication and crisis response 
capability  
 Create linkages to pre-crisis activities (stage I). 
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Appendix B 
Interview Questions 
General Challenges during the Pre-Crisis Stage of CERC 
 Monitoring and recognition of emerging risks 
o To what extent does current technology allow for EQ forecasting? 
 General public understanding of risk 
o To what extent does the public understand the limitations of EQ 
forecasting? 
 Public preparation for the possibility of an adverse event 
o To what extent do current information campaigns such as ShakeOut 
prepare people to protect themselves when an EQ occurs? How might 
EQ early forecasting align with a program such as ShakeOut? 
 Changes in behavior to reduce the likelihood of harm (self-efficacy) 
o To what extent do you believe such advance training can instill positive 
behavioral changes for self-protection during an EQ? How might EQ 
forecasting make a positive contribution to this process? 
 Specific warning messages regarding some eminent threat, such as evacuation 
notices, take shelter warnings, product recalls, etc. 
o What is the most important information to communicate in an EQ 
forecast message? 
 Alliances and cooperation with agencies, organizations, and groups 
o In your opinion, what agencies, organizations, and groups should 
collaborate on developing an EQ forecasting plan? 
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 Development of consensual recommendations by experts and first responders 
o To what extent do you believe such collaboration could develop 
consensual recommendations—particularly between experts and first 
responders? 
 Message development and testing for subsequent stages 
o What type of message testing would be most helpful regarding EQ 
forecasting? 
Communication Challenges  
 What do you perceive are the key communication challenges about earthquake 
forecasting? 
 What implications did the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake disaster have on 
earthquake forecasting?  
 What are key takeaways for scientists from the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake 
disaster? 
 What strategies would you recommend for improving the communication of 
earthquake forecasting?  
Communicating Probability to the Public 
 How often do you have to make probabilistic statements to the public when 
earthquake forecasting? 
 What forms (i.e., storytelling, numbers, combination of storytelling and 
numbers, etc.) of communicating earthquake probability do you believe to be 
better understood by the general public than others?  
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 What advice would you give to other scientists on communicating probability 
to the general public?  
  What workshops or seminars are held to inform scientists about how to 
communicate probability to the general public? How might these be helpful to 
preventing misinterpretation of probabilistic messages by the public? 
 What challenges do you face in communicating about earthquakes to the 
general public? 
 How do you believe effectively communicating probabilistic statements to the 
public to be important or unimportant to your field? 
 What other information do you believe to be important for me to know about 
communicating about earthquakes? 
Demographic Questions  
 How many years of experience do you have in your field?  
 How much experience do you have with earthquake forecasting? 
 What is your current position?  
Other Questions 
 May I contact you for follow-up questions? 
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Appendix C 
Log of Interview Data Gathering Activities 
Date   Place Activity Explored 
    
9/12/15 Palm Springs, CA F2F Interviews Challenges 
Experienced 
9/13/15 Palm Springs, CA F2F Interviews Challenges 
Experienced 
9/14/15 Palm Springs, CA F2F Interviews Challenges 
Experienced 
9/15/15 Palm Springs, CA F2F Interviews  Challenges 
Experienced 
2/9/16 Skype F2F Interview Probing Questions 
on Communication 
2/10/16 Telephone Phone Interview Probing Questions 
on Communication 
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